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1 Executive summary 
For the last decade a major trend within tax administrations has been to shift from a 
roughly one size fits all approach—where close to all taxpayers experience a deterrence 
approach—to a more responsive and collaborative approach as in co-operative compliance 
programmes. Such programmes build on the idea that the participating corporations 
disclose relevant information including their tax risks and are transparent to the tax 
administrations and in return will tax administrations provide real-time predictability and 
clarity concerning taxation issues of relevance for the corporation. In brief, co-operative 
compliance builds on the slogan: “…certainty in exchange for transparency” (OECD 2016, 
7). Co-operative compliance has increasingly become a core concern and way of organizing 
the relation between tax authorities and large corporate tax payers when it comes to 
securing tax compliance. 
This working paper is the result of research by Work Package 6 in EU’s Horizon 2020 
funded programme FairTax that has been running for the four-year period 2015-2019. Our 
research in Work Package 6 addresses how proactive engagements with large corporate 
taxpayers have affected regulation of tax collection and administrative processes, changed 
relationships between stakeholders and tax administrations, and influenced tax 
compliance in the Nordic countries. The aim of this working paper is to provide a 
comparison of the experiences in four of the Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden and to propose recommendations. 
The Nordic countries are considered similar and so were the co-operative compliance 
programmes that were implemented in each country, yet the outcomes were very different. 
We thus dealt with various case characteristics (Flyvbjerg 2006) where the outcomes 
hinged on a complexity of elements. We argue that the Swedish case is an extreme case due 
to its turbulent life and concomitantly with only a handful of participants that have very 
little activity. The Norwegian case, in contrast, is an example of a maximum variation case 
because of the much longer history of collaborative relationships and the outcome of the 
work with tax risk. The combination of a collaborative way of working and systematic risk 
management and monitoring may either reflect a most likely scenario of future tax 
administration—or perhaps the least likely. Lastly, we argue that the Danish and Finnish 
cases represent paradigmatic cases because both of these align largely with the standards 
set by the OECD and because they therefore present more ordinary or regular ways of 
working with co-operative compliance. Analyzing a wide variety of case characteristics 
means that our findings can be of general interest, beyond the Nordic countries. 
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1.1 Challenges 
In our research we are interested in experiences and practices of co-operative compliance 
projects. Our comparison aims to go beyond differences in jurisdictions and 
organizations—we compare how co-operative compliance has been practiced in the specific 
everyday interactions of the actors involved in each of the Nordic cases. Our ambition with 
comparing four Nordic cases is to transcend or—at least—to add another perspective on the 
ways that co-operative compliance cases have so far been compared. What we aim to do is 
not only to describe various national interpretations of “co-operative compliance” (which 
we did in our national reports: Boll and Brehm Johansen 2018; Brøgger and Aziz 2018; 
Kettunen et al. 2018), but to propose some theoretical understanding of societal responses 
to these programmes. Our aim is thus to conceptualize which dimensions of co-operative 
compliance work on a societal level and which do not. Simultaneously we retain an 
awareness of existing relations between actors in the tax arena. Relations are built over 
time and relations develop. We have to understand relations especially between large 
corporate taxpayers and tax administrations, but also to take into account the roles tax 
advisors and other stakeholders on the tax arena have played—and are playing. 
A comparison on experiences with co-operative compliance programmes has a number of 
implications. First, we take into consideration a broad range of actors involved in co-
operative compliance programmes; actors that have had an impact on how the 
programmes played out. Second, we are interested in how these programmes played out in 
practice. We do not compare how co-operative compliance ought to be according to 
models or guidelines, but instead focus on what have become of the model and its 
variations when implemented and worked with in practice by the different tax 
administrations. Third, our data material is mainly based on in-depth qualitative 
interviews with involved actors and supplemented with other material actors use while 
working with co-operative compliance.  
 
1.2 Findings: Comparison across cases on seven dimensions 
The core element of this working paper is the comparison between the experiences with co-
operative compliance in the Nordic countries. The comparisons are made on seven 
dimensions developed in an inductive manner from the empirical material. Our approach 
to comparison is inspired by anthropology (Schnegg 2014, van der Veer 2016) and our 
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main focus in the comparisons is more broadly how the compliance programmes were 
applied in practice and how they have an impact on existing relations between actors in the 
national tax arenas. The findings of each of the dimensions will be given in brief in the 
following.  
 
1.2.1 Dimension I — Cultural orientation  
The comparison shows that the co-operative compliance programmes have resulted in 
cultural reorientations in all the Nordic countries. Discussing the cultural reorientations 
we draw on the notions of time, space and organization of relations. In case of Denmark 
and Finland, time, space and the organization of relations are weighty elements of the 
cultural change that can be argued to happen through the reoriented interactions between 
the tax administrations and large corporate tax payers with the introduction of new 
principles and routines of working. In Norway, the main concern was with the temporal 
reorientation. Each tax payer had to work out the meaning of a number of changes 
individually. However, the changes were contained by a long collaborative tradition. In 
Sweden, the spatial reorientation evoked strong reactions, and as there was neither any 
new organizational programme, nor a strong collaborative tradition to contain the changes 
and the plans for co-operative compliance programme were not realized, they were instead 
considerably downsized. 
 
1.2.2 Dimension II — Efficiency evaluations  
The comparison of the Nordic cases also points to that the evaluation of co-operative 
compliance programs against the criteria of effectiveness and efficiency is very difficult. It 
is not unproblematic to try to find a point of comparison in order to determine what the 
outcomes would have been without co-operative compliance. Therefore, it is difficult to 
infer which outcomes are attributable to the co-operative compliance, or overall 
attributable to the tax administration’s actions. Based on the data collected for the present 
research, it cannot be determined whether the use of tax administration’s resources is 
more efficient than before or to say that co-operative compliance would have materialized 
direct cost savings. 
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1.2.3 Dimension III — Competences in tax administrations  
In this dimension the question of competences required by tax officials when working with 
co-operative compliance programmes is dealt with. The comparison shows that how the 
requirement for changed competences was articulated differed both between countries and 
between stakeholders e.g. between corporations and the tax administrations. The 
participating corporations and the tax administrations do not look for the same criteria 
assessing competences. First, that tax officials lack knowledge about business reality was a 
view expressed by corporations in all four countries. Secondly, the additional, ‘new’ 
knowledge required from a tax official was in Denmark expressed as a skill to resolve 
conflicts, in Finland as providing good customer service and good answers to help getting 
the clients to disclose relevant issues, and in Sweden it was articulated that the contact 
persons should be a ‘people person’.  
 
1.2.4 Dimension IV — Structural and organisational hindrances  
We find similar kinds of hindrances across the cases, some of which are external structural 
hindrances and some of which are internal organisational hindrances. External structural 
hindrances are matters connected to legal issues—such as public access to documents, 
equality and possibilities of attaining binding responses from the tax administration. The 
internal organisational elements comprise organizing principles (in both the tax 
administration and the corporations) challenging the work with the co-operative 
compliance programme; different but co-existing ‘schools of thought’ in the tax 
administration and internal discussions in the tax administration on impartiality. Overall, 
regarding the external structural hindrances the comparison shows that legal matters can 
come to impede a programme while the internal organisational hindrances are more subtly 
shaping the way the programmes unfold. If the external structural hindrances become too 
large to overcome, the co-operative compliance programmes might not get as far as to be 
faced with internal organizational hindrances – as in the Swedish case. 
 
1.2.5 Dimension V — Resistance  
The comparison shows that outspoken resistance has played a minor role in the 
implementation of co-operative compliance measures in the Nordic countries, with the 
exception of Sweden. In case of Denmark, Finland and Norway the most apt description of 
the stance of the corporations is “Voice” and “Loyalty”. It can be described as characterized 
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by the co-existence of silent resistance—declining the invitation to participate or 
postponing letters and meetings—and loyalty—stay in place and cope in either a proactive 
way or through a more passive stance of accepting the premises, but not taking the lead in 
the collaboration. In Sweden the stance was “Voice” and “Exit”, which stalled the 
implementation of the co-operative compliance programme.  
 
1.2.6 Dimension VI — Trust 
Trust is essential in building enduring co-operative compliance programmes and 
relationships between tax administrations and corporations. In all four countries, the 
dominant form of trust involved appeared to be the inter-organisational trust. Along the 
interaction between tax administration and corporations, trust seems to persist even if the 
individuals change. There were also differences between the countries as to the types of trust, 
however. The interpersonal trust between the tax officials and tax directors in the 
corporations played a significant role, especially in the Danish and Finnish cases. However, 
as the case of Sweden shows, a generally high level of measured trust towards tax 
administrations is not a guarantee for a success of the co-operative compliance approach. 
 
1.2.7 Dimension VII —Fair competition and equitability  
The last dimension, shows that with regards to fair competition and equitability there was 
a substantial variation between the countries. In Norway it was not an issue at all. Here the 
tax law is structured according to industrial sectors which means that corporations as an 
outset are used to that different industries might be subject to different treatment. In 
Denmark was the issue up for discussion as potential favorable treatment. The discussion 
was pronounced in terms of consultancy vs. guidance. The first type of activity in not 
allowed for Skat’s tax officials, whereas the latter is. In the context of the Finnish 
Syvennetty has discussion about unequable treatment been scarce. In Sweden, the 
discussion of unequitable treatment was one of  the major obstacles to Fördjupad 
dialog/Fördjupad samverkan. The very idea of a VIP lane for certain ‘customers’ at a 
public bureaucracy did not go down well in Swedish society. Overall, equitable treatment of 
taxpayers according to the law and to societal values is a fundamental issue in 
constitutional jurisdictions like the Nordic countries. The dimension of equal treatment is 
one where the diversity of our Nordic cases is most distinctly pronounced. 
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1.3 Conclusion 
In this working paper, the comparison between actual co-operative compliance practices in 
four Nordic countries provides evidence that a number of cultural, institutional and 
societal factors also influence compliance practices. First, tax compliance does not only 
depend on the will of the taxpayers but is as much shaped in the course of the actual 
interaction between the taxpayer and the tax administration as well as by contextual 
factors. Second, key principles of the OECD guidelines, namely voluntary disclosure and 
real-time responses are too narrow, and perhaps too idealistic, to be feasible guidelines for 
all circumstances when compliance is mitigated. In this working paper, we show that real-
time responses are generally highly valued but are neither welcome nor possible under all 
circumstances. It is actually more crucial to be explicit about a change in time frame, than 
to have all interaction real-time. Third, the possibility to get reliable measurement and 
evaluations of effects when it comes to co-operative compliance is highly sought after. A 
key ambition for the co-operative compliance measures has been to increase efficiency and 
effective use of resources for tax administration and many are the stakeholders that 
demand ‘proof’ for efficient usage of resources, not least the taxpayers themselves. A 
conclusion from our project confirms findings from an earlier OECD study that there is so 
far not identified one single objective method for assessing effectiveness and efficiency 
(OECD 2001). In actual practice, such evaluations of costs and effects need to combine 
subjective and objective criteria, statistical analysis, logical argument, common sense, 
human skills and judgement. 
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2 Introduction  
For the last decade a major trend within tax administration has been to shift from a 
roughly one size fits all approach—where close to all taxpayers experienced a deterrence 
approach—to a more responsive and collaborative approach. Large multinational 
corporate taxpayers were at the centre of attention for these changed ways of working. On 
the one hand there were initiatives to identify various segments of taxpayers to receive 
treatment according to their motivational positions on compliance (Braithwaite 2003). On 
the other hand, there was a move to increase taxpayer services in the name of efficiency 
and thus reduce the costs of compliance. 
The Forum on Tax Administration (FTA) at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) was one of the main proponents for these new ideas. The FTA is 
made up of representatives from member states tax administration. In a collaborative 
effort they have developed a framework for these new ways of working. OECD, through the 
work of FTA, thus recommends that the corporations that have an effective internal tax 
control framework and are willing to disclose their uncertain tax positions and other 
relevant information to the tax administration can be enrolled into what are called “co-
operative compliance programmes” (OECD 2013, 2016).  
 
2.1 Co-operative compliance  
The main idea of co-operative compliance in the OECD framework is for tax 
administrations to work proactively with corporations in order for them to report due 
information and pay the right tax at the right time. This proactive approach aims to 
enhance tax compliance before tax statements are delivered and legal control systems take 
over. This is a change from the traditional obligation-based relation and has various 
implications for ways of working—both for the tax administrations and for the large 
corporate taxpayers that participate. Co-operative compliance programmes are intended to 
make the taxation process more efficient and beneficial for both parties.  
The OECD defines co-operative compliance as a regulatory framework building on the idea 
that—on the one side—the participating corporations disclose relevant information 
including their tax risks and are transparent to the tax administrations. And—on the 
other—the tax administrations will in return provide real-time predictability and clarity 
concerning taxation issues of relevance for the corporation. In brief, co-operative 
compliance builds on the slogan: “…certainty in exchange for transparency” (OECD 2016, 
FairTax WP-Series No.20 
Nordic experiences of co-operative compliance programmes: Comparisons and Recommendations 
 
12 
7). One proposed advantage of this approach is that the extent of backward looking reviews 
and audits of returns submitted to the tax administrations are significantly reduced. This is 
an advantage for both the large corporate taxpayers and the tax administrations, as 
engaging in this work requires many resources.  
While the OECD framework (2008, 2013, 2016) is relatively stable and consistent in its 
definition of what co-operative compliance is and which elements ought to be included in 
co-operative compliance programmes, the implementation and adaptation of the OECD 
framework within the various national tax administrations comes in many forms (see also 
OECD 2017, 147–153). As is noted: “National revenue bodies face a varied environment 
within which to administer their taxation system. Jurisdictions differ in respect of their 
policy and legislative environment and their administrative practices and culture. As such, 
a standard approach to tax administration may be neither practical nor desirable in a 
particular instance” (OECD 2013, 3). In this report, we focus on the adaptation and 
implementation of ideas from the co-operative compliance framework in four Nordic 
countries.1  
 
2.2 Aim and background of working paper 
The aim with this working paper is to provide a comparison of the experiences of Nordic 
countries of programmes inspired by the OECD proposed co-operative compliance 
framework. Our qualitative research approach makes possible a comparison beyond legal 
perspectives and economic outcomes. Based on our comparison we suggest a number of 
recommendations concerning the adaptation and implementation of these new regulatory 
approaches. This working paper builds on previously published results from each country 
(Björklund Larsen 2016; Boll 2018; Boll and Brehm Johansen 2018; Brøgger and Aziz 
2018; Kettunen et al. 2018). Here we draw together our national cases of four Nordic 
countries in a comparison and provide recommendations concerning these programmes. 
In our research we have addressed how proactive engagements with large corporate 
taxpayers have affected the regulation of tax collection and administrative processes, 
changed relationships between stakeholders and tax administrations, and influenced tax 
compliance in Sweden, Norway and Denmark. These proactive engagements all aim to 
increase tax compliance. We are grateful for the opportunity to include Finland in our 
research group, thus expanding the research focus to four Nordic countries. The start of 
                                                        
1 In what follows, for the sake of readability we use the term “Nordic countries” despite our 
awareness of the fact that only four of the Nordic countries are represented in this study. 
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this part of FairTax was an invitation by the Nordic Agenda, a collaboration between 
Nordic tax administrations, to study co-operative compliance programmes. We were thus 
generously given access by the tax administrations. Yet, it is essential to underline that this 
project has been carried out as independent research funded by the Horizon 2020 
programme. 
Our research approach is qualitative and more specifically inspired by ethnographic 
methods. From the outset it is important to take a holistic approach to co-operative 
compliance programmes, engaging with all stakeholders within such programmes. We 
have thus focused not only on tax administrations but equally on large corporate taxpayers, 
third parties (e.g. tax advisors) and other stakeholders having an interest in the taxation of 
large corporations. We are most grateful to all participants who have generously given us 
time and information about their participation in the national co-operative compliance 
programmes. Thank you. 
This report builds on insights from the national reports: Sweden (Björklund Larsen 2016); 
Denmark (Boll 2018; Boll and Brehm Johansen 2018); Norway (Brøgger and Aziz 2018); 
and Finland (Kettunen, Pellinen and Potka-Soininen 2018), each detailing how elements of 
co-production and co-operative compliance come into play when large corporate taxpayers 
are being regulated in this specific way.  
Further information about our research on co-operative compliance in the realm of 
FairTax in four Nordic countries can be obtained at FairTax Website. 
 
2.3 Structure of paper 
This working paper is structured as follows. In Section 3, we start by introducing our 
methodology. This not only presents methods used but also our approach to this research. 
In Section 4, we proceed to briefly presenting the co-operative compliance programmes in 
each of the four Nordic countries. We also make an overall categorization of our national 
cases arguing that general insights can also be had from a relatively small number of cases. 
Hereafter—in Section 5—we discuss comparisons of co-operative compliance programmes. 
We start with a review of existing comparisons, from an academic perspective and from a 
policy-oriented perspective. This is followed by a presentation of the comparative approach 
we have applied in our research. In Section 7, we define our comparative concepts which 
we call dimensions. We explain how we arrived at this concept and tease out the various 
dimensions through which we compare our cases. The dimensions we propose are: cultural 
orientations; efficiency evaluation; competences in tax administrations; structural and 
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organizational hindrances; resistance; trust; and equitability and fair competition. Each of 
our proposed dimensions ends with a set of recommendations made on the basis of the 
comparison. Finally, in Section 8 we conclude our findings. 
There are three appendices to help the reader. Appendix 1 contains a list of abbreviations 
and national concepts. Appendix 2 outlines a basic comparison of the programmes. 
Appendix 3 contains a table of key differences and similarities summarizing our findings. 
This is a collaborative effort by eight researchers from four different countries. We have 
collaborated throughout the project, conducted our national research in very similar ways 
and have had extensive discussions, arriving at results. Yet, our style of writing differs and 
we have decided to keep it as such with the ambition of making the text more authentic.  
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3 Methodology 
What is unique about the research conducted in relation to Work Package 6 in the FairTax 
research project is that all four country studies draw on qualitative research approaches 
inspired by ethnography. A similar study on co-operative compliance but with more focus 
on the role of tax advisors has been done in FairTax Work Package 7 where the countries 
studied are United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, the Netherlands and Germany.2 
While taxation has most often been researched by means of legal or quantitative 
approaches (Lamb et al. 2005), qualitative and ethnographically inspired studies of tax 
administration and taxation are increasingly in demand (Alm 2012; Oats 2012; Peters 
2014; Ring 2010). Taxation is a complicated issue and we need knowledge on how policies 
are adapted in practice and how taxpayers respond to them (Steinmo 2018). Notably this 
has been promoted by some of the authors behind this working paper (Björklund Larsen 
2017a, 2017b, 2018; Boll 2011, 2014, 2015), but also by others interested in promoting 
interdisciplinarity within the research field of taxation (Currie et al. 2015; Gracia and Oats 
2012; Morrell and Tuck 2014; Oats 2012; Radcliffe et al. 2018).  
All four cases presented in this working paper build on extensive qualitative studies 
inspired by ethnography, where especially in-depth qualitative interviews form the basis of 
the methodology. Moreover, in each of the four cases, a compilation of documents 
reflecting the research topic has been collected. When we say that the studies are inspired 
by ethnography, we do not claim that they draw on the core ethnographic elements such as 
extensive fieldwork or participant observation. Access to meetings where in essence 
corporate secrets are discussed or tax administrative strategies revealing tax avoidance is 
to say the least difficult. Instead we rely on in-depth qualitative interviews and document 
studies. Our focus is on the specific doings of co-operative compliance. Our consequent 
data analyses have aimed to investigate how co-operative compliance has been practised in 
the specific everyday interactions of the actors involved. Furthermore, we have presented 
our findings, insights and knowledge of what works or not in co-operative compliance ways 
of working in numerous meetings, workshops and conferences with the various 
stakeholders we have interviewed. This is an essential outset for all four national projects 
on which this working paper is based. 
We have thus worked inductively teasing out our insights. We have analysed our material 
on our own, in FairTax workshops and presented our insights and results for our 
                                                        
2 http://www.org.umu.se/fairtax/english/research-groups/wp7/tax-advisers-and-large-business-
tax-compliance/ 
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informants qua stakeholders in seminars. Our project is a true collaboration; between us 
researchers as well as including our informants—those we study. For further information 
about the specific methods used in each country study, please consult the respective 
national reports. For the purpose of this report suffice it to say that it aims to compare 
cases studied qualitatively. This poses both some challenges and opportunities which we 
address in more detail in Section 6. 
We need to include a methodological caveat relating to time. The FairTax research project 
has been running since 2015. While it is a privilege to have four years to conduct one’s 
research, it is also an impediment. The challenge in this time frame is that data collected at 
the beginning of the research period may be outdated by the end of the research period. 
What we mean by outdated is that the practices that we have studied may have changed or 
been overtaken by other practices during this period. New practices are constantly being 
implemented in the tax administrations that we have been studying. We acknowledge that 
this means that our data in some cases may reflect previous practices and interpretations 
already succeeded by new practices and interpretations. On the other hand, the 
participants’ reflections on the changes have been a rich and valuable source of data. There 
have been changes in organization structures, which influence everyday work routines. In 
preparation for and evaluation of such structural changes, co-operative compliance has 
been considered as one element among others. Also, changes and amendments to the law 
and regulations governing these particular ways of working have taken place. 
Simultaneously technological advancement during this period has been disruptive which 
makes for changed practices in both tax administrations and corporations. 
Yet, at the same time we see that there is stability when it comes to the larger picture of 
running a tax administration and also inertia when it comes to radically shifting working 
practices. None of what we have seen implemented in the Nordic tax administrations 
studied during this research project has been done overnight. Where there have been 
questions regarding these programmes and new ways of working they have always been 
posed in relation to previous experiences. For some countries co-operative compliance was 
a radical change, for others a slight variety of ways of working already implemented. The 
point is that the programmes we have studied are part of a larger movement that goes 
under a variety of names. The co-operative compliance experiences are examples of the 
emerging new trend of “co-producing” (Mindlab 2013), “nudging” (Thaler and Sunstein 
2008), “distributing” (Grabosky 1995) and proactively “engaging and involving 
stakeholders” (OECD 2013). In these processes, public administrations engage 
stakeholders outside their own organizational boundaries to further their institutional 
interests, and thereby “distribute” their powers of enforcement. Co-operative compliance 
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programmes are just one variety that tax administrations have introduced; there are many 
other examples of tax administration-initiated collaborations with accountants, lawyers, 
unions, employer associations, the media, politicians, and the general public. These 
programmes are of particular interest as they engage large corporations as precursors; the 
idea is that if they are seen to comply, other corporations will follow (Björklund Larsen 
2016, 15). 
Hence, we are aware that new programmes have been started and we acknowledge that 
modified programmes have been introduced, yet we hope to convey the message that this is 
not as such a problem. It is a sign of how tax administrations are continually developing 
their ways of working. Our aim is to provide a glimpse into such developments and propose 
a more encompassing way of discussing these changes on a societal level. With this project 
we aim to understand the larger picture of how the four Nordic tax administrations have 
started to work in new collaborative ways with large corporate taxpayers and how these 
collaborations work out in practice. Based on our cases we also propose some general 
recommendations when working with co-operative compliance, recommendations that 
might also be of interest beyond the Nordic countries. More than 20 OECD member 
countries are committed on a broad level to implementing these frameworks (OECD 
2017).3 Discussions are held to implement these measures in even more countries, e.g. in 
Africa.4 Insights from the comparisons and recommendations in this working paper may be 
used to inform the planning and development of new—or the revision of existing—co-
operative compliance programmes. Needless to say, much further research is needed, 
drawing on other countries, other experiences. 
 
  
                                                        
3 https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/tax-administration-2017/table-a-143-cooperative-
compliance-requirements-for-participation_tax_admin-2017-table201-en#page1. 
4 A cooperation between the WU Global Tax Policy Center in Vienna, the African Tax 
Institute (ATI) at the University of Pretoria’s Faculty of Economic and Management 
Sciences and the Commonwealth Association of Tax Administrators (CATA) work with the 
implementation of these ideas in a few select African countries. 
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4 Experiences from four Nordic countries and 
classification of cases 
This section introduces the co-operative compliance cases of the four participating 
countries. This will be done briefly as the respective national reports can be consulted for 
further information and detail.5 The section focuses on the question of what characterizes 
the cooperative and collaborative compliance programmes in the respective countries—
programmes that shape in new ways relationships and interactions between tax 
administrations and the large corporate taxpayers. 
Our comparative analysis of these four cases is inspired by Bent Flyvbjerg and his research 
on case-study research (Flyvbjerg 2006). Two of his points are emphasized. First, inspired 
by philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein—who argues that the meaning of a word is given by its 
use—Flyvbjerg proposes how best to understand an issue is by studying how it is practised. 
In detail Wittgenstein illustrated this with getting to know a city. We should not just follow 
a map and explore the most important streets and sites; it is just as important to wander 
through the backstreets and alleys which also make up the city. The point is that we ought 
to understand all the city’s different parts in order to get to know the city. Relating this to 
how we can “get to know” co-operative compliance means that we need grounded, detailed 
and in-depth knowledge on how co-operative compliance is done in practice. This includes 
knowing when such programmes do not work out as intended. 
Second, Flyvbjerg argues that the generalizability of case studies can be increased through 
a strategic selection of cases and that in order to achieve the greatest possible amount of 
information on a given problem—in this case the adoption of co-operative compliance 
ideas—a variety of cases is suitable (ibid., 229). Our cases are thus information oriented 
cases; we base our research on national cases yet aim for a comparison between them. It is 
crucial to underscore that our comparison goes beyond legal specificities or programmatic 
descriptions of co-operative compliance; we focus instead on the practices, relations and 
practical outcomes of co-operative compliance in the Nordic countries. Inspired by 
Flyvbjerg and his typology for classifying cases, we argue that our material consists of an 
extreme, a maximum variation and two paradigmatic cases. This classification was not a 
hypothesis going into our research, since our qualitative ethnographically inspired 
approach does not build on hypothesis testing as a core methodological principle. That we 
in fact had such a selection of cases, we must admit we did not know at the outset of the 
                                                        
5 Denmark (Boll and Brehm Johansen 2018); Finland (Kettunen, Pellinen and Potka-Soininen 
2018); Norway (Brögger and Aziz 2018); Sweden (Björklund Larsen 2016). 
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research. The cases we studied were ongoing co-operative compliance programmes that 
took place during our research.6 Yet, we believe that the diversity of the cases, and 
especially how they played out in practice, provides a solid background for generating rich 
knowledge and information about the various experiences of co-operative compliance in 
the Nordic countries. There are thus lessons to be learnt beyond the Nordic context. 
Although the Nordic countries are considered similar, as were the co-operative compliance 
programmes that took place in each country, the outcomes hinged on a complexity of 
elements. Our findings are thus of general interest.  
 
4.1 Sweden—the extreme case 
The case from Sweden (Björklund Larsen 2016) outlines a co-operative compliance 
programme called Fördjupad samverkan (enhanced collaboration) introduced in SKV in 
2011 and relaunched in a modified version as Fördjupad dialog (enhanced dialogue) in 
2014. This case shows that SKV proposed an initiative—co-operative compliance—which 
carried international success stories from similar programmes. Yet, in the concrete 
Swedish version and context it was met with strong resistance from various stakeholders. 
The strong resistance that the programme met in Sweden was primarily based on the 
programme’s conflicts with existing laws regarding tax confidentiality, principles of legality 
governing administrative law and equal treatment before the law (cf. Hambre 2018). Yet, 
there was also an underlying scepticism from many large corporate taxpayers and their 
advisors towards SKV rooted in their previous initiatives (Björklund Larsen 2016). 
Accordingly, Fördjupad dialog lives a quiet existence with only five participants (October 
2018). Yet, there are discussions with a few additional corporations that have shown 
interest in participating; there is a dormant discussion about making changes in the law, 
and SKV continues to follow the international development. 
Based on Flyvbjerg (2006) we categorize the Swedish case an extreme case. Flyvbjerg 
argues that an extreme case can be used to obtain knowledge through an unusual and 
problematic case (2006, 230). Also, extreme cases often activate more (and perhaps other) 
actors than “normal” cases, and thus, the extreme case provides insights into more 
mechanisms in the situation studied. Last, extreme cases are well-suited to get points 
across in an especially dramatic way (ibid., 229). Following this, we understand the 
                                                        
6 The simultaneous unfolding of these projects also underscores the point that there is an 
international if not pressure so at least a nudge brought on by collaborative organizations such as 
OECD to perform such programmes. They are in fashion (cf. Björklund Larsen 2016, 13). 
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Swedish case is an extreme case precisely because it is unusual—we have no knowledge of 
any other co-operative compliance programme that has been as much debated in the public 
as is the Swedish case. Also, it is a problematic case because it caused so much fuss that the 
programme was almost brought to a stop. What the Swedish case also does—compared to 
the rest of our cases—is that it shows that more or at least different mechanisms are at play 
because the public scrutiny of this programme was so intense. In the case, we hear about 
judges, public opinion makers and interest organizations that are all eager to express their 
views on the programme. Last, the case is simply dramatic, as the proposal for the co-
operative compliance programme triggered a number of mechanisms that no one in SKV 
foresaw and which basically surprised them.  
 
4.2 Norway—the maximum variation case 
The case from Norway (Brøgger and Aziz 2018) identifies—as in the other country cases—
how the OECD framework on co-operative compliance has been adapted to this specific 
national context. Since 1992, collaboration has been part of the permanent way of 
operating in the Central Tax Office for Large Enterprises (LTO). It was a way of operating 
internally, with the large enterprises and with the headquarters, SKD (Skattedirektoratet) 
in the Norwegian Tax administration (Tax Norway). The Norwegian case shows that the 
OECD inspired ideas of co-operative compliance came into the LTO in two main ways. One 
was by means of an enhanced relationship pilot programme running from 2011–2013, 
called “Reinforced Dialogue”. The other was through refined tools for risk analysis 
developed for the whole of Tax Norway. The pilot programme on co-operative compliance 
ended in 2013, yet this did not mean that the ideas behind co-operative compliance were 
abandoned. Quite the contrary; several of the collaborative ideas within co-operative 
compliance had already been implemented in the normal working ways of the LTO since its 
establishment in 1992. This had come to be known as “the LTO way” of working. It is based 
on multidisciplinarity, risk analysis, one point of contact and dialogue. The pilot 
programme documented the internal tax control systems and processes in the 
corporations. 
The participants have a common interest in ensuring high quality in work with tax risk. 
Reasons for refinement of the risk assessment tools in SKD were to monitor tax risks 
professionally to protect the legitimacy of the tax system, guard against loss of tax revenue, 
and ensure correct national accounts. Corporations conceptualize their analyses of tax risk 
as strategic and responsible management of corporation resources. The case shows how the 
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institutional infrastructure for this collaboration on corporate tax compliance was 
perceived and experienced by different key stakeholders.  
We describe the Norwegian case as a maximum variation case. Referring to Flyvbjerg 
(2006), a maximum variation case is characterized by being very different in one aspect—
in comparison to the “normal” case (ibid., 230). Moreover, the maximum variation case 
may be used to test a verification; is this case showing what is least or most likely to 
happen? (ibid., 231). Compared to the rest of the four Nordic cases, we see that the 
Norwegian case is different in relation to one central aspect, namely as to how the ideas of 
collaboration were stretched out to cover all of the work with tax risk monitoring in the 
LTO ever since it was established in 1992.  
The Norwegian case is also an expression of a maximum variation case as it is relevant to 
pose the question as to whether what we see happening in this case is what is least or most 
likely to happen. Is it the most possible scenario that tax risk monitoring actually gets 
implemented in “whole” departments as part of the collaboration, reflecting the normal 
ways of working; or is this the least possible scenario—as such a radical change from the 
normal ways of working is difficult to accomplish? In brief, the Norwegian case shows a 
maximum variation of how co-operative compliance becomes a means to strengthen the 
routine of ongoing clarification in the tax administration and systematic internal tax 
auditing in corporations, with implications for mutual trust and taxpayer empowerment.  
 
4.3 Denmark—the paradigmatic case I 
The Danish tax administrations have been working with a co-operative compliance 
programme in relation to regulating a segment of their large corporate taxpayers since 
2008 (Boll 2018; Boll and Brehm Johansen 2018). The aim with the programme has been 
(and still is) to cultivate extended collaboration with selected large corporate taxpayers in 
Denmark to pre-emptively secure their tax compliance. In Denmark, more than 50 
corporations were invited to participate in the programme and in 2017 as many as 30 
corporations were participating in Tax Governance (from 2017). Moreover, since the 
programme has been running for approximately ten years much experience has been built 
up over the years. In this brief introduction it suffices to say, first, that the Danish 
programme in many regards mirrors how the OECD defines co-operative compliance in 
general (Boll 2018). Second, that the Danish programme reflects a movement—also found 
in the OECD—where more rigour and systematism have become part of co-operative 
compliance programmes (Boll and Brehm Johansen 2018). In the Danish case, this 
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especially applies to how the tax administration demands that participating corporate 
taxpayers perform tax risk assessments and document their internal controls, and how 
these are then to be assessed and monitored by the tax administration.  
We see the Danish case as a paradigmatic case. Flyvbjerg (2006) defines a paradigmatic 
case as one that sets the standard (ibid., 232). It has the potential to establish a school for 
the domain/theme that it concerns (ibid., 230). Finally, citing Dreyfus, Flyvbjerg writes 
that one may recognize a paradigm case because it “shines” (ibid., 232). We find that the 
Danish case is paradigmatic because it provides a clear example of how the core elements 
of co-operative compliance may be implemented and worked with in a tax administration. 
It closely mirrors—so to speak—OECD standards on co-operative compliance. Saying that 
the Danish case “shines” may provide the wrong connotation as indeed not everything in 
this case shines and works. The report on experiences in Denmark shows several 
challenges in the programme. Yet, it does “shine” in the sense that it provides something 
close to an exemplary implementation and execution of co-operative compliance with the 
possibilities and challenges this inevitably implies.  
 
4.4 Finland—the paradigmatic case II 
In Finland, the ideas on co-operative compliance were introduced at the beginning of 2013 
through a co-operative compliance programme called Enhanced Customer Cooperation–
ECC, Syvennetty asiakasyhteistyö. It ran as a pilot programme from 2013 to 2015 with five 
participating companies. Since the beginning of 2016, Syvennetty has become a part of the 
permanent ways of operating in the Large Taxpayers’ Unit (Konserniverokeskus, KOVE) in 
the Finnish tax administration (Verohallinto, VERO).  
The goals for introducing co-operative compliance in Finland were to take steps towards 
working in real time, to improve the predictability and legal certainty in taxation and to 
establish a dialogic relationship with the tax administration. According to interviews 
conducted for the present study, the Finnish tax administration also hoped for a general 
improvement in relationships between the tax administration and large corporate 
taxpayers.  
Participation in Syvennetty was on a voluntary basis. In order to participate, however, 
companies were required to be known as a “good corporate citizens”. The tax 
administration aims to successfully invite approximately ten new corporations into co-
operative compliance each year. 
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The Finnish co-operative compliance programme links relatively closely to the OECD 
definition. Especially as co-operative compliance involves documenting internal tax 
processes and controls in corporations, a more proactive and dialogical relationship 
between the tax administration and large corporate taxpayers, and, it is hoped, a win–win 
situation for these parties. The case of Finland shows that the introduction of co-operative 
compliance in tax administration has brought about a cultural change where a “culture of 
discussion” is more prominent than earlier. The changes in the culture of discussion seem 
to have taken place, however, between the tax administration and the corporation. Apart 
from a couple of corporations disclosing their participation in Syvennetty, the programme 
has not gained publicity in the sense that this regulatory approach would have been 
discussed in the media, which makes the case of Finland very different from that of 
Sweden. 
In line with the Danish case, we call the Finnish case a paradigmatic case. The reason is 
that this case also has the signature of being like the co-operative compliance programme 
as defined in the OECD reports and it is also a case that sets a standard for how a “normal” 
co-operative compliance programme may be implemented and executed by a tax 
administration. In scale, the programme is smaller than the Danish on, yet there are no 
major differences. The themes where these two cases differed were in the efficiency 
evaluation, the structural hindrances and resistance to the programme.  
As we see it, the Finnish case adds to the notion that there is a more or less standard or 
paradigmatic way of developing co-operative compliance programmes. The Finnish and 
Swedish legal systems and societal structures are considered to be similar, and it is not rare 
that Sweden is used as a point of comparison when legislation is being prepared or 
interpreted in Finland,7 or administrative changes or reforms are planned. The fact that 
introduction of co-operative compliance programmes resulted in opposite outcomes in 
these two countries, where legal systems and societies are rather similar, underscores the 
importance of conducting qualitative analysis that allow for capturing the significant 
nuances that contributed to the opposing outcomes despite similarities at the outset.  
 
                                                        
7 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/SV/tietoaeduskunnasta/kirjasto/aineistot/ulkomainen_oikeus/Sidor/R
uotsi.aspx 
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4.5 Sub-conclusion: Our selection of cases 
The above brief introductions to the cases show some of the core elements of how co-
operative compliance has been implemented and adopted differently in four of the Nordic 
countries, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland. With this we want to convey the 
message that there is a huge element of local adaptation when it comes to understanding 
how co-operative compliance—and co-production of tax compliance more broadly—
actually comes to play out in practice.  
We have used Flyvbjerg’s proposal for various case characteristics to convey the message 
that we—in fact—deal with quite distinct cases. On the one hand the cases are comparable 
as they all thematize co-operative compliance and attempts to establish new collaborative 
relationships between tax administration and large corporate taxpayers based on a 
standard proposed by the OECD and on the perceived successes of OECD members’ tax 
administrations. In the guidelines they were intended to work in similar ways. Albeit they 
are implemented in four different countries, these countries are similar culturally, socially, 
and in regard to their tax systems. On the other hand—and this is where Flyvbjerg comes 
in—the cases have different characteristics. We argue that the Swedish case is an extreme 
case due to its turbulent life and with concomitantly only a handful of participants that 
have very little activity. The Norwegian case, in contrast, is an example of a maximum 
variation case because of the much longer history of collaborative relationships and the 
outcome of work with tax risk. The combination of a collaborative way of working and 
systematic risk management and monitoring may either reflect a most likely scenario of 
future tax administration—or perhaps the least likely. Last, we argue that the Danish and 
Finnish cases represent paradigmatic cases because both of these align largely with the 
standards set by OECD and because therefore they present more ordinary or regular ways 
of working with co-operative compliance.  
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5 Approaches to comparing co-operative compliance  
A considerable number of analyses exist which—implicitly or explicitly—compare co-
operative compliance programmes. This section reviews a selection of these comparisons. 
These studies build on different approaches to doing comparison, both explicit and implicit 
approaches. Although there are many insights to be gained from them, they also provide us 
with a stepping stone for how our own approach to comparison adds knowledge to this 
existing body of research about co-operative compliance.  
 
5.1 Review of existing co-operative compliance comparisons  
This section presents literature on experiences of co-operative compliance with a focus on 
selecting work that implicitly or explicitly compares experiences. The first part describes 
analyses of co-operative compliance made in academia. The second part focusses on two 
policy-oriented analyses provided by the OECD and a national tax administration 
respectively.  
 
5.1.1 Academic analyses 
In this subsection first, two academic studies on co-operative compliance with an explicit 
comparative approach and subsequently two studies with a more implicit comparative 
approach are presented. 
A recent publication analysing co-operative compliance is Katarzyna Bronzewska’s PhD 
dissertation which has been published as a book in the IBFD8 Doctoral Series (Bronzewska 
2016). It is a legal study taking sociological and psychological issues into account. Chapter 
4 of the book is devoted to the issue of practical questions of introducing co-operative 
compliance in Australia, the Netherlands (NL), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United 
States (US). The chosen countries represent long and solid experiences of co-operative 
compliance programmes. In addition they are chosen because they represent various legal 
systems, have various types of tax systems and diverse roles for the tax administrations set 
to collect and control the taxes (ibid., 13–14). Yet while the choice of countries is argued 
for, there is no explicit argument for why the specific dimensions of comparison have been 
chosen. The comparative element that she introduces in comparing NL, UK, Australia and 
                                                        
8  International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
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the US consists primarily of building descriptions of the individual countries around 
common themes: “every jurisdiction is described in a similar way” (ibid., 17). Bronzewska 
introduces “building blocks” that are needed for co-operative compliance. These are: a 
successful working basic relationship; political and social acceptance; tax culture; 
organizational tax culture; readiness of tax administrations; readiness of taxpayers; and a 
legal environment within which co-operative compliance can develop. Furthermore, 
additional countries9 are compared with the four main ones on basic factual dimensions 
(year of initiation, name, target group and “essence of strategy” (ibid., 222–223). 
Bronzewska’s study thus focuses more on the introduction of co-operative compliance 
initiatives (the what, why and how of implementation), rather than on how these initiatives 
are running, what are the experiences of being part of them, and what effects they have 
more generally on the relation between tax administrations and large corporate taxpayers.  
Another study with an explicit comparative element is Dennis de Widt and Lynne Oats’s 
study “Risk Assessment in a Cooperative Compliance Context: A Dutch-UK Comparison” 
(de Widt and Oats 2017). The article “compares risk assessment techniques applied to large 
corporate taxpayers in the UK and the Netherlands” (ibid., 230). Their comparison is 
based on interviews: 21 interviews in the Netherlands and 18 in the UK. All are conducted 
with tax specialists, either tax administrators, tax professionals in corporations or tax 
advisors. They describe how the risk assessment has been conducted in the two countries 
and compare “risk-assessment in a co-operative compliance context” in a table on the four 
elements: which corporations the programme applies to, the main risk assessment criteria, 
the main actor responsible for risk assessment, and the main outcome (in terms of 
categories used to describe the outcome of the risk assessments with regards to risk level 
(UK) or regardless if it is a corporation with a covenant or not (NL)) (ibid., 236). How 
these four elements have been chosen is not explicated. The article ends with an in-depth 
analysis of the different kinds of impact these techniques have had for both companies and 
tax administrations in the UK and the Netherlands.  
Both studies provide important information on the design of co-operative compliance 
programmes. The studies share broadly the same approach: countries are described one 
after the other on different parameters, but parameters that are not explicitly argued for 
why they are chosen. Following initial descriptions is a table stating similarities and 
differences, also without an explicit argument for why they are chosen. Yet, importantly, 
whereas Bronzewska’s study only briefly touches on the practices of how co-operative 
compliance is done, de Widt and Oats’s study comes much closer to bringing us into the 
                                                        
9 Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, Singapore, 
Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden. 
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machinery of how co-operative compliance works. They draw extensively on interviews 
with key stakeholders involved in working with co-operative compliance and use them for 
an in-depth analysis of risk assessment techniques.  
The next two studies to be treated in this section use more implicit comparative 
approaches than the two discussed above. One of the earliest comparative studies of co-
operative compliance is Justin Dabner and Mark Burton’s comparison of Australia’s and 
New Zealand’s experiences of adopting OECD’s enhanced relationship model (Dabner and 
Burton 2009). In the article, experiences with what they call the “partnership model” are 
described for the two countries one by one. Subsequently “the question of which 
implementation issues will need to be addressed if other countries adopt the partnership 
model” is addressed (ibid., 317) in the section “Challenges with the Adoption of the 
Enhanced Relationship or Partnership Model” (ibid., 318). The section is opened with the 
following:  
Australia’s and New Zealand’s experiences provide almost ten years of evidence of the 
difficulties in embracing the OECD’s call for an “enhanced relationship” between tax 
administrators, taxpayers and tax intermediaries. This evidence suggests that there are many 
obstacles to sustaining such a relationship, including: (…). (Dabner and Burton 2009, 324)  
Then obstacles are listed and discussed. We understand that this implicit “comparison” is 
more like an implicit pooling of the separate experiences of the two countries that are then 
used as a basis to draw out obstacles from which other countries may learn. While we in 
this working paper not only address obstacles, our aim is similar to Dabner and Burton’s as 
we point to dimensions to be attentive of when implementing co-operative compliance 
programmes, areas grounded in specific practical experiences that other countries 
hopefully can learn from when facing the task of implementing a co-operative compliance 
programme.  
A recently published analysis on co-operative compliance with an implicit comparative 
focus is Rita Szudoczky and Alicja Majdanska’s (2017) examination of “the conditions 
under which the EU Member States can introduce co-operative compliance regimes 
without the risk of providing illegal state aid to the taxpayers participating in them” (ibid., 
204). Part of this examination is a section (Section 3) giving an “overview of co-operative 
compliance programmes in place in the EU” (ibid., 208). This section has comparative 
elements, however, not explicitly stated. For all countries, there is a list of co-operative 
compliance programmes’ duration, their administrative and their legislative status. Next 
comes what they describe as a “common feature” which means the extent of inclusion of 
taxpayers’ being able to participate in the co-operative compliance programmes (ibid., 
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209). They state that the co-operative compliance programmes were developed in order to 
address aggressive tax planning among large corporations which is a noteworthy difference 
compared to what the Nordic tax administrations have argued. This background provides 
the “bridge” to the article’s main focus—whether the co-operative compliance programmes 
provide illegal state aid to participating corporations. In brief, although comparison is not 
the main focus of this article, it paints a broad picture of co-operative compliance 
programmes. Yet, this study resembles Bronzewska’s in that it primarily reports on the 
main general characteristics of co-operative compliance programmes, not the practical 
experiences of running the programmes. 
In short, although these studies are mostly descriptive of how such programmes ought to 
work, they provide many insightful questions to address our research on how co-operative 
compliance programmes are done and enacted in practice. Our contribution is about 
practical experiences in the Nordic countries, complementing the array of countries 
studied by de Widt and Oats on NL and UK, as well as Dabner and Burton’s study of 
Australia and New Zealand. In addition, we propose a theoretically grounded comparative 
perspective in that we thoroughly ground our findings in the social science literature as 
well as in inductive and collaborative reasoning. This is further elaborated on in Section 6. 
 
5.1.2 Policy oriented analyses 
In this section, two central policy oriented analyses of co-operative compliance are 
discussed in terms of a comparative approach. 
The first is the OECD report Cooperative Compliance: A Framework (2013) which is 
based on input from OECD member states’ tax administrations. The purpose of this OECD 
report is stated as:  
addresses past and current experiences and it is dedicated to evaluating the co-operative 
compliance approach and how revenue bodies assess its contribution to the delivery of 
compliance outcomes. (ibid., 3) [emphasis added]  
Furthermore, it is noted that:  
This report is based on a detailed study of the practical experiences of countries that have 
developed co-operative compliance programmes and the views of the business community 
(…) The report is based on a survey of 21 FTA members and consultations with the Business 
and Industry Advisory Committee. (ibid., 13) [emphasis added] 
and:  
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Chapter 2 describes the current state of play, and includes a stock take of country 
experiences, illustrative examples and common features of co-operative compliance 
approaches as well as interesting and significant differences. (ibid., 16) [emphasis added] 
Chapter 2 introduces a table of countries and a few details of their programme (name, 
duration, pilot or not, for some countries also a few details on the content of the 
programme are included) (ibid., 22–24). Two countries—Australia and Singapore—are 
then described “to illustrate in more detail how the principles have been translated into 
practice” (ibid., 24)—but how and why these specific two countries were selected is not 
mentioned. The chapter then goes on to list and discuss “common features” of co-operative 
compliance (ibid., 29): pillars, context (part of a wider compliance strategy), 
implementation, corporate governance. Hereafter “interesting and significant differences” 
are presented based on survey results. How they are selected is not explicated, it is just 
stated that “This part describes the most significant differences” (ibid., 30)—but 
“significant” is not explicated. The section is organized around common features of co-
operative compliance and poses the following questions:  
• Is the co-operative compliance approach established in regulation? 
• Inclusiveness: Are co-operative compliance approaches open to all taxpayer 
segments? 
• Entry techniques: Is entry into the co-operative compliance programme upon 
application or invitation? 
• What are the conditions for acceptance into the programme? 
• Is disclosure mandatory or voluntary? 
• Does multilateral co-operative compliance work? 
The questions are answered in a descriptive way—typically mentioning one country after 
the other (but not all countries for each question), or in compiled categories such as “in 
most countries”, “many countries”, “several countries”, “a few countries”. Hereafter a 
section on challenges follows. It is stated that: 
survey results demonstrate, that implementation of co-operative compliance programmes 
comes with challenges. Both revenue bodies and businesses need to address the following 
challenges [it is followed by five elements]. (ibid., 35)  
The linkage between the survey and the list of “need to address”-challenges is not 
explicated further. Instead, the last section of chapter 2 is a section titled: “principal 
findings of reviews or evaluations” (ibid., 36). Here is described one after the other how 
programmes have been evaluated in different countries. This has in general been done 
through surveys but also through external evaluations, telephone interviews or a 
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compliance effectiveness framework (the last developed and used in Australia to measure 
the impact of the compliance strategy). Some of the issues in chapter two are explored in 
depth in subsequent chapters (e.g. tax control frameworks and evaluation). Finally, Annex 
F is an “overview of lessons learnt” and a number of “difficulties encountered, solutions 
and lessons learnt” are presented—some of them based on one country, some on more 
countries. However, again, we miss an explanation of the selection criteria for comparison. 
Another key policy oriented analysis and comparison of experiences of co-operative 
compliance is L.G.M. Stevens et al.’s report Tax Supervision—Made to Measure (2012), 
ordained by the Dutch Tax Administration. This report addresses primarily the Dutch 
context and is in many ways a seminal study. First, because the Netherlands was at the 
forefront of implementing co-operative compliance;10 and second, because this is the first 
comprehensive analysis of these experiences. For our purpose here, the report contains a 
chapter (chapter 6) on “Horizontal monitoring from the international perspective” (ibid., 
105). The question this chapter sets out to answer is explicated: “Is the Tax and Customs 
Administration’s development of horizontal monitoring compatible with international 
developments in supervision?” This is broken down into two questions: (1) “How have 
‘enhanced relationships’ developed with foreign tax administrations?” and (2) “What are 
the consequences of the development of ‘enhanced relationships’ for the business 
community?” (ibid., 105). 
The first sub-question is answered by way of descriptions that have been sent out for 
commentary from tax administrations (ibid., 105). Summaries of strategies from Canada, 
the US, New Zealand and Australia are presented in one table and ten EU countries in 
another (ibid., 108, 109). They are summarized on their dimensions: strategy, core, target 
group, year implemented. In the notes following each of the tables a few comparative 
comments are added, for example the number of businesses entering during 2005/2006 or 
comments on the target groups (ibid., 109, 110).  
The second sub-question is answered on the basis of telephone interviews with “a number 
of”11 large businesses in the UK and Sweden (ibid., 105, 112). These two countries were 
selected for different reasons—the UK for having run it for a number of years and since the 
committee finds that “the UK tax administration’s drive is comparable to that of the Tax 
and Customs Administration”. Sweden was selected “since the Netherlands regards 
                                                        
10 The Dutch programme Horizontal Monitoring was introduced as a pilot in 2005; it thus 
preceeded the introduction of the term “co-operative compliance” by OECD in 2013. However, for 
the sake of clarity—and due to the connections between the programmes—we use cooperative 
compliance as a common denominator in this section.  
11 Not defined how many corporations were contacted. 
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Sweden as an example of a state with transparency and open cooperation between the 
business community and government” (ibid., 112). Noteworthy is that the Swedish variety 
of co-operative compliance had hardly started at the time of interviewing. The two 
countries are treated in separate sections. The report goes on to list “vulnerabilities and 
points of attention” provided in the survey. They are not country-specified, but rather a 
pool of points.  
Summing up the report by Stevens et al. (2012), we see that it is the most explicit about 
their chosen methods—compared to the rest of the reports provided in these two sections. 
However, like the others it is not very explicit about the selection of comparative 
dimensions. The practical experiences of working with co-operative compliance are slightly 
touched upon in the sections on Sweden and the UK while the other countries are 
compared on dimensions of factual and descriptive characteristics. 
 
5.1.3 Sub-conclusion: Many facts, fewer specific practices/in-depth 
experiences 
On the basis of this glance at other studies on co-operative compliance with an implicit or 
explicit comparative element, we want to draw attention to two areas where our 
approach—and thereby this report—differs. First, since our research interest has been 
focused on practices and experiences of co-operative compliance, our data material is 
primarily based on in-depth qualitative interviews with involved actors. Our data material 
is therefore suited to answer questions and make comparisons of a different kind than 
studies based on survey data or other kinds of data. We can step beyond the checklist-like 
approach and descriptive dimensions of formal set-ups of the programmes in various 
countries as well as the normative details on how co-operative compliance ought to be 
according to the “model”. Instead we focus on what has become of the model—and its 
variations—when implemented and worked with in practice by the different tax 
administrations. Moreover, we take into consideration a broad range of actors involved in 
co-operative compliance programmes; actors that have had an impact on how the 
programmes played out.  
Finally, we set out to be more explicit about our selection of dimensions to compare across 
the Nordic cases. In subsection 5.2 we will explicate our approach to comparison which is 
inspired by anthropology. Then, in Section 7, we provide an analysis of a number of key 
comparison dimensions, with each subsection concluding with recommendations based on 
this analysis.  
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6 A comparative approach inspired by anthropology  
This section is devoted to a brief theorization of how we compare our qualitative case 
studies. Our aim is to compare beyond the choice of the various “models of co-operative 
compliance”, across national tax laws, policies and guidelines, number of participants or 
size of participating corporations, year of introduction and similar basic factual 
dimensions. We aim to compare how these programmes worked out; why did they take the 
shape they did in different societies despite being quite similar on the drawing board? With 
this research aim we find inspiration in anthropology. We take a holistic approach to co-
operative compliance programmes: we account for the views of a broad range of 
stakeholders, we are interested in the programmes’ outcome in practice, and we see 
taxation as creating relations (cf. Steinmo 2018). This has a number of implications. 
In anthropology, a case study is “a detailed examination of an event (or series of related 
events) which the analyst believes exhibits the operation of some identified general 
theoretical principle” (Mitchell 1982, 27). This approach was inspired by legal reasoning, 
where conflicting legal principles were debated in connection with concrete cases. In 
examining the cases in this research, the theoretical principle is co-operative compliance. 
It is a gloss over a range of different practices, which the review of the comparative 
literature above confirms (see Subsection 4.1). An anthropologically inspired case study is 
also a very suitable approach for gaining knowledge about co-operative compliance 
because it allows the analysis move from theoretical principles to empirical data and back 
again. It is an iterative process of arriving at insights which will also be apparent from 
discussion of the cases below.  
Our ambition with comparing four Nordic cases is to transcend or—at least—to add 
another perspective on the ways that co-operative compliance cases have so far been 
compared. Our project compares the programmes across different legal jurisdictions and 
various tax collection infrastructures although these are quite similar. What we aim to do is 
not only to describe various national interpretations of “co-operative compliance” (which 
we did in our national reports: Boll and Brehm Johansen 2018; Brøgger and Aziz 2018; 
Kettunen et al. 2018), but to propose some theoretical understanding of societal responses 
to these programmes. Our aim is thus to conceptualize which dimensions of co-operative 
compliance work on a societal level and which do not. Simultaneously we retain an 
awareness of existing relations between actors in the tax arena. Relations are built over 
time and relations develop. We have to understand relations especially between large 
corporate taxpayers and tax administrations, but also to take into account the roles tax 
advisors and other stakeholders on the tax arena have played—and are playing. 
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Comparison lies at the very heart of the anthropological discipline (Eriksen 2004). Case 
studies in anthropology were developed as an alternative to “armchair studies” of 
travelogues and snippets of information in policy briefs about ongoing social life in 
different parts of the world. Such armchair studies largely generated speculative accounts 
that confirmed stereotypes. There was an urgent need for empirically valid accounts that 
advanced social theory; of being there, seeing what people actually engaged in and hearing 
them talk about it. Anthropologists could then describe and reflect on what people said and 
did in practice and to compare the various accounts from different parts of the world. Yet, 
the world includes our own societies and anthropology has since long cast its gaze on 
contemporary issues “at home”.  
Even in faraway places there are very few, if any, issues studied that are untouched by 
outside contacts. In our comparison, anthropology thus studies specific issues in a given 
society that interacts with outside forces. In order to understand these interactions, 
anthropology has on the one hand to continuously reflect on one’s own concepts; and on 
the other hand, on the ways the history of such interaction has affected the issue under 
scrutiny (van der Veer 2016). Our comparison is thus distinct from the more sociological 
generalism and especially from a rational choice theory. We find it fruitful with 
comparison without striving for unified theories (van der Veer 2016, 6, referring to the 
work of Marcel Mauss [1922] and Max Weber [1954]). While so doing we raise a warning 
for “easy comparisons” of concepts used across nations; neither if the word or expression 
itself is the same (as English descriptions in Anglo-Saxon countries show), nor if it is 
translated into similar concepts in other languages. The risk is even larger when 
translating between similar languages such as the Scandinavian ones (Finnish excluded).12 
Although researchers from the outside look at programmes called “co-operative 
compliance”, we have to understand the specific meanings of adopted concepts; how they 
play out in practice and how they affect established relations. As we will see in Section 7, 
various aspects of co-operative compliance take on different meanings in different 
countries. We thus take seriously the problem of translation between languages and across 
cultures (van der Veer 2016, 20). 
In order to get closer to describing our assumptions and decisions when it comes to 
comparison, we draw also on Michael Schnegg who writes:  
By comparing, anthropologists thus check the similarity or dissimilarity of phenomena or 
processes across cases. […] [comparison] requires three fundamental operations: defining the 
                                                        
12 Even the same concept in wording can have various local meanings depending on laws, history, 
culture, etc. (there are well-known examples in our everyday language, e.g. “rar”). 
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case and the dimensions to be compared and an operation to determine whether the 
observations differ or are the same. (Schnegg 2014, 57–58)  
Schnegg thus argues for three elements of special methodological importance when doing 
comparisons: (1) defining cases, (2) determining dimensions for comparison, (3) 
interconnectedness of the cases to be compared (ibid., 57). In the following comparison of 
national cases, we take inspiration from Schnegg’s approach, considering the challenges 
with translation (cf. van der Veer 2016) and analysing our cases along dimensions drawn 
from the social sciences. As we are eight researchers with different backgrounds, we have 
each consulted with literature in our academic fields to identify possible dimensions. We 
discussed a number of them, and developed those that most clearly reflected stakeholder 
concerns. This means that we look beyond specific concepts, the national jurisdictions and 
specific tax laws, the policy documents and the choice of the various “models of co-
operative compliance”. These issues are definitely not unimportant, but our main focus is 
how these issues have interacted when co-operative compliance programmes were applied 
in practice and how they have an impact on existing relations between actors on the 
national tax arenas. 
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7 Comparison of the Nordic experiences 
In this section, we use the above theorization about comparison inspired by Schnegg 
(2014) and van der Veer (2016) as a ground on which to compare the concrete experiences 
of co-operative compliance programmes in our four Nordic cases.  
A first challenge is to define the cases that we want to work with. This we have done at the 
outset of our research. With co-operative compliance as the common denominator, we 
identified the practices and relationships it framed in each country. These cases were 
presented in Section 4. The second challenge is to define and argue for the dimensions to 
be compared in those cases; that is, to provide definitions and classifications of dimensions 
that are both locally meaningful and, indeed, comparable. In relation to this, Schnegg—
referring to others’ work—mentions that categories or dimensions to describe the social 
world must be built on an inductive process (ibid., 62). We have analysed our diverse cases 
and presented and discussed them in numerous meetings, workshops and conferences. 
Such meetings were both internal and external presenting for various groups of 
stakeholders and at academic conferences. Through inductive reasoning, a common 
language for talking about the different observable practices gradually emerged. We draw 
on Schnegg and call each set of observable practices that can be compared for dimensions. 
These dimensions are those that “survived” as meaningful to account for what works and 
what does not regarding co-operative compliance programmes in the Nordic countries.  
In this section we suggest seven dimensions that can be compared across the four national 
cases. Each dimension, is illustrated with examples from our cases. These are summarized 
in a comparison that substantiates a set of recommendations for what to consider if 
implementing co-operative compliance programmes. Importantly, our focus is from the 
detailed experiences and specific practices that comprise co-operative compliance when 
programmes are implemented and worked with in practice. We have included views from a 
broad variety of stakeholders. Most of the dimensions are illustrated by examples from all 
four Nordic cases. A few dimensions are important across all countries as illustrated by our 
cases; other dimensions have elaborate and substantial illustrations from a few countries 
and fewer from others. How each dimension exactly plays out in practice differs. Yet, we 
found all dimensions important to consider when implementing co-operative compliance 
programmes. 
This section is organized around our proposed dimensions. We start with describing what 
we mean with each dimension, then follows national descriptions in alphabetical order. As 
it happens, the Paradigmatic cases (Denmark and Finland) come first, followed by the 
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Maximum variation case (Norway) and finally the Extreme case (Sweden). Each 
dimension ends with our recommendations. 
  
FairTax WP-Series No.20 
Nordic experiences of co-operative compliance programmes: Comparisons and Recommendations 
 
38 
7.1 Dimension I: Cultural orientation  
Culture influences the way co-operative compliance programmes fare. The question is 
how? This dimension addresses how we can understand cultural implications. The OECD 
co-operative compliance framework inspired new routines. New routines have impact at a 
deep cultural level as they affect the details of everyday work, which are based on taken-
for-granted cultural assumptions. Therefore, when routines change, cultural orientations 
might also change which create ample opportunities for misunderstandings. Tax 
authorities cannot be held accountable for cultural orientations. However, when aiming to 
change the relationship with taxpayers, talking about the cultural increases mutual 
understanding. 
This dimension reveals that there is more to the measures than merely a matter of 
voluntary disclosure of uncertain tax positions. In highly charged deliberations such as 
those between tax administrations and large corporations about the latter’s tax returns, an 
understanding of whether the source of a disagreement is a cultural misunderstanding or a 
real conflict of interest influences the outcome of the interaction. A misunderstanding may 
result in a lengthy and costly audit, or an even lengthier and costlier court case, when an 
exploration of the disagreement in cultural terms could have cleared the air and resulted in 
continued discussions about only the contentious issue.  
Cultural orientations are basic notions about the world and peoples’ interactions in it (Hills 
2002). Summed up after more than 50 years of comparative research on culture in 
organizations, there appears to be a limited number of orientations, which, when combined 
in different ways, are the sources of cultural variation—and misunderstandings; cultural 
orientations include ideas about the nature of people, the relationship to nature, the 
relationship to other people, the modality of human activity (being versus doing), the 
temporal focus of human activity, and the concept of space (Browaeys and Price 2015, 31; 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 1961). Each orientation is further subdivided into categories 
that are commonly used for analyses of organizational cultures (Adler 2002; Schein 1996) 
and cross-cultural comparison (Hofstede 2011; Smith et al. 1996). Making use of the 
original definitions from 1961, we discuss the routine changes driven by the co-operative 
compliance measures in light of three of these orientations that most clearly embed 
administrative work:  
• time (past, present, future)  
• space (private/public)  
• organization of relations (hierarchical, mutual, contractual).  
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The new OECD guidelines are ripe with possibilities for cultural misunderstanding. An 
example is the change from assessment of historical records (past) to real-time 
assessments (present). Such changes need to be explained to ensure a sense of 
predictability. If not, they may create conflict and discontent, or in the worst case take 
attention away from material issues. In terms of spatial horizon, the tax control framework 
represents a shift in the boundary between the tax administration and the corporation. 
Previously, internal tax management routines of a corporation were its private matter. 
When the tax administration requires to know about them and assesses them to determine 
levels of compliance, they are no longer internal. In terms of relationships, if the tax 
administration sees itself as the apex in the hierarchy of sovereign power while a tax 
director in a corporation regards the relations as mutual, this is likely to cause friction. 
Explicitly addressing cultural issues will make clear unspoken criteria for assessment of 
compliance, criteria that have nothing to do with taxation.  
 
7.1.1 Dimension I: Comparison by drawing on practices/experiences 
Denmark: Time has been a central cultural element in the changes in administrative 
routines in the tax administration (Skat) and the corporations brought about by the 
introduction of Tax Governance.13 
Time orientation in the Tax Governance programme and in the basic relation between Skat 
and large corporate taxpayers has changed due to the move away from reactive backward 
looking audits to an emphasis on real-time clarification and payment of the correct amount 
of tax. This is a cornerstone in Tax Governance collaboration and marks a strong shift in 
time orientation from reactive to real-time orientation. Generally, corporations highly 
value this element of being able to regard tax processes as finalized and closed—of being 
able to define the past as the past and not having it present as a constant potential source 
of uncertainty.  
This is not the only shift in time orientation encountered in the Danish case. With the 
radically changed time orientation of Tax Governance in the relation between Skat and the 
large corporate taxpayers some important nuances of the development of new time 
orientations have also emerged. A time related nuance means that the path towards 
“future” states of tax compliance has become less of a given. Several tax directors point to 
new kinds of collaborative decision making with regards to what the specific next step is 
                                                        
13 For a detailed description of the methodology and specific data material that the Danish case 
draws on, see Boll and Brehm Johansen (2018, 10–11). 
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and how to move forward; this becomes something that to some degree can be negotiated, 
discussed and agreed upon with Skat, not something fully prescribed in advance. 
Therefore, moving forward to a non-predetermined future becomes contextually defined 
and varies with the pace of the corporations’ participation. 
Last, another nuance of time orientation to be included here is working in multiple 
coexisting time frames in the relation between Skat and large corporations in Tax 
Governance. Due to the circumstance that Tax Governance participants are not exempt 
from the traditional audit system in Skat, corporations can have to be subjected to lengthy 
audits in the traditional reactive system while at the same time working real time in the 
realm of Tax Governance. This is not always seen as beneficial for the collaboration, and 
one corporation has even postponed their participation in Tax Governance due to an 
encompassing ongoing audit. All in all, the changed work practices oriented differently 
timewise (reactive to real time; contextually and collaboratively defined path towards the 
future; coexisting time frames) are important elements of the changed (work) culture of 
both Skat and the corporations brought about by the introduction of Tax Governance.  
With regards to a change in cultural orientation related to space—particularly understood 
as changes in relation to public and private space—two elements stand out in the data 
material. First, with the introduction of a new principle of regulation building on 
collaboration, the spaces of the tax administration and the spaces of the corporations are 
no longer just connected by the flow of paper/data material travelling between spaces 
electronically or physically through rather minimal interaction between Skat and the 
corporation. With the introduction of new working routines in the realm of Tax 
Governance, the physical presence of Skat employees in the corporations—in regular 
meetings and with Skat employees working based in the corporation for some days—is a 
prominent new mode of spatially organizing collaboration. In that sense what was the 
corporation’s private space is increasingly inhabited by Skat—a change that is described by 
the tax directors to be predominantly an advantage of Tax Governance; but a few other tax 
directors use the opening up of the private space of the corporation as an argument for not 
participating in Tax Governance.  
The second element that stands out in relation to changes in spatial orientation is the way 
Skat has not been allowed to disclose and make public which corporations are part of Tax 
Governance, since this question can be seen as an internal administrative issue in Skat. 
However, corporations themselves are free to publicly announce their participation in Tax 
Governance. For several corporations in Tax Governance the main concern is not to 
conceal their participation but rather to disclose it due to tax policy/tax strategy being 
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increasingly requested for elements of a corporation’s external communication and as part 
of their public image. More of the corporations interviewed therefore explain that they 
actively use their participation in Tax Governance as an element of their tax policy or tax 
strategy and as part of their larger corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts in order to 
signal to the public that they are tax compliant and a responsible corporation. Opening up 
a corporation’s private space to interact with Skat in new ways is a strong reorientation of 
Tax Governance. This seems to be an element that is either highly appreciated or a weighty 
reason for not participating in Tax Governance—the issue of the shifting of private and 
public space in relations between Skat and the corporations thus cover polarized positions 
in the interview data. The change in corporations’ societal relation, however is much more 
agreed upon in the data and can be argued to be facilitated by a general reorientation in 
Danish society where tax policy, tax strategy and CSR have become increasingly important 
elements of being a responsible corporation. This has become a public matter, not just a 
private or internal matter.  
With the introduction of Tax Governance, the very organization of the relation between 
Skat and corporations has also changed—and this relates to the third cultural element 
introduced above. The traditional hierarchical relation between Skat (the authority) and 
the corporation (the regulated) has changed and corporations are increasingly able to take 
the lead in relation to Skat with regards to defining frames, the “playing field” and time 
frames of the collaboration—if they take the initiative to do so. Skat and corporations thus 
operate in a more mutual relationship where the direction of the initiative to work forward 
is not predetermined. In addition, some of the interviewed tax directors explain that they 
internally in their own organization have experienced a shift in their position due to their 
participation in Tax Governance. One tax director for example explains that he finds he has 
gained more impact since the corporation he works for has committed to Tax Governance. 
So paradoxically, the dissolving of the hierarchical relation between Skat and corporations 
can in some regards be seen to contribute to a shift in the position of the tax directors 
internally within corporations. They explain a move towards a position with more 
influence and authority due to the emphasis and weight the taxation area is given.  
Last, in relation to discussing organization of the new relationship, it is worth pointing to 
the basic detail that Tax Governance builds on the formal signing of a declaration of intent, 
hensigtserklæring, by both parties. This can be understood as a form of contractual 
relationship—despite the fact that it does not contain juridical aspects; it solely formulates 
some frames of interaction and intentions of the collaboration. In the Danish case a few of 
the interviewed tax directors however find that collaboration has developed to encompass 
more elements than they expected when they entered Tax Governance collaboration. In 
FairTax WP-Series No.20 
Nordic experiences of co-operative compliance programmes: Comparisons and Recommendations 
 
42 
this light the Tax Governance programme can also be understood to have developed at a 
different pace from the specific practices it first encompassed in its “contractual form”, 
which can be seen as an impediment to the programme.  
What the two above paragraphs argue is that this basic reorganization of the relation 
between Skat and the corporations inscribed in the Tax Governance programme has moved 
from a hierarchical towards a collaborative—and more mutual—relation. In this way it 
seems that the cultural orientation to some extent has been changed with regards to the 
basic relation between Skat and the corporations. However, the data also points to the fact 
that this is not the only reorientation that has taken place in the sense that some of the tax 
directors describe changes in their basic relation with management and the rest of their 
organization due to the formal collaboration with Skat in Tax Governance. Therefore, it can 
be argued that the cultural reorientation of the basic relation between Skat and the 
corporations has resulted in effects on other relations.  
Finland: The overall view of cultural changes in the Finnish tax administration VERO is 
similar to Denmark’s. Co-operative compliance has brought about changes to the temporal 
orientation, changing the emphasis from past-oriented control towards the present and the 
future. There have been some changes to the private/public boundary between the tax 
administration, and steps have been taken from hierarchical towards mutual or contractual 
orientation to organization. These aspects of the cultural change are elaborated below. 
The orientation towards the present and the future in co-operative compliance entails the 
corporation in taking the initiative to disclose to the tax administration relevant 
information concerning uncertain tax matters in case the corporation expects for example 
that an interpretation of the law might differ between the corporation and the tax 
administration. Both the tax administration and corporations aim at working in real time 
on tax matters. 
While the emphasis of co-operative compliance is in the present and the future, it is 
possible that traditional tax audits are conducted in the corporations participating in the 
programme. The data collected for this study does not, however, include information on 
any corporation where a traditional tax audit would have taken place after entering the co-
operative compliance programme. The tax administration may adjust the forms and extent 
of control based on the perceived risks and other control mechanisms that there are in 
place in the corporation, meaning that the tax administration may not deem it necessary to 
carry out full-scale tax audits.  
Overall, co-operative compliance programmes can be viewed as one aspect of the broader 
present-time or future orientation that has strengthened in the Finnish tax administration 
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during recent years. Changing the emphasis from backward looking control to proactive 
guidance is part of the strategic goals of the Finnish tax administration.  
Regarding the spatial orientation—the private vs public sphere—have increased 
transparency within co-operative compliance caused changes to the public/private 
boundary between tax administration and corporations. Increased transparency by the 
corporation includes an obligation to disclose the corporation’s tax strategy and relevant 
plans to the tax administration. It also entails documenting tax processes and controls, and 
disclosing them to the tax administration as a part of a so-called “compliance scan”. 
Traditionally, internal controls and processes in corporations have been part of the private 
sphere, and efforts by the tax administration used to focus on controlling the outcomes, 
not the processes involved in producing these outcomes.  
Similarly, tax administration promises to be transparent about why it is asking for certain 
information. Previously, the reasons for posing certain questions were considered part of 
the tax administration’s private matters. 
Tax administration has argued that participation in co-operative compliance falls within 
the private sphere in the sense that it cannot make public which corporations participate in 
co-operative compliance. The conclusion is in line with Finnish legislation which retains 
taxation in the private sphere (apart from exceptions specified in the Act on public 
disclosure and confidentiality of tax information [1346/1999]). 
Yet, participating corporations can bring the information into the public sphere if they 
wish to do so. For example, one corporation writes in its sustainability report that it “has 
been collaborating with the tax administrations to enhance transparency in taxation”. 
When entering the programme, another corporation communicated that in co-operative 
compliance, “the parties have a joint interest in handling taxation in real time and 
timewise efficiently”. It further stated that “co-operative compliance is a proactive and 
transparent way of working, which is based on trust and common understanding between 
the tax administration and tax payer”. As these disclosures show, some corporations have 
chosen to make their cooperation with tax administration a public matter, and to 
emphasize the voluntary compliance and mutual trust between the taxpayer and the tax 
administration. 
A co-operative compliance relationship is started by signing a Letter of Intent by the 
corporation and by the tax administration—which is an element of contractual 
relationship. The Letter of Intent outlines the agreements between the parties, the 
expected ways of working and the mutual goals of trust, transparency and real time 
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processes. As the participation in co-operative compliance is voluntary, the contractual 
element also requires the willingness of both parties to enter co-operative compliance. 
With the introduction of co-operative compliance, the traditionally hierarchal relationship 
between the tax administration and the taxpayer has become a more mutual one. In co-
operative compliance, corporations readily take the initiative in contacting the tax 
administration, as an interviewee described: 
Even more often than every month, we have contacted them. We have now asked for guidance 
concerning VAT in two cases. VAT is a typical one, where we have these questions. They can 
be very complicated. And there are difficult questions. And I believe that our payroll also has 
had different questions every now and then. And then we have been in contact with the 
transfer pricing people at the tax administration. And we have met several times during this 
spring, for different reasons. (Interview, tax Director) 
As the above quotation illustrates, new practices have created a new culture of discussion 
between tax administration and large companies. Previously the style of communication 
was very “official” and the exchange of information was based solely on written 
documentation. When handling matters, different forms were filled in and sent back and 
forth, and it was a very slow and difficult process to get any answers from the tax 
administration. The new culture where tax administration and companies share more 
information to create tax compliance is at the core of understanding what the new 
practices are built on.  
There were some concerns within tax administration towards the new culture. New skills 
and ethics are required from tax administrations when meeting clients in face-to-face 
communication, understanding different business cases and giving their opinions more 
promptly. The status of public servants has not changed, however, but the virtues of the 
past did not hold any more. Tax officials are now required to be “ambidextrous”. On the 
one hand they have to be proactive and help their customers to do the right thing. On the 
other hand they have to enforce tax laws and keep up the threat of punishment following 
on from non-compliance with a tax audit.  
Even more apparent as a signal of cultural change—orientation to mutual organization—
was the expression of a common interest with tax agencies in other countries, or resolving 
tax questions in international settings. A tax director interviewed in a corporation 
explained one of the rationales for entering co-operative compliance as follows: 
Finland is always at the other end. This is one of the strongest reasons for why we wanted to 
be a part of Enhanced Customer Collaboration. To have enough focus on us by the tax 
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administration. So that they really try to help us and co-operate with us (in international 
cases) … They understand that we are in the same boat. (Interview, tax director) 
While the culture of discussion between the tax administration and corporate taxpayers 
has changed, even the new discussion culture has its limits.. New co-operative compliance 
practices are initiated and put forward without any public discussion in the media, with the 
exception of a few articles on the topic written by the tax administrators in professional 
media (e.g. Piiskoppel 2017). In this sense, new practices are built on the prevailing culture 
where decisions are made and information shared with stakeholders within smaller groups 
and not directly in the public sphere. There has been some criticism towards co-operative 
compliance in Finland, as an interviewee described: 
Yes, we are bound by the same rules and regulations as anyone else. Because sometimes it has 
been claimed that this whole co-operative compliance is some kind of plotting behind the 
scenes. Or that we do some sort of horse-trading and other things. But my understanding is 
that we work on the tax matters when they are on the table, and not five years after. That’s the 
idea. (Interview, tax director)  
As the above excerpt describes, there has been criticism against and doubt about co-
operative compliance. Yet, these discussions have not entered the public sphere and have 
not taken place in the media or in courtrooms. In respect of private/public sphere, where 
the formation of ECC practices take place, Finland and Sweden seem to lie at opposite 
extremes of the continuum. 
Norway: In the case of Norway, it must be remembered that no formal Tax Governance 
programme as in Denmark and Finland was set up. Instead, the changes were incremental 
and dealt with as part of ongoing everyday work. We therefore discuss the routine changes 
in light of two identifiable initiatives: one a pilot “Reinforced Dialogue” of LTO from 2011–
2013; the other a bundle of what we interpret as interrelated, strategic initiatives to 
improve routines for the assessment of compliance in all of Tax Norway. For the purposes 
of discussion of cultural reorientation, we set the starting point to revisions of the risk 
assessment methodology in 2009 and the end point to an organizational expansion in 
2016. The initiatives impacted on everyday routines and resulted in a number of cultural 
reorientations.  
In terms of a time horizon, with the pilot programme, there was no reorientation. 
Administrative practices had been based on assessment of the present risk 
(implementation of new laws and regulations, investment decisions). The interaction was 
in real time. Historical data was not required in the regular contact between corporations 
and LTO, but was used on an ad hoc basis for discussions about specific issues and for 
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regular assessment of the corporation’s tax returns (selvangivelse). This did not change 
with the “Reinforced Dialogue” programme. With organizational expansion in 2016, and 
the use of the more systematic risk assessment methodology, there were time 
reorientations of several kinds. One was from the present to the past as the tax 
administration required large amounts of historical data extending further back in time 
than what had been established practice. The other time reorientation was the result of 
confusion about the requirements. The tax directors we interviewed did not know if the 
past time horizon was to be a new routine or if it was an ad hoc occurrence in connection 
with something they had not been informed about. They therefore adopted various 
varieties of “wait-and-see” attitudes, in case the perceived changes were caused by 
temporary adaptations and hoping that the relationship would eventually revert to normal. 
In this case, the initiative to the temporal reorientation came from the tax administration. 
None of the tax directors interviewed expressed a wish or a need to act on it immediately. 
In this sense, the routine change occasioned a temporal break, a pause, in the collaborative 
relationship with the tax administration, and signals of a possibly lasting spatial 
reorientation.  
In terms of spatial orientation and organization, there were major changes from the 
beginning. The main dividing line between private and public did not run between the 
corporation and the tax administration, but between these two institutions and the general 
public. The corporations had regularly for many years had their boundaries crossed by tax 
administrators. LTO habitually asked about internal matters, which was nothing out of the 
ordinary. In this sense, tax administration was also situationally given room in the private 
space and there was a degree of mutuality in the interaction. A discussion would start with 
an inquiry from a known contact person from either side. Occasionally a tax advisor would 
be the first point of contact. The context for the inquiry could be some issue relating to the 
corporation’s financial dispositions, or external factors thought to directly affect them. It 
would be solved by discussions between a small group of people who knew who the others 
were. The process and solutions were recorded in the internal system of each organization 
and the records were confidential, and not publicly available knowledge. Hence, even if 
there was a reorientation from the private to the public in the relationship between the tax 
administration and corporations, there was no reorientation of the boundary between 
private and public in terms of the media. On the other hand, the corporations found it 
problematic that there was no reorientation of the boundary between the Norwegian tax 
administration and the tax administrations in other countries. When several countries 
claimed taxes from a corporation, the tax directors had to weigh the claims against each 
other. If they had to pay double, the Norwegian tax administration was of no help. Either 
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the corporations’ own tax directors or local tax advisors had to step in and negotiate to get 
the excess payment back. This could be a costly affair. One tax director estimated that even 
if ideally he should get it all back, an 80 per cent reclaim rate was a more realistic estimate. 
There was also another kind of reorientation between private and public as a result of the 
organizational expansion. When in 2016 the tax administration started to request large 
amounts of data without giving any hints about why, this created confusion among the tax 
directors in corporations, and led to speculations that they were suspected of something 
without knowing what. This uncertainty was further aggravated as tax administrators, who 
were unknown to the tax directors, were sent in. This generated a need to know who these 
persons were, not as specific individuals, but as professionals working in certain units and 
with certain reputations. Because the tax directors were not informed about what the 
requested information would be used for, the need to know who would use it became 
urgent. Suddenly, the formerly private exchanges had turned into potential public 
information. Reactions to this were that such internal matters were not relevant for the 
media or tax advisors not working for a corporation. One tax director in a corporation that 
operated in a highly competitive international industry was concerned with the risk that 
anyone with access to the vast material they were asked to provide could identify the 
corporation’s business models. Hence, he identified a risk of trade secrets becoming public 
knowledge. The response from all the tax directors interviewed was consideration about 
how to withdraw behind the boundary of the private. They searched for non-
confrontational ways to limit the tax administration access by limiting the quality and 
amount of information to be sent over. By not doing anything proactively, the risk of 
unintentionally revealing something would also be reduced. The tax administration had 
not revealed anything about what was going on in their organization. Even though it was 
clear to the tax directors that something was going on, their reaction was that they had had 
not been informed about it. Symbolically, the tax directors were turned out of the space 
they had previously shared with tax administrators. There was no longer a mutual effort, 
and the tax administrators demonstrated their sovereignty, their power to make the 
taxpayers do what they wanted without asking or explaining. This was a big change from 
the previously more mutual relations moving towards a more hierarchical one, only the 
taxpayers were not informed.  
As this reorientation represented a dramatic shift in the quality of cooperative 
collaboration, and we got the same reaction from all tax directors interviewed, we decided 
to discuss the findings with the tax administration directly. From that discussion, it 
became clear that this outcome was an unintended consequence of the reorientations in 
time, space and relations. 
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Concluding on how “culture” has played a role in the Norwegian case, the most apt 
description of the corporations’ reactions as well as those of the tax administration might 
be a cultural misunderstanding due to different interpretations of the changes. 
Sweden: The announcement of a co-operative compliance programme in 2011 (Fördjupad 
Samverkan, FS) disturbed existing orientations in time, space and the organization of 
relations. In the Swedish tax administration (SKV), co-operative compliance was thought 
to be just a change to a more collaborative, modern way of working (cf. 
Ekonomistyrningsverket 2012; Skatteverket 2012). This view was not shared by everyone, 
and the programme occasioned a heated media debate. This debate gives valuable insight 
into the cultural reorientations expected from the programme, and the reactions to them.  
In terms of the temporal orientation there were several possible changes, all questioned in 
different ways. The guidelines for the programme stated that the aim was not to change 
faulty historical decisions, but to work proactively with taxpayers to ensure that 
information, taxes and fees were to the largest extent correct as early as possible in the 
taxation process. Participating in the programme would provide a quicker response time 
for questions posed, there would be less uncertainty in tax positions as questionable tax 
issues would be resolved before reporting, and there would be fewer issues to be decided in 
court. This signals a reorientation from the past to the present. Taxpayers on their part 
reacted to the prospect for reorientation to the future. Before entering into any co-
operative compliance agreements, they wanted to know to what extent the additional 
information gathered through the programme from and about a corporation would be used 
if the agreement between SKV and a corporation ended? Furthermore, the corporations 
questioned that for their part, they would perhaps even spend more time administratively 
addressing concerns that the participation required. Reporting information in real time 
increased the workload, which would not be offset by the legal requirement of fewer audit 
controls.  
The spatial orientation in the Swedish case is articulated in what information is private and 
public. Information exchanged under co-operative compliance programmes was decided in 
court to be a counselling practice and thus not considered part of tax confidentiality under 
current laws. A private person demanded information about participating corporations, 
referring to the principle of public access to official records, offentlighetsprincipen. He 
argued that this type of collaboration was more like counselling than having a specific 
relation to specific tax cases (which are excluded from public access). SKV denied this 
request and the case went to the Administrative Court of Appeal who ruled SKV to be 
correct (February 2013). The case was then taken to the Supreme Administrative Court, 
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Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen, which ruled that SKV had to provide information about 
participating corporations. Information that can be publicly disclosed did not stop there; it 
was also ruled that details about issues handled were not part of the secrecy if these did not 
refer to specific tax cases. Given this ruling one corporation did decide to withdraw (July 
2013). Spatial reorientation implied that the public–private distinction was completely 
eliminated.  
The cultural reorientation was also noteworthy on an organizational level. New ways of 
working disturbed the distinction between regulator and regulated. In terms of 
organization of relations, SKV had the ambition to change how the Swedish tax system 
should work in practice; that it should not only rest on the application of black letter law 
but be governed by the spirit of the law. This view is contested by opponents to the 
programme, who state that it is the law that rules relations between tax administration and 
taxpayers, and that laws should be obeyed to the letter. According to them, it is not up to 
SKV to make these changes. Hence, even though SKV’s position was challenged, the 
paradoxical result was that the position taken by opponents to the changes confirmed the 
hierarchical relation between regulator and regulated. Furthermore, there were also 
internal critiques at Swedish administration which voiced the opinion that with Fördjupad 
samverkan, SKV outsourced control to those who were supposed to be controlled. The 
resistance to cultural changes in terms of organization was voiced not only by opponents in 
the corporate sector, but also from within the tax administration itself.  
Some light on how the changed relations between SKV and large corporations were voiced 
can be had from the media debate that unfolded after the launch of the first programme. 
“Should SKV be a buddy?” asked professor of law Robert Påhlsson in a heading (Påhlsson 
2011). The article questioned how well the programme fitted with contemporary Swedish 
law especially concerning the issue of equal treatment before the law. Fördjupad 
samverkan was situated as one among many of SKV’s changing strategies over the years—
the tension between control on the one hand and increased information to taxpayers on the 
other. The programme was argued to be two sides of the same coin. Behind the rational 
legal arguments proposed in the article is a sentiment of mistrust. Påhlsson writes 
(author’s translation):  
I choose to interpret SKV’s initiative seriously and not at all as an insidious or conspiratorial 
way to undermine economic discretion or entrepreneurship. Although there is always a risk 
when roles coincide; when an institution that should control and make difficult decisions also 
aims to be a buddy. (Påhlsson 2011) 
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The “buddy” issue also highlights the previous point; the aim to keep the existing private—
public relation. The corporations did not want to risk that information hitherto reserved 
for treatment in the private sphere should become available in the public sphere. This 
confirms a strong-private–public distinction, and the idea of the independence and right of 
the business community to manage its own affairs.  
SKV responded promptly with an article under the heading “SKV does not aim to cheat 
corporations” (Påhlsson 2011). Påhlsson’s legal apprehensions were recognized, yet the 
article argued for the need to change ways of working at governmental bureaucracies in 
general. “Laws and taxation rules apply to all, yet bureaucracies have to adapt their service 
and administration to the users, in our case tax payers, diverse needs”. Fördjupad 
samverkan was described to be just one of many adaptations that SKV had undertaken in 
its change of strategies and ways of working, e.g. information in different languages; 
information directed towards newly registered corporations; and e-services. SKV’s view 
was more directed towards a timely change in society. The incumbent Director General 
Ingemar Hansson argued that the programme was just an illustration of changing tax 
morals (in Swedish society). Taxpayers in general were now less forgiving towards tax 
planning; to pay tax is to show a concern for the society in which the taxpayer works and 
operates. Hansson went on to argue that tax policy ought to be part of a corporation’s 
ethical guidelines and he compared taxation to environmental issues where many 
corporations have larger ambitions (cf. CSR) than just following the letter of the law. This 
also signals a shift in spatial orientation, in situating the corporations more clearly in the 
public space.  
Moreover, as the information exchanged between participating corporations and SKV is 
not subject to tax confidentiality (as ruled by the Supreme Administrative Court), this way 
of working ends up in an “informal greyzone”, not previously encountered in Swedish 
administrative law. It was suggested that Fördjupad samverkan cannot be categorized for 
a Swedish administrative authority in the usual triangulation of organizational activities, 
between the actual administration of issues, case handling and the exercise of public 
authority towards subjects. The proposed ways of working within the programme would 
mean SKV departing from the traditional and ordinary roles of public authorities as stated 
in administrative law (Bernitz and Reichel 2015). Simply put—what role would SKV have 
when it acts both as an arbiter and a consultant? What would the changing societal role of 
a tax administration which is engaged in co-operative compliance programmes with 
taxpayers do to the trust in SKV and to tax compliance in society writ large? 
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The reorientation of the organization of relationship is further underscored by how SKV 
tried to reformulate the first programme, Fördjupad samverkan from 2011, into 
Fördjupad dialog in 2014. Samverkan—literally meaning collaboration—was changed to 
Dialog—dialogue. The new guidelines were considerably shortened compared to those 
describing the previous programme and cooperation ambitions were much lower key. The 
change of name displays the ambition of retaining distance; it is now a dialogue instead of 
a collaboration emphasizing communication instead of working together.  
 
7.1.2 Dimension I: Summary 
The intention of this section was to compare how culture influenced the implementation of 
co-operative compliance measures in the Nordic countries. The co-operative compliance 
measures did result in cultural reorientations in all the Nordic countries.  
In the case of Denmark and Finland, time, space and the organization of relations are 
weighty elements of the cultural change that can be argued to happen through the 
reoriented interactions between tax administrations and large corporate taxpayers with the 
introduction of new principles and routines of working. The changes were contained by the 
process of setting up a new programme and units. This enabled taxpayers to locate the 
source of the changes and see them as part of a new and common frame for cooperation. It 
was a matter of an organizational change and not their own tax compliance level. In 
Norway, the main concern was with the temporal reorientation. Each taxpayer had to work 
out the meaning of those changes individually. However, the changes were contained by a 
long collaborative tradition. In Sweden, the spatial reorientation evoked strong reactions, 
and as there was neither any new organizational programme, nor a strong collaborative 
tradition to contain the changes, the plans for a co-operative compliance programme were 
considerably downsized.  
Each case exemplified the complex interplay between national context and co-operative 
compliance measures. A number of cultural reorientations were the result. Discussion of 
these reorientations revealed that there is more at stake in co-operative compliance than 
the simple action of voluntarily disclosing uncertain tax positions. The possible need to 
look into cultural nuances of the measures was not considered in any of the countries 
except Sweden where the programmes occasioned a heated public debate. Explicitly 
addressing cultural dimensions of such measures would make clearer unspoken criteria for 
assessment of compliance, criteria that have little to do with taxation per se. We have 
suggested a number of possible trajectories to investigate such criteria. The simplest way to 
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do it is for the tax administration and the taxpayer to go through the three key orientations 
together and clarify differences in orientations and discuss how to deal with them. These 
orientations are so fundamental that arriving at an agreement of what is the “right” 
orientation if they are very divergent may not be realistic. However, the more each side is 
aware that the differences exist and may skew their assessment of compliance, the more 
realistic will be the assessment.  
 
7.1.3  Dimension I: Recommendations  
• Consider collaboration about the conditions for co-operative compliance in terms of 
time, space and prior organization of relationships.  
• It is important to ground changes in ways of working. Inform taxpayers well in 
advance about organizational and routine changes in tax administration.  
• Agree internally on priorities and direction of changes internally before involving 
taxpayers.  
• Identify alternatives to either/or categorizations, for example the categorization of 
taxpayers into either compliant or recalcitrant, either friendly or hostile. 
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7.2 Dimension II: Efficiency evaluation 
The co-operative compliance initiative has been promoted by OECD with references to 
ideals of effectiveness and efficiency. Co-operative compliance is grounded on the 
assumption that when the tax control framework in the participating corporation is well 
documented and it has been declared effective by the tax administration “the extent of 
reviews and audits of the returns submitted can be reduced significantly” (OECD 2016, 7). 
Nevertheless, it is questioned whether these programmes lower the administrative costs, or 
further, whether co-operative compliance demands more human resources, in tax 
administrations and/or in corporations (Boll and Brehm Johansen 2018; de Widt and Oats 
2018). In this dimension we discuss the challenges of evaluating co-operative compliance 
programmes. 
The efficiency of taxation can be evaluated based on the costs of taxation and the related 
outputs (such as tax audits, responses given to taxpayers up front, education). Total costs 
of taxation can be divided into administrative costs and performance costs. The 
administrative costs of taxation fall both on tax administrations from collecting taxes and 
on corporate taxpayers in the form of administrative costs and tax planning. The 
performance costs of taxation are various unintended effects from taxation in society when 
taxpayers try to optimize their behaviour with the negative performance effects for society 
as a whole (Tuomala 2009, 175). 
Effectiveness is a concept that is used in evaluating whether an organization or a change 
programme has met the objectives and targets set a priori. Effectiveness means the extent 
to which tax administrations’ “activities and outputs achieve desired outcomes” (OECD 
2014, 14). The expected outcomes of co-operative compliance programmes are broader and 
more versatile than the decrease in administrative costs borne by tax administrations 
and/or large corporations. The expected outcomes of co-operative compliance programmes 
can relate to the following aspects of compliance (see also OECD 2014):  
• the amount of taxes collected/decreasing the tax gap 
• voluntary compliance  
• integrity and confidence in the tax administration system. 
It is somewhat self-explanatory that co-operative compliance programmes are expected to 
improve the overall level of compliance, and in particular, voluntary compliance. However, 
the programmes may also have influence over how taxpayers, or society more broadly, 
perceive the fairness of the tax system, and they can affect the level of confidence taxpayers 
have in tax administration.  
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As the expected outcomes of co-operative compliance are rather broad and versatile, those 
evaluating the programmes should not try to capture their costs and merits with a small 
number of narrow indicators, such as the audit yield (i.e. additional tax revenue resulting 
from tax audits) or number of corporations participating (de Widt and Oats 2018). Besides 
the outcomes in terms of taxes collected, co-operative compliance has the potential to 
impact the compliance environment: the extent to which corporations comply voluntarily, 
and integrity and confidence in the tax system. The potential impacts of co-operative 
compliance programmes on the integrity and confidence in the tax system, or the 
willingness to comply, are likely to manifest in the long short term, if at all. 
Broader evaluation of the effectiveness of a co-operative compliance programme could be 
based on a framework that is developed in a heuristic fashion for this specific purpose, and 
would include all three aspects above. Hence, in addition to the efficiency of taxation, the 
evaluation framework could include other broadly accepted criteria for good taxation. 
Accordingly, fairness between corporations in similar situations, decrease in performance 
costs from unintended economic consequences for society, and intelligibility or ease of 
compliance could be among those criteria (Tuomala 2009, 159).  
As the OECD (2014) report Measures of Tax Compliance Outcomes also points out, tax 
administrations need to carefully reflect the changes in taxation practices when designing 
indicators to assess the outputs and outcomes of these practices. While the evaluation of 
effectiveness and efficiency of co-operative compliance programmes is not 
unproblematic—and may potentially lead to other unintended consequences—similar 
reform evaluations have been conducted, however, in other areas, such as privatization (cf. 
Hodge 2000).  
This dimension shows that the extent to which different tax administrations have 
attempted to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of co-operative compliance varies 
considerably between countries. And so too does the anecdotal evidence on the outcomes 
of co-operative compliance vary. The evaluation of co-operative compliance programmes 
against the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness is difficult but merits thorough 
consideration. If these programmes are to be evaluated, a comprehensive set of indicators 
must be developed. One prevailing challenge is inferring which outcomes are attributable 
to co-operative compliance, or overall attributable to the tax administration’s actions, and 
which result from other contextual factors.  
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7.2.1 Dimension II: Comparison by drawing on practices/experiences 
Denmark: In 2008, a pilot of the Danish Tax Governance programme—then named 
“Enhanced Relationship”—was introduced primarily in order to make Skat’s work of 
regulating the largest Danish corporate taxpayers more efficiently. This was supposed to be 
obtained by using less manpower on resources demanding reactive audits and thus 
lowering costs associated with regulating the segment of large corporate taxpayers already 
judged compliant. A manager from Skat explains: 
Well, they have initiated this [Tax Governance] because the heaviest post we have resource-
wise is to go out and make audits in these corporations [the largest]. And because our 
resources have been cut back, we have to find out whether we can still have control of the 
many billions that need to come in every year and can we do it in a more appropriate way. 
And someone has been behind this approach that it could be done by having a dialogue with 
the corporation. […] It came to Denmark because the former general manager […] had 
attended an OECD-meeting and came home and said “we also need to try this”. (Interview, 
tax official) 
A part of the rationale of introducing Tax Governance is thus that through dialogue—and 
the more formalized elements of risk assessment and the instalment of internal control 
systems in corporations—the resources needed for securing tax compliance are lessened 
due to decreased need for resource demanding reactive audits. The efficiency agenda is 
thus primarily bound to lowering Skat’s administrative costs of regulating large corporate 
taxpayers. Skat however emphasizes that the new approach will also lower the resource 
demand in terms of administrative costs for corporations. However, our interviews show 
that evidence of the proposed decreased use of resources is still lacking. On the contrary—
and paradoxically—a couple of the corporations interviewed tell of the need to expand their 
tax departments—or re-staff with employees with other competencies—due to their Tax 
Governance engagement (Interview, tax directors). It can therefore be argued that through 
the demand for permanent control measures to be installed in corporations—such as 
internal control systems—some of the administrative costs of attaining compliance have 
been shifted from Skat to corporations.  
With regards to the aspect of effectiveness—the extent to which tax administrations’ 
“activities and outputs achieve desired outcomes” (cf. OECD definition above)—the picture 
is less clear in the Danish case since the overall purpose of Tax Governance is to:  
… establish a trust-based collaboration, which means that both the corporations who are 
included in the collaboration and Skat get greater security that the tax, VAT, duties, etc. paid 
is initially correct. This means that both the corporations and Skat need to use fewer 
resources on reactive audits from Skat. (From 2017, 1) 
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Here the goal of establishing trust-based collaborations is coupled to the expectation of 
lowered resource use with regards to reactive audits for both the corporations and Skat. So 
the efficiency element (reduced costs) is tightly coupled to the effectiveness of Tax 
Governance which then is hinged on both the establishment of trust-based collaborations 
(which are hard to measure) and lowered administrative costs.  
Skat usually measures the effects of its activities by drawing on quantitative data from 
internal records and IT-systems. But when the core elements of Tax Governance are dialogue 
and proactive work there is no quantitative information to use for measuring effects. 
Therefore it is a challenge to measure and provide evidence of the impact and outcomes of 
the Tax Governance programme when the overall purpose is to create enduring trust-based 
relations with large corporate taxpayers. A tax official says:  
It is difficult to say what parameters support us to get correct behaviour [tax compliance] and 
how we get a lasting effect because it is not about numbers it is about relations, it is about 
how you act, and that is for sure difficult to measure. (Interview, tax official) 
Another tax official adds:  
We talk about KPIs in Skat, well, what is it they want to measure? […] It gives no regulation if 
you can sit down with a corporation and say “we are not agreeing, you will get an adjustment 
if you do it like that”. Then they go home and do what we have suggested and then there will 
be no adjustment […] but the money will come in anyway and that is difficult to measure. But 
it is one of the things where we can say, well the effect of having dialogue might be that we see 
that this money will come in because they did something other than they had planned to do. 
(Interview, tax official)  
They all point to the behavioural and relational elements as the cornerstones of Tax 
Governance, but cornerstones that do not easily fit into the agenda of measuring 
efficiency—or effectiveness when efficiency is included as a goal. These considerations on 
the theme of measuring the effects of Tax Governance are spurred on by a critique from the 
National Audit Office, Rigsrevisionen. They have questioned Tax Governance exactly 
because of the lack of documentation on the efficiency of Tax Governance compared to the 
traditional control approach since Skat has not been able to “account for whether Tax 
Governance is a more or less resource demanding method to lower the tax gap compared to 
the traditional control” (Rigsrevisionen 2014, 22). The National Audit Office finds that the 
shift from traditional control to Tax Governance collaboration should have been based on a 
convincing collection of effects (ibid.). Partly as a response to this critique of lacking 
documentation on the efficiency of Tax Governance, Skat has reformed the programme 
(From 2017, 2) to encompass a phase model (phase 0–4) as this is to enable showing 
progress for the corporation as the moving between phases can be shown—and measured.  
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The Danish case thus shows that a strong separation of efficiency and effectiveness is not 
always the case. We have shown how these aspects are intertwined in the Danish case 
which has contributed to the fact that it is inherently difficult to measure the effects of Tax 
Governance. Running a programme based on elements such as collaboration, running 
dialogue and enduring trust-based relations is not necessarily easy in a context where 
quantitative performance measures and evaluation means are most often the standard.  
Finland: In line with ideals of effective and efficient use of resources, the Finnish tax 
administration has publicly argued that co-operative compliance with the largest corporate 
taxpayers was introduced with the aim of achieving as effective and efficient administrative 
procedures as possible while also achieving predictability and legal certainty (Vero 2017). 
While the hoped-for cost effectiveness of the approach came up in early meetings between 
the tax administrators and the researchers authoring the present working paper, and in 
some of the interviews, it does not seem likely that the tax administration has 
systematically attempted to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the approach.  
Within the tax administration, however, there were concerns about the increase in 
administrative costs for the Finnish taxation administration especially in the short run. It 
was unclear how much the need for specialist work would increase due to cooperative 
practices, and where this additional resource would be found. It was expected that the 
human resources needed for the new cooperative practices would be gained from 
automation of processes and reallocating resources from other activities of tax 
administration, more particularly from tax audits. 
In the longer run, however, the overall administrative costs of taxation are expected to 
diminish due to new practices. Both tax administration and large taxpayers are expected to 
benefit from a diminishing need for tax audits, whereby administrative costs are expected 
to decrease. In addition to cost considerations, the qualitative objectives for the 
programme, such as increased legal certainty and predictability, were significant. 
Further, the Finnish tax administration has specified the meaning of efficiency and 
effectiveness in the context of co-operative compliance somewhat differently from e.g. the 
OECD 2014 report: VERO states that in the context of co-operative compliance, “efficiency 
means handling the tax matters as close to real time as possible, and effectiveness refers to 
the goals of enhanced predictability and legal certainty” (Vero 2016).14 As already noted in 
                                                        
14 https://www.vero.fi/tietoa-
verohallinnosta/verohallinnon_esittely/uutiset/uutiset/2016/syvennetty_asiakasyhteistyo_osaksi_
kons/ 
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the case of Denmark, such qualitative goals are not easily convertible into quantitative 
metrics. 
As an interviewed tax administrator pointed out, the lack of systematic evaluation of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the programme does not mean that the issue has not been 
considered. Rather, the negative experiences concerning the inadequacy of evaluations in 
other countries and the overall difficulty of measuring efficiency and effectiveness have 
been among the reasons for not conducting a broader evaluation.  
Norway. In the Norwegian case, goals for the “Reinforced Dialogue” programme were to 
enhance dialogue and facilitate open and frank discussions about tax control routines. 
Discussions between LTO and the corporations were not initiated to deal with specific 
issues in individual corporations. The emphasis was on the meaning of compliance as a 
generic term, and how internal control systems could reduce the risk of incorrect tax 
returns. However, if gaps were uncovered, they would be investigated. Neither increased 
efficiency nor increased effectiveness figured prominently in the discussions in that 
programme. These outcomes were desired outcomes of LTO’s increased understanding of 
gaps in internal tax control routines. Refinement of the risk analyses tools on the other 
hand, were more clearly aimed at reducing costs and increasing revenue. It was therefore 
coupled to other agendas in Tax Norway than in only co-operative compliance measures 
per se. 
The tax administration early identified the need to evaluate the effects of the new 
initiatives. Several evaluation methods were considered, and the one finally chosen for 
further investigation was a methodology for measuring outcome of institution building 
programmes. A particular characteristic with the methodology was that it made use of the 
informants’ own theories and concepts. Not only should it make outcomes measurable in 
“objective” terms, outcomes should also be some of the criteria that participants used. In 
the end they were not used. We mention this example to point out how complex is the 
measurement of effects, efficiency and effectiveness.  
One habitual way to measure effectiveness was that the contact person for a corporation 
would assess the difference between expected tax revenue and actual tax revenue. The 
expected revenue would be estimated based on historical tax returns, previous experience 
and knowledge about strategic decisions since the previous filing of a tax return. Although 
this was part of the routine for the contact persons, the exact figures for each corporation 
would not add up to a grand total. The figures were discussed internally and in the teams, 
and provided a kind of road map for where to go in future. Apart from this, concerted tax 
gap mapping was not attempted. 
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Another habitual way to assess the outcomes was the yearly estimates of the amount of 
additional tax payments corporations had to make versus the amount of money returned 
by the tax administration to corporations as the result of tax controls/audits. Figures 
would be calculated separately for the tax administration and the corporations and the 
grand total added up. Some years the balance was in favour of the tax administration, in 
other years in favour of corporations. The tax managers interviewed explained that in the 
long run, it evened out. 
When it comes to assessment of administrative cost, there was a general notion that earlier 
and more precise targeting on corporations unwilling to pay taxes would reduce the 
administrative costs of tax audits. A full audit of the books of a multinational corporation 
was regarded as extremely costly and should be reserved for special cases where suspicions 
about tax fraud had been confirmed through several channels.  
Based on a survey of the willingness of Norwegian businesses to pay taxes, taxpayers either 
unwilling or lacking the skills and competence to do it properly were estimated to make up 
only a small percentage of the total business population in Norway. These are very rough 
estimates, but supported the LTO claim that corporations aim to comply. When it comes to 
large enterprises, there was even stronger certainty that they aimed to comply as the cost 
in terms of loss of reputation and credibility outweighed the cost of paying company tax.  
One tax manager stated that: “Tax is not a main criterion for doing business. We pay the 
required taxes. We could have used more resources (on tax management) … it is important 
to remember that tax is not crucial as a measurement of doing business” (tax director).  
Another tax director was concerned with the increased cost of hiring tax advisors, and how 
that compared with building up an internal tax administration. He said these were ongoing 
discussions and we did not get any actual figures or estimates about the corporations’ 
administrative costs. 
Yet another indicator habitually used to assess administrative costs was the number of 
companies per tax administrator. At the time of an organizational extension of the LTOs in 
2016, there was no great difference from the previous ratio. 
Even though this had little effect during the time of the initiatives investigated here, it is 
worth mentioning that Tax Norway is actively engaged in digitizing its services. Taxpayers 
have been segmented according to the complexity of their tax returns, and eventually only 
taxpayers with complex tax returns can expect personal service. Already the filing of 
citizens’ private tax returns and of small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) with simple 
tax affairs have been digitized. This is also a way to reduce administrative costs for the 
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individual taxpayer. Apart from some systems overloads and other “children’s diseases” 
(barnesykdommer) early in the process, digitization has been a successful and popular 
reform. So much so that only 40 per cent of individual taxpayers opened the suggested tax 
return from Tax Norway in 2018. The fact that individuals did not check their files at first 
caused some concern in the media as it was feared that responsibility for individuals’ tax 
returns had shifted to the tax administration. As there were few public complaints, nothing 
more happened. It is anyway a clear indication of Norwegians’ trust in Tax Norway. 
Sweden: An evaluation of efficiency has never had serious discussion in Sweden due to 
the still very tentative implementation of the programme. Yet, there are two issues to be 
raised following discussion about the programme’s imagined efficiency and effectiveness: a 
short-term pragmatic stance resolving everyday issues; and a longer-term question of 
effectiveness, collecting “the right tax” rather than explicitly decreasing the tax gap and of 
integrity and confidence in the tax system.  
As a background to what could be evaluated, Fördjupad samverkan, FS, was argued to be a 
more efficient and cost-effective way of working, both for corporations and for SKV. SKV 
argued that the benefits for participating corporations would be a quicker response time 
for questions posed; there would be less uncertainty in tax positions as questionable tax 
issues would be resolved before reporting; and there would be fewer issues to be decided in 
court. At SKV this way of working with corporations was argued to release more resources 
which could be concentrated on fighting taxpayers deemed more risky. In short it was seen 
as a modern and more efficient way of building relationships between large corporations 
and SKV. Yet SKV hosted internal critiques, voicing the opinion that SKV outsourced 
control to those who were supposed to be controlled. The efficiency aspect was thus more 
broadly questioned; what might be gained in the short term by being cost-effective and 
shorten response time for questionable tax issues would be lost in the longer term with 
corporations’ decreased compliance. Corporations also questioned the efficiency with 
initiatives like Fördjupad dialog; would only an extra workload be given to them? Would 
we do the work of SKV? asked several of the non-participating corporations.  
One of the few participating corporations initially took a sceptic stance towards the 
programme when it was introduced. Yet, the director of its tax department felt they had to 
try given earlier issues put to SKV. It had previously taken SKV 26 months to respond to 
the five unique but characteristic questions for this corporation’s specific situation and 
even so the responses given were not adequate enough to be translated into practice. 
“What did we have to lose?” he asked, “We had to try it out.” This corporation operates in 
peculiar circumstances where new tax issues continually spring up. There is a lot of “new” 
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knowledge needed for interpreting existing tax laws. The overarching question for this 
corporation is in regards to who will pay in any given new tax issue: the corporation, other 
corporations, the municipality, the state or private individuals?  
The accumulation of new knowledge regarding these taxation questions, both internally 
and at SKV, is the most important issue for the corporation. If possible, they would like to 
keep the contact person at SKV for much longer than the stipulated four years. “The only 
good thing about changing the initiative from Fördjupad samverkan to Fördjupad dialog 
was that now we can keep him for six years. He served for two years under the previous 
programme and with the new one we could start all over again”. Otherwise the change 
meant longer response times for questions posed by the corporation.  
Both co-operative compliance programmes have thus been very efficient for the 
corporation for several reasons. Issues are resolved much more quickly and it has given 
them access to more specialists, and thus knowledge, at SKV. The short-term issues can 
thus be easier to quantify and evaluate than the long-term goals: response time for issues 
raised, number of issues raised over a certain period of time, etc. The tax director said: 
We have a much larger range of cooperation possibilities [with FS/FD]. SKV has now more 
knowledge about us, which is deemed positive and which in turn has created opportunities 
for other ways of working together. There has been no resource demanding audit control 
since 2008. This is a very positive result as an audit control requires and takes up a lot of 
resources. (Interview, tax director) 
This leads us to the longer-term question, articulated in terms of the need for audit 
controls or not. These are very resource consuming; both for corporations subject to them 
and for SKV performing them. In the best of worlds, all would like to get rid of them, yet 
they are deemed to serve a purpose of efficiency in the long run. A tax expert at the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprises argued that it was better for SKV to retain working 
with audits instead of these modern, so-called efficiency-creating cooperations: “We would 
prefer that they perform more of the old-fashioned audits to catch the real crooks” 
(Interview, tax expert).  
Yet, the tax director of the participating corporation above was content that they had not 
been subject to audit control. Participation in the programme does not exclude any 
corporation from being part of SKV’s Common Risk Evaluation.15 This fact can empirically 
be questioned, based on the above corporation’s favourable experience of not being subject 
to audit since they started participating in the programmes. There is of course no proven 
                                                        
15 Allmänna riskvärderingen. 
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causality, but this corporation’s previous experience was in audits with a few years in 
between. The corporations’ contact person at SKV explained why they had not carried out 
any audits since the start of the cooperative programme: “We know the corporation better 
and thus know better when to audit them” (Interview, tax official).  
The discussion about pros and cons of audit control and its impact on tax compliance is a 
broader question that merits a discussion elsewhere, yet there seems to be a belief that the 
very threat of auditing anyone raises confidence in the tax system writ large in society. This 
discussion also points to co-operative compliance programmes being deeply intertwined 
with all other ways SKV conducts its work and relates to taxpayers. It would thus be very 
difficult to evaluate the long-term assessments of a qualitative way of collaborating.  
 
7.2.2 Dimension II: Summary 
Overall, evaluation of co-operative compliance programmes against the criteria of 
effectiveness and efficiency is very difficult. It is not unproblematic to try to find a point of 
comparison in order to determine what the outcomes would have been without co-
operative compliance. Therefore, it is difficult to infer which outcomes are attributable to 
co-operative compliance, or overall attributable to the tax administration’s actions. Based 
on data collected for the present research, it cannot be determined whether the use of the 
tax administration’s resources is more efficient than before or to say that co-operative 
compliance would have materialized in direct cost savings. Based on the cases of Denmark 
and Finland, co-operative compliance may have even increased the administrative costs, at 
least in the short run, for some corporation and/or tax administration. This is not to say, 
however, that collaborative compliance may not have brought about other improvements if 
evaluated with other criteria, such as improved communication between taxpayers and tax 
administration, or the potential reduction of tax risk if evaluated from the viewpoint of 
participating corporations.  
Denmark differed from other countries in that those evaluating tax administration (i.e. the 
National Audit Office) requested information on the efficiency and effectiveness of Tax 
Governance. As a result, this co-operative compliance programme was reformed to include 
more measurable elements, encompassing a phase model (phases 0–4). The phase model 
enables showing progress for the corporation as the moving between phases can be shown, 
and consequently measured. 
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7.2.3 Dimension II: Recommendations 
• Consider ways to evaluate the outcomes of the approach up front. 
• Given the qualitative nature of the expected outcomes, consider how previously used 
metrics of evaluation (e.g. audit yield) could, should and are interpreted.  
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7.3 Dimension III: Competences in tax administrations 
It has been proposed that “taxes are obscenely complex” (Clemens 1999, 518). A valid 
question is then what type of competence should tax officials have to deal with this 
complexity, especially when new ways of working programmes like co-operative 
compliance challenge routines and competences teased out over centuries. In the Nordic 
cases we saw several aspects raised regarding tax administrators’ competence. The 
questioning of competences was argued to be both on an individual and structural level. 
First, how can officials at the tax authorities help and/or teach a big corporation to 
mitigate its extremely complex accounting system with regards to reporting and paying the 
“right tax”? The large corporations that take part in co-operative compliance programmes 
have dedicated tax departments staffed by professionals, access to expert tax advisors and 
operate if not globally, certainly internationally. Their tax affairs are usually very 
complicated.  
Second, the competence requirements of tax administrators engaged in co-operative 
compliance were somewhat enlarged. It was not enough to be knowledgeable about the 
technical details of tax; they should be able to communicate with taxpayers. 
Problematizing the new competences that are required we draw on insights from the 
British tax administration, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). In the early 
2000s, new working practices at HMRC were introduced. Penelope Tuck describes how 
these new ways of working ultimately changed the identity of tax officials (Tuck 2010). The 
result was that HMRC’s formerly inward facing public officials with wide technical tax 
knowledge, here referred to as vertical knowledge, had to transform into “T-shaped” 
officials. As HMRC had increasingly taken on a strategic and marketing emphasis, a new 
style of officials had to emerge. It was one that had to master other skills in addition to 
traditional technical tax knowledge. Such an official had to be more outward looking and 
have “non-confrontational meeting skills, customer service skills, and treating taxpayers as 
customers, in addition to greater specialist knowledge as multinational corporates and tax 
legislation becomes increasingly complex (the horizontal part of the T)” (Tuck 2010, 594). 
In the Nordic co-operative compliance programmes, we see that additional skills are 
recognized in the new roles of being contact persons. Although they have to understand the 
overall tax technicalities of tax corporations, they should be able to deal with 
representatives of corporations, be good communicators and also have a large network 
within the tax administration so that issues raised by corporations could be duly forwarded 
to an expert and resolved. As Tuck notes, such a transformation of officials has impact both 
on social and organizational aspects and implications for tax policy writ large. 
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Third, internally at tax administrations tax officials’ competences were questioned. This 
issue was only pronounced in the Swedish case, emphasizing Sweden as being the extreme 
case of co-operative compliance. This was not a question of distrusting colleagues, but 
rather of tax administrations seen as vulnerable in relation to the much larger tax 
competence available to multinational corporations. This mirrors an old-fashioned view of 
adversity between tax administrations and large corporations; an adversity the very idea of 
co-operative compliance was set to fight. 
 
7.3.1 Dimension III: Comparison by drawing on practices/experiences   
Denmark: On the aspect of whether Skat employees are capable of assisting corporations 
in their efforts to pay the correct taxes, the Danish case shows that they are seen as 
competent and capable in this regard—when it comes to certain matters. In the realm of 
Tax Governance and on specific tax/legal matters corporations seem to be very content 
with the collaboration and guidance they receive from Skat. A Tax Director explains: “We 
call them [the relevant persons in Skat in the Tax Governance team] if there is something 
new or if we need to get something clarified (…) it is one of the elements that works well” 
(Interview, tax director). The element of presenting questions and dispositions that have 
unclear tax or legal consequences is generally very well perceived by corporations and 
explained to be of huge benefit to them. Importantly, this competency of the Tax 
Governance employees is also directly related to the core tax competences and legal 
knowledge of a well-trained tax official. 
However, regarding the competence repertoire of the tax official—especially Tax 
Governance managers—new dimensions and demands have been added. In the Danish 
case this is also found to be an explicit theme occupying employees both in the tax 
administration and in corporations. A tax official says: “Expressed in popular terms, we 
turn the cap; it does not say ‘control’ anymore, it says ‘guidance and service’” (Interview, 
tax official). This shift brings new competencies to the fore. The “control”-approach and 
tax specific knowledge have not been discarded, but other competencies are-drawn to the 
foreground as essential new elements of a Tax Governance manager—skills in risk 
assessment and internal control and also communication and social skills. Whereas the tax 
officials’ competences with regards to “old” core taxation skills are highly acknowledged 
and appreciated by corporations (as indicated above), skills related to risk assessment and 
internal control are not aired in the same appraising manner. A tax director explains that 
he does not think Skat is strong enough in their response: 
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As you know, it [the Tax Governance programme] starts with a process where we make this 
risk assessment and we say where things may go wrong (…). So, well, you may say, that we 
came with this introductory presentation of where we thought something may go wrong in 
our processes. But, I do not think that we got any response from Skat—because they are really 
not ready to engage in this mindset. And then I want to say, that when we do this, when we 
show where in the processes something may go wrong, then when it comes right down to it, 
then this is my words, or our words come to be worthy of credence. And well, here they [Skat] 
ought to be better at challenging us. Maybe they will later, over time, because [for them] it is a 
muscle that “needs training”. (Interview, tax director) 
Some tax directors also mention the long response times from Skat on materials submitted 
in the processes of reviewing specific areas of law in the collaboration. Moreover, their 
skills regarding internal control are questioned:  
You do notice, that they [Skat] do not k now, what a control is (…) the tax official has typically 
only worked in Skat, so they do not know, what a control is (…) In our first discussions it was 
quite clear that they [the tax officials] did not know what they asked for [when talking about 
internal control] and that made this part of the collaboration a bit hard, we had to try to talk 
to them about the fact that when you deal with control and risks then it is unavoidable to also 
talk about substantiality. (Interview, tax director) 
Over to Skat on the element of communication and social skills. One Tax Governance 
manager explains:  
So it [my role] is a lot about seeking dialogue, talking to people, being able to resolve conflicts 
[…] internally in Skat it can be a challenge [to work in this way] because we need to 
remember to inform each other that we go out [to the corporation] and all that. It is 
completely banal, but it is difficult to do collaboration outwardly if you cannot even 
coordinate and be in control internally. (Interview, tax official)  
In general, most of the Skat employees interviewed like the collaborative idea and way of 
working brought about by the introduction of Tax Governance. However, they also express 
a need to develop skills in order to satisfactorily master their reconfigured role in relation 
to corporations. Another Tax Governance manager says:  
I think you are not equipped [to this way of working]. You get chosen more or less randomly, 
who is seen to have the time and so on. In my mind it should be the case that the persons who 
are to work with this [Tax Governance] also have to get trained or educated and have some 
tools and methods. (Interview, tax official)  
The tax official gives an example that they need to be trained in the self-checking approach, 
egenkontroltilgangen, instead of the tax control approach, skattekontroltilgangen, since 
they are two very different principles of working.  
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Summing up, the Danish case shows that when it comes to the core issue of 
professionalism of tax officials, their knowledge and skills on taxation matters are 
generally found to be good. When it comes to knowledge and skills on risk assessment and 
internal control the picture is less positive. These skills are seen as inadequate by both tax 
officials themselves and the tax directors they work with. This is problematic as such skills 
might be termed potentially future core elements of the professionalism of tax officials. It 
must be mentioned that this issue has been dealt with by the tax administration in recent 
educational initiatives. Last, an element of competences not so closely connected with the 
specific taxation work are the specific process and collaboration related knowledge and 
skills in the areas of communication, contextual knowledge of the corporations and general 
social skills. When tax compliance becomes a collaborative endeavour will these skills 
increase in importance for the collaboration to work well?  
Finland: “The right tax at the right time” is an old tax administration slogan, which was 
said to be still valid today. The tax administration’s task under Syvennetty is to help its 
customers find out what is the “right tax” and finding the “right tax” should be the common 
goal for the taxpayer and the tax administration. In search of the “right tax”, taxpayers 
should be able to trust the guidance given by the KOVE personnel. The opinion was that 
the taxpayer must be able to trust the discussion, the content of the discussion, which 
would place a relatively extensive burden and responsibility on tax administrators on what 
they say. To succeed in finding the “right tax”, in cooperation with the customer, the first 
requirement for the tax administration personnel is the ability to cooperate and to 
communicate. Second, providing trustworthy advice for customers requires adequate 
expertise of the personnel to handle all the complicated taxation issues. As one of the 
interviewed tax officials stated: “Of course we should have the expertise so that we are able 
to give them the right guidance”. (Interview, tax official). Some of the KOVE informants 
doubted whether KOVE employees always had the expertise: “… sometimes I felt like, are 
we now really sure of what we are doing, a little bit like, oh help, we are really here pretty … 
one should be able to do so much and one should know so much". (Interview, tax official) 
The KOVE interviewees opined that providing good customer service and good answers 
help in getting clients to disclose relevant issues. In addition, KOVE has to be transparent 
and open and has to disclose its intentions to clients. Openness creates openness, which is 
a crucial factor in successful cooperation. Providing “good customer service” requires the 
right kind of service attitude and considering taxpayers as customers. Interviewees in 
corporations understood that new communication requirements might pose difficulties for 
personnel of tax administration. The transition from written exchanges of opinion to face-
to-face discussions, where commenting and expressing opinions in real time is of the 
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essence, requires new skills and determination. To develop these new skills, personnel 
have to be willing and able to make the transition. The inward facing officials have to 
become outward looking. This also became evident in some of the tax officials’ discussions. 
A tax official explains: 
It [Syvennetty] does require something else in addition to command of the substance; for us 
it is the cultural change, also this kind of social, that is we have meetings with the clients, it is 
a different kind of guidance, when you just write your decision on paper, for me personally it 
has been a threshold here, that you go and meet face to face and that you have to, or you do 
not have to be able to give the answer right away, but in a sense it requires, it is more 
demanding in my opinion. (Interview, tax official) 
Syvennetty requires openness, which does not come easily to all personnel of the tax 
administration, was the opinion. As chemistry between the personnel of tax administration 
and companies’ representatives was also seen as an important factor in making the 
cooperation work, it was argued that working in Syvennetty was not for every member of 
the personnel in KOVE. Instead, it was suggested that personnel had to be selected 
carefully, as the old mistake-oriented attitude still may exist.  
One of the requirements for the new “T-shaped tax official” is greater specialist knowledge, 
which was evidenced in the interviews. It was acknowledged that with increasing 
internationalization the regulatory environment around taxation is becoming ever more 
complex and demanding. This, combined with the Syvennetty goal of working in real time, 
demands high expectations from the knowledgeable tax administrator, whose advice 
customers are to be able to trust. This ability to trust is a precursor to successful 
cooperation. Comments on the required level of expertise were twofold: for some contacts, 
this was a source of some concern, while some saw that KOVE expertise was the very 
reason cooperation between KOVE and companies had succeeded. Adequate expertise was 
also named as a prerequisite for impartiality: with enough expertise, tax administrators 
would have the courage to take a stand and not play it safe siding with tax recipients.  
Norway: In the following each of the three aspects are discussed in turn: understanding 
business; skills to deal with people and technical (tax legal) skills; respect for competences 
of others in the organization. 
The first aspect relates to the kind of knowledge required to assess the “right” tax. Two 
kinds of knowledge can be distinguished. In line with working definitions at the Norwegian 
tax administration they are “tax risk monitoring” or “tax management”. Tax monitoring is 
the prerogative of the tax administration. In simple terms, “tax risk monitoring” means to 
be alert to the goings on in corporations, to register signals that something is not quite 
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right and a possible loss of tax revenue. This requires tax administrators to follow the news 
about the corporation, read their publications, or send emails or call to check up on 
relevant information and so on. “Tax management” on the other hand is what the 
corporations do to manage the tax part of their financial affairs. Corporations have various 
management systems. One example of a management system is as follows: A general tax 
strategy is decided annually by the board. The tax strategy provides a general framework 
for assessing risk, for each country and in total. Separate tax memos, which assess the tax 
risk and gain of individual deals are written as needed. The tax memos are decided on a 
case-by-case basis at different levels of the management hierarchy, following the 
established order of delegation. Decisions and outcomes are registered in the accounting 
systems, and reported with ordinary financial reports, or when the tax administration or 
other licensed parties require facts and figures. Accounting departments are large; 
however, the separate tax units, if any, are small. The tax risk assessed by a corporation is 
different from the risk assessed by the tax administration. One way that tax administrators 
assess the quality of the tax management systems is by noting to what extent the 
corporation repeatedly make mistakes. (The tax administration was unwilling to share 
details about their “mistake criteria”, so as not to alert corporations to what they were 
looking for). When repeated mistakes occur, the corporation is regarded as a risk case, and 
observed mistakes would be a topic in the regular meetings. Corporations did not report 
scepticism of the qualifications of tax administrators, but expressed concern that 
cooperation would benefit if the tax administration had more understanding of the nature 
of their business operations. On the other hand, their specialist competence on taxation 
was also appreciated. The organizational culture of LTO is also well known among its 
external stakeholders. An interest group representative fondly referred to LTO as a place 
for the “nerdy” tax people, those whose main interest is corporate taxation for its own sake, 
not for the money or careers. A prominent tax lawyer said he found LTO people accessible 
and competent. He could contact them when a client asked about a new tax planning 
scheme of which he was in doubt. His experience was that LTO staff were willing to talk 
through such issues without committing to or expecting commitment to any one solution. 
The “Office way” is an early example of a co-operative compliance practice.  
The second aspect, relates to technical or person skills, both of which were identified as 
crucial for achieving good cooperation. Legal or economics qualifications, or long 
experience, were required for employment. However, recruiting tax administrators with 
“people skills” was a key concern as well. This was a special requirement for those tasked 
with being contact persons for corporations. The appropriate mix of technical and people 
skills was achieved by the composition of teams. Another example of the concern with 
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people skills was the introductory programme for new employees. It was a basic 
programme where the main tenets of the formalized organizational culture were 
introduced. Employees were advised to be particularly aware of their position of power, 
and to be careful with the words they used. They were for example advised to not use the 
adverb “very” at all (very late, very untidy), as it could easily be interpreted to mean much 
more than intended.  
On the third aspect, about internal respect for others’ qualification, a most telling example 
was the difference between the two “schools of thought”, the Skatt Øst and the LTO way 
(see also section 7.4. There was internal disagreement as to how strict or how 
understanding the tax administration should be towards a corporation. Discussions were 
ongoing and took place internally at seminars, over lunches and during interviews. 
Another aspect of qualifications mentioned by several tax administrators was that as the 
tax administration required a high quality of corporation, the tax administration needed to 
provide the same in return. They need to be fully up to date and have expert knowledge, so 
that corporations can maintain the respect that was the result of years of systematic 
investment in competence and high-quality relations.  
Sweden: There were various opinions on the competence of tax administration officials. 
Several representatives from corporations said that SKV employees are helpful and friendly 
and this goes well with private citizens, qua taxpayers. But corporate taxpayers were 
concerned that when it comes to the more detailed, in-depth knowledge about complicated 
tax matters the issue is different. On specific questions they get answers through 
Dialogueen16 which they overall seemed content with; the issue of competence seemed to 
be more directed towards the larger question of business knowledge. Yet, again it is 
important to underline that very few corporations have actually engaged in any of these 
programmes so their views are stated on previous experiences and imagined ways of 
working. 
From the perspective of SKV, most stated that this criticism was somewhat unfounded. The 
contact persons at Agency are selected for their experience and communication 
capabilities. One official qua contact person meant that most questions he received were 
quite simple ones, either he could respond himself or find someone else at SKV who could 
provide an answer. In certain cases, he corresponds with SKV’s legal department. This 
                                                        
16 Dialogen is a way for corporations to pose very specific questions to SKV either by email or by 
phone. The advantages with Dialogen are said to be several: corporations obtain SKV’s view on 
issues from a tax perspective prior to making doubtful transactions; and the possibility of quickly 
solving unclear issues. Corporations are pleased with Dialogen as it has made taxation issues less 
insecure and more predictable. Questions posed through Dialogen are anonymous which means 
that SKV cannot connect issues with actual tax returns. 
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contact person reflected that his work had started to look like legal consulting; a task he 
found somewhat strange. Regarding the help SKV provides, this contact person was proud 
that on the contrary “his” corporation had adopted several of SKV’s proposals.  
The Tax Director of this corporation that operates in peculiar circumstances continually 
encounters new tax issues. There is a lot of “new” knowledge needed for interpreting 
existing tax laws. With Fördjupad dialog issues are resolved much more quickly as it gives 
them unprecedented access to more specialists throughout SKV. The SKV contact person 
seems thus able to communicate well both throughout the tax administration and with the 
corporation. “We have a much larger cooperation range [with these programmes]” says the 
tax director, “SKV has now more knowledge about us” (Interview, tax director). 
What is missing in the simplified critique from some corporations is what competence is at 
stake. It was never meant that SKV would solve all complicated tax issues through co-
operative compliance but would rather help corporations identify issues that make taxation 
in Sweden unnecessarily cumbersome. SKV would for example help corporations to be 
timely in the manifold reporting deadlines or help them identify why certain errors are 
made repetitiously. Second, the contact person is the contact; it is not s/he who decides but 
instead forwards questions to specialists within SKV. The competence should perhaps not 
be specific tax knowledge but rather being a “people person”. The contact person had to 
deal directly with the corporation: in writing, in phone conversations and in meetings. The 
contact person had to ensure that a good, constructive and trustworthy relation was 
established and maintained. SKV seems to have adopted many of the requirements 
identified in T-shaped tax officials. 
Yet, other tax officials not directly engaged in Fördjupad samverkan or Fördjupad dialog 
were concerned about SKV’s lack of competence. They questioned if “we”, SKV, were at risk 
of being cheated by letting those who should be controlled, control themselves. Such a view 
moves beyond the requirements of T-shaped tax officials and expresses questions of 
distrust. 
 
7.3.2 Dimension III: Summary 
The question of competences required by tax officials was raised in all countries. As co-
operative compliance means a changed way of working this issue is quite obvious. Yet, how 
the requirement for changed competences was articulated differed somewhat; on the one 
hand between countries and on the other hand between corporations and tax 
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administrations. Participating corporations and tax administrations do not look for the 
same criteria in assessing competences. 
First, that tax officials lack knowledge about business reality was a view expressed by 
corporations in all four countries. In both Finland and Norway this requirement was 
expressed as knowing how to assess the “right tax”, in Denmark as lack of “contextual 
knowledge”. Danish corporations expressed the view that there was no question that the 
contact persons had vertical knowledge, the old-fashioned technical tax ones. Yet regarding 
risk assessment, internal control and also social and communication skills, the Danish tax 
officials might be somewhat lagging behind. The Norwegian tax professionals seemed 
largely content and happily acknowledged that discussions could be had with tax officials 
regarding tax planning schemes. Corporations in Sweden, being the extreme case, were not 
all negative about the competence. One of the few participating corporations said they were 
quite satisfied. The tax director got answers so much quicker and SKV had also learnt 
about their requirements which made for much quicker responses. One could perhaps 
argue that “one always wants more” and if the question is posed there can always be 
additional requirements—wishes—for making a service even better.  
Second, we initially drew on the experiences from the UK’s HMRC and learnt from the new 
“T-shaped official”. The additional, “new” knowledge that a T-shaped official required—the 
“horizontal” knowledge—in Denmark was expressed as a skill for resolving conflicts, in 
Finland as providing good customer service and good answers to help in getting clients to 
disclose relevant issues, and in Sweden it was articulated that the contact person should be 
a “people person”. There seems to be a lot to learn from the Norwegian experience with its 
long institutional collaboration with corporations that Skatteetaten has had through its 
LTO department. High competence (e.g. in technical tax-related questions) and high 
“people” skills is the recipe for a successful workforce (the LTO way). Employees in the 
department express pride in this way of working and corporations generally agree. 
Interestingly communicative skills are appreciated through the contact person’s 
“nerdiness”, e.g. through strong vertical tax knowledge.  
Yet, several tax administrations also acknowledged that co-operative compliance should be 
a team effort on the tax administration side. As tax officials at HMRC acknowledged, now 
we have to work in teams (Tuck 2010, 593). 
Third, regarding the reluctant view from within tax administrations, it seems more a 
systemic concern than one of individual competences. The Swedes were not the only ones 
expressing concerns that revealing too much would make SKV an easy target for tax 
planning schemes to pass. The Finns said that adequate expertise among tax officials was a 
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prerequisite for impartiality; contact persons would then have the courage to take a stand 
and not play it safe siding with tax recipients. Ultimately, such concerns do reflect the 
older way of working where corporations and tax administrations are seen as true 
adversaries.  
All in all, it seems that the competence question is something that can be worked upon. By 
communicating, tax administrations and corporations will learn about each other’s 
competences, and ways of working can accordingly be adapted. But competence is not 
static; it has to be maintained so that respect can continuously be earned.  
 
7.3.3 Dimension III: Recommendations 
• It is important that the right contact persons are selected: they have to be “T-shaped” 
both in understanding technical tax issues and in how to communicate well—with the 
corporation and within the tax administration so that issues raised can be quickly and 
correctly resolved. 
• Tax administrations need to carefully and explicitly explain the work tasks included 
in a proposed co-operative compliance programme. What are the tasks for 
corporations and tax administrations respectively and what competencies are needed 
to fulfil them? With such preparation both parties can be confident that no one is 
being “used”. This seems an essential ingredient in building trust (see also section 
7.6). Be very explicit on what can be expected from the collaboration and on what 
competences are needed on both sides. Perhaps teams are the way forward as very 
few people can completely fill out the T-shaped suit? 
• Have patience and be generous when competence requirement changes. “Openness 
creates openness” it was said in the Finnish case, thus the initiating party—the tax 
administration—needs to lead the way. 
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7.4 Dimension IV: Structural and organizational hindrances  
Under this dimension, hindrances that influence the way co-operative compliance 
programmes fare are to be discussed. They are grouped in two categories:  
• External structural elements  
• Internal organizational elements  
We draw on a classical definition of social structure to define the external structural 
elements. These are: “… groups, institutions, laws, population characteristics, and sets of 
social relations that form the environment of the organisation” (Stinchcombe 2013 [1965], 
142). Such a strong disconnection of organization and environment—as Stinchcombe 
suggests—is questioned in much contemporary organization theory since they are 
increasingly seen as interconnected. However, for the purpose of this analysis this 
definition is useful for pointing to different kinds of hindrances, some that are primarily 
sourced outside organizations (outside tax administrations and corporations) and some 
that are primarily sourced within organizations. It is important that the internal 
organizational elements are included, since they also set specific frames for how the co-
operative compliance collaborations can unfold—for example through the existence of 
coexisting organizing principles or the introduction of internal soft law regulations not 
aimed at the specific programme but nevertheless affecting the co-operative compliance 
programmes. Neither of these elements can determine the outcomes of the co-operative 
compliance programmes, but as we will see can any of them can be strong hindrances to 
the running of the programmes. 
The specific elements to be considered under the two categories of this dimension are 
selected since they are strong frames around and influence activities in the co-operative 
compliance programmes studied. The specific elements have all emerged from the 
empirical material for example in interviews with employees in tax administrations and 
with tax directors from corporations. Elements in the category external structural 
elements mostly influence the very mandate of the tax administrations and the co-
operative compliance programmes in different ways; while elements in the category 
internal organizational elements of the tax administrations and the corporations are in 
general slightly more subtle and implicit hindrances. However, both kinds partake in 
shaping the way co-operative compliance programmes fare.  
This dimension is included in the comparison due to its prominence in the empirical 
material of the co-operative compliance programmes studied. Yet, it is also included 
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because it consists of relatively hard to change elements. Such elements are important to 
keep in view when considering the “fit” between a co-operative compliance programme and 
the specific “tax landscape” in which it is to be implemented.  
The analysis below shows that across cases we generally find similar kinds of hindrances, 
some of which are external structural hindrances and some of which are internal 
organizational hindrances. External structural hindrances are matters connected to legal 
issues—such as public access to documents, equality and possibilities of attaining binding 
responses from the tax administration. The internal organizational elements comprise 
organizing principles (in both the tax administration and corporations) challenging the 
work with the co-operative compliance programme; different but coexisting “schools of 
thought” in tax administration and internal discussions in tax administration on 
impartiality. Overall, regarding the external structural hindrances we show that legal 
matters can come to impede a programme while internal organizational hindrances are 
more subtly shaping the way programmes unfold.  
 
7.4.1 Dimension IV: Comparison by drawing on practices/experiences   
Denmark: In the Danish co-operative compliance programme—Tax Governance—several 
issues relating to structural and organizational hindrances have been at stake for the 
employees in Skat (the Danish Tax and Customs Administration) and for the tax directors 
in participating corporations—which are the primary informants in the Danish case. In the 
following, two structural hindrances will be presented: (1) the issue of non-binding 
responses and (2) the decreased possibility of signing off issues due to overall public 
sentiment regarding Skat. In addition three internal organizational hindrances are 
discussed: (1) a guideline on when to start case work, (2) the internal departmental 
organization of Skat, (3) aspects of internal organization of corporations found not easily 
fitted to the Tax Governance programme. These five elements are all in different ways 
hindrances to the smooth daily running of the Tax Governance programme. 
Regarding the first structural hindrance, the issue of non-binding responses, legislatively 
stated there is no possibility for corporations to get a binding response on issues taken up 
in the realm of the Tax Governance collaboration. The responses they can get are informal 
advance notifications, uformelle forhåndstilkendegivelser, which are only indicative of 
Skat’s position on an issue. The status of these responses is a key concern in the 
collaboration as one of the main incentives for corporations to participate in Tax 
Governance is that they are to get certainty in exchange for transparency (cf. OECD 2013, 
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29; Skat 2018); yet certainty can never be “certain”, but only “indicative” when it comes to 
informal advance notifications. Several interviewed tax directors explain that they have 
experience that despite the non-binding character of the responses they can obtain in the 
realm of Tax Governance collaboration, the responses are typically not contradicted later 
in the processes. Hence, these tax directors find this not to be a problem. Others—in 
contrast—find the non-binding character of the informal advance notifications and the 
insecurity associated with it rather unsatisfactory. A tax director for example explains that 
it is a problem, that corporations commit to being open and disclose their tax 
dispositions—that is, provide transparency—but in return they only receive informal 
advance notifications on how Skat interpret their questions (Interview, tax director). 
Clearly there is a discrepancy between the aim to provide “transparency in exchange for 
certainty” within the Tax Governance programme and the legally defined frame within 
which the programme operates, which states that only informal advance notifications can 
be provided. If a corporation wishes to get a definitive answer they must apply for a 
binding response on equal terms with corporations not part of Tax Governance.  
The second structural element in the Danish case is the experienced decreased possibility 
of getting minor issues signed off in the corporations’ interaction with Skat. Several tax 
directors explain that they have experienced a shift towards more restricted Tax 
Governance employees when it comes to the possibility of signing off minor issues. Issues 
that have no direct revenue or tax-related significance but issues that may cause great 
administrative workload for a corporation to correct—for example to provide the 
possibility of taxing an asset a year later than planned or to correct an administrative error 
only going forward—and not from years back—if it only concerns administrative issues and 
not actual revenue. Importantly, here we are not talking about “sweet-deals”, but only 
acceptance or “signing off” on issues of an administrative character, which eases daily 
administration in corporations. Tax directors ascribe this shift to the structural element of 
public opinion of and media pressure on Skat. A tax director explains that he finds the 
decreased accommodation from the Tax Governance employees on these kinds of issues to 
be partly caused by case handling and critical cases in Skat more broadly, cases and 
decisions that have made it to the media and to public opinion and he finds that it has 
restricted the Tax Governance employees’ scope for action (Interview, tax director). In 
plain words, Tax Governance employees are seen to be afraid of making a front page if they 
are too accommodating to corporations and employees are wary about adding a new case 
to the somewhat critical image that the Danish tax administration has already experienced 
having in public opinion. This said, it can be hard to judge whether this is the prime reason 
for an experienced shift in the Tax Governance employees’ possibilities of signing off 
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issues. Because, in addition to the media and public opinion, another contributory factor is 
the issuing of a case handling guideline on when to start casework, which we will now turn 
to as one of the internal organizational hindrances for Tax Governance.  
The first internal organizational hindrance to be discussed on the basis of the Danish case 
is a guideline issued by the Danish tax administration on when to start casework. The 
guideline was issued to support correct, uniform and legal case handling when Skat starts a 
case (Skat 2016)—and is an example of a soft law regulation. It is however also found to 
lessen the individual employees’ discretion and personal judgement on the question of 
when to start casework—precisely because it is quite detailed on when cases must be taken 
up. This has been pointed to as a central hindrance for Tax Governance and is mentioned 
by many of the tax directors in corporations who were interviewed. As indicated, this 
guideline is found to lessen the manoeuvre room for tax officials to prioritize on the basis 
of the weight of an issue. The guideline has therefore in the eyes of many of the tax 
directors interviewed made the question of substantiality a key concern in collaboration 
with their Tax Governance manager. With “substantiality” we refer to the question of what 
it is important to prioritize to take up in Tax Governance collaboration. Tax directors find 
it a waste of resources to have to deal with issues that might mean close to nothing for the 
amount of tax they are to pay but prefer to work on issues of major substantiality and thus 
significance in the realm of Tax Governance. However, corporations find that they need to 
use resources to deal with details of no economic significance due to the hesitance of the 
employees in tax administration to prioritize or sign off issues when collaborating with 
corporations (Boll and Brehm Johansen 2018, 31–37) due to the guideline. Moreover, it 
can easily be the case that the guideline can impede corporations’ willingness to be 
transparent about their tax dispositions—one of the central elements of co-operative 
compliance—and therefore can also be a hindrance in this regard. 
The second organizational hindrance to be discussed here is the internal organization of 
Skat. The way Skat is organized has been pointed to by some Skat employees interviewed, 
as well as tax directors from corporations as a hindrance to a well-functioning 
collaboration. Internally in Skat, the issue of not having the necessary resources anchored 
in the office for large corporations is mentioned as having caused initial difficulties for the 
running of Tax Governance. A tax official describes it as a challenge that some of the Tax 
Governance specialists are anchored in other departments where they do not operate with 
a collaborative approach and do not necessarily prioritize Tax Governance questions even 
though they are to be answered in a faster time frame (Interview, tax official). This is more 
overall related to operating a traversing programme in an otherwise silo divided 
organization like Skat. 
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The third organizational hindrance we want to draw out from the Danish case is slightly 
different in character than the previous two since it relates to considerations of how the 
internal organizational set-up in a corporation is compatible with entering Tax 
Governance. From interviews with tax directors of the corporations we give two examples 
of how specific internal organizing principles in corporations are used in consideration of 
whether to go into Tax Governance or not. These organizing principles have in some 
instances been contributory factors for why corporations have chosen not to participate in 
Tax Governance. One corporation explains that they have a decentralized organization and 
a very small tax department with just two persons who are responsible for the more 
strategic tax decisions, while different local financial departments deal with the specific 
work related to VAT, salary, travel, etc. The tax director explains that the decentralized 
organization makes it difficult for him to have an overview of all taxation processes—which 
is a prerequisite in Tax Governance because of the centrality of the elements of tax risk 
assessments and internal controls on close to all different taxation areas in a given 
corporation. Moreover, he is critical of the assumption of Tax Governance that a tax 
director should have this detailed overview of the organization (Interview, tax director). 
Second, a tax director from a private, family-owned corporation—with neither a large 
shareholder base nor a general public to be accountable to—explained this to be a 
contributory reason for not participating in Tax Governance because they could not use 
their participation in a strategic manner in relation to these stakeholders (Interview, tax 
director). These are examples of how elements of internal organization of the corporation 
are used as an argument for not participating in a co-operative compliance programme or 
at least as a hindrance to be overcome before entering.  
Finland: In the Finnish case, the main external structural hindrance for living up to the 
principle of “certainty in exchange for transparency” (OECD 2013, 29) is that tax 
administrators cannot issue binding responses as part of Enhanced Customer 
Collaboration; a hindrance that mirrors one of the central hindrances in the Danish case.  
While one of the aims with co-operative compliance is to resolve unclear tax issues up front 
and to avoid potentially lengthy litigation processes, the extent to which the guidance given 
by tax administrators within co-operative compliance gives protection of trust in a legal 
sense raised doubts among the interviewees. While the legal principle of “protection of 
trust” is codified in the Finnish tax legislation (see Knuutinen 2014; Tax Assessment 
Procedure Act), both the tax administrators and the representatives of the corporate 
taxpayers interviewed were hesitant about how the principle of protection of trust is being 
practised in the context of co-operative compliance. In principle, the protection of trust 
relates to cases where the tax matter is open to interpretation, the taxpayer has acted bona 
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fide, and the taxpayer follows the guidance given by the tax administration. However, the 
corporate tax directors interviewed expressed concerns about under what circumstances 
the guidance given to taxpayers would actually result in the protection of trust in favour of 
the taxpayer in case of potential litigation. They assumed that the bar for considering the 
guidance given as legally binding is rather high. Further, if the matter is open to 
interpretation, the tax administration may encourage the corporation to apply for an 
advance ruling from the Central Tax Board. An additional nuance to the structural 
hindrance to achieving certainty in real time, which often came up in the interviews, was 
the possibility that the unit within VERO entitled “Tax Recipients’ Legal Services [Vova]” 
may appeal against a tax assessment decision. An interviewed corporate tax director 
expressed as follows: 
We have started from the assumption that when they reply to us in an email, or elsewhere, it 
is binding. On the other hand we have talked about the role of Tax Recipients’ Legal Services 
Unit [Vova] … But well, the impression that we have is that if they want to flag or show or 
present something to Vova, they will also tell it to us at the same time. Then we will have the 
information that Vova may appeal and it is not a surprise then … But we have somehow 
thought sincerely, that they are willing to change practices [through co-operative 
compliance]. (Interview, corporate tax director) 
By contrast, e.g. the Dutch Tax Administration can issue binding responses as part of co-
operative compliance as documented by de Widt and Oats: “enquiries, or other fiscal issues 
about which NTCA [The Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration] client managers 
are uncertain, must be forwarded to working groups of tax inspectors that operate at the 
national level, who discuss the matter and provide binding advice on how to deal with it” 
(de Widt and Oats 2018, 12–13). Such mechanism for getting a binding response as a part 
of co-operative compliance does not exist in Finland, apart from binding advance ruling 
through regular routes, which all corporations can apply for. In this regard the Finnish 
case is similar to the Danish case.  
With regards to internal organizational hindrances, uncertainty on questions of 
impartiality and equal treatment of taxpayers has been such a hindrance in the Finnish 
case. Impartiality and equal treatment of taxpayers have been central concerns discussed 
broadly within the tax administration and to some extent also by other stakeholders. The 
tax officials interviewed explained that while some corporations have been invited to 
participate in co-operative compliance, all corporations have the possibility of participating 
if they fulfil the criteria and have the right attitude for participating in co-operative 
compliance: 
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If a corporation says that they would like to participate, we do not close the door on anyone. 
Then we see what phase they are in, if they fulfil the prerequisites, if they have the attitude … 
That way we see that impartiality and equitability are not a problem. Anyway, we do not 
promise that you will not be audited, or that you have better rights than others. We do not 
promise that kind of thing, so there will not be problems regarding equitability. (Interview, 
tax official) 
Further, encouraging the corporation to apply for advance ruling in matters that are open 
to interpretation was viewed as improving legal certainty and equal treatment of taxpayers 
in general. For example, a tax official stated that: “We can say that ok, this is such a 
challenging case and open to interpretation, that for your legal certainty, we encourage you 
to apply for advance ruling” (Interview, tax official). So while the lack of advance rulings 
was seen as a hindrance to the protection of trust and legal certainty given to the particular 
participating corporation, it was also considered to enhance equal treatment of taxpayers 
in general.  
The Finnish case thus points to the issue of binding responses and uncertainty with 
regards to the question of impartiality as the main hindrances for Syvennetty.  
Norway: In the Norwegian case several hindrances have influenced the co-operative 
compliance initiatives. We will present one external structural and two internal 
organizational hindrances as they came up in interviews and were the occasion for several 
green-papers, meetings and seminars. 
The external structural hindrance was in the organization and coordination with other 
compliance initiatives, for example in relation to transfer pricing (TP), Base-and-Erosion 
Profit Shifting (BEPS) and country-by-country reporting. We describe issues related to 
such initiatives as external because these originate in institutions outside Tax Norway and 
are translated into national tax law and regulations. In implementation, administrative 
resources and skills must be developed. We present TP as the example below: 
In the case of TP, the initiative came from OECD and the World Bank. In response, SKD 
established a separate “national programme” (Riksprosjekt) to build up internal 
competence and to deal with compliance issues in TP cases. Administrators from this 
programme could be asked to assist the teams responsible for a corporation, but they could 
also initiate investigations of their own. This resulted in confusion. Several tax managers 
reported that it was no longer clear which part of the tax administration did what or even 
who their contact person was. The TP-issue also gave fuel to a discussion about ongoing 
clarification and to what extent a ruling was binding for the tax administration. Tax 
Norway firmly held on to the principle that TP-considerations could not be made binding. 
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There were too many risk factors involved. The chances that international conditions as 
well as national tax regimes could change did not make that feasible. Such a ruling could 
bind the tax administration for years to come and in worst case, result in unequal 
treatment of taxpayers. The international companies and their tax advisors were equally 
concerned because to them their TP-system was an important part of their fiscal 
management. Not knowing how a large investment or new distribution channels would be 
assessed in terms of compliance increased the financial risk of the contract. The decisions 
about excluding TP-considerations raised doubt about the predictability of the process, 
although tax managers said they understood the dilemma of the tax administration. 
However, as companies had to pay for ongoing clarification, it also raised questions about 
the value of the service. We see all these challenges in relation to the 
administration/clarification of TP as an external hindrance to the work in Tax Norway 
because the initiative did not come from within the organization itself. 
The first internal organizational hindrance we will mention in relation to the Norwegian 
case is the existence of two different “schools of thought” in the tax administration. In 
corporations and among tax advisors, they were referred to as either “LTO” or “Skatt Øst”. 
Both held that the small percentage of taxpayers who were outright unwilling to pay taxes 
should be dealt with in no uncertain terms. Taxpayers who cheated should be brought to 
court. However, there were also differences in the two approaches. The LTO approach is 
based on ideas that most taxpayers are competent and aim to comply. Some taxpayers lack 
the skills or systems to get it right. The best approach towards them is friendly guidance to 
increase the quality of their understanding and routines: “it is better to help them get it 
right the first time, than to wait for them to make a mistake and then react with controls 
and audits”, as one tax administrator expressed the LTO sentiment. The Skatt Øst 
approach is based on the idea that in order to assess anything there must be 
documentation; therefore files must come before controls. Then well-developed risk 
monitoring methods will allow the tax administration to identify mistakes and evasions. 
The taxpayer and tax administrator’s role must be kept separate and impersonal to ensure 
the professional distance required to do disinterested assessments. All taxpayers should be 
treated equally and not according to contextual conditions.  
Followers of each of the two tenets worked in different offices until the reorganizations 
mentioned above. After that, new teams were composed of people from the two schools. 
New leaders for teams and administrative units were trained and employed. For example, 
one high-level tax LTO administrator conceded that the Skatt Øst approach was more 
precise and efficient when it came to risk assessment. The corporations noticed that 
something was going on, but had not been informed. There were discussions in and 
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between the corporations and discreet attempts to find out what, and if it would have any 
consequences for the company’s tax returns and tax management practices. This indicates 
that the two different approaches led to a complicated internal adjustment and mutual 
learning process and thus formed considerable internal organizational hindrance for the 
implementation of co-operative compliance initiatives.  
A second internal organizational hindrance was the development of tax risk monitoring 
routines and software. This is not exactly a hindrance, as it was developed in order to work 
more effectively, but perhaps more of an organizational challenge. The development of new 
tax risk monitoring routines was needed as the census had increased, but was not followed 
by the same budget increases. Therefore, more should be done with less. First, the job of 
defining the variables and scales to be used to assess the risk level of a corporation 
required considerable technical knowledge. Second, the administrative routines and 
equipment had also to be carefully considered. Seemingly simple matters, like timing of 
input and output in the systems, how to ensure sharing of key information between teams, 
training and production of information material have an impact on the quality of the 
assessment. The tax administration required good, if not perfect, paper trails by taxpayers, 
and they should not demand less of themselves. At least this is a sentiment expressed by 
several tax managers. Some also added that it did not seem as if the tax administrators had 
read the documents they had demanded from the corporation. In sum, these issues related 
to the development of tax risk management created an internal organizational challenge 
for working successfully with the ideas related to co-operative compliance.  
Sweden: There were several external structural hindrances in terms of contested laws. 
These put together were the main reason for putting the co-operative compliance 
programme on hold. First, Swedish legislation regarding public access to official 
documents is to be considered. Since 1766, with the first Freedom of the Press Act, it is 
stated that secrecy constitutes a restriction of public access to official documents (Hambre 
2015, 122); “public access is the main rule and secrecy is the exception” (ibid., 129). 
Information exchanged under co-operative compliance programmes was decided in court 
to be a counselling practice and thus not considered part of tax confidentiality under 
current laws. The legal issue of public access to the documents involved in the processes of 
both the Swedish co-operative compliance initiatives (Fördjupad samverkan and the 
lighter version Fördjupad dialog) has thus been a major obstacle for the programme.  
Second, both initiatives implied that not all taxpayers would be treated according to the 
principle of equality. This goes against the Swedish constitution and also against values 
held in Swedish society; hence this is also seen as an external structural hindrance. 
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Participants in co-operative compliance programmes were seen as getting in a VIP lane for 
certain taxpayers; they would get different—better—treatment that is not consistent with 
Swedish administrative law or practice, the latter point underscoring how laws and societal 
values interact. Yet, this was contested. The counter-argument from SKV is that different 
taxpayers have to be met in different ways. The programme would just continue the long 
tradition SKV has developed; for example by providing different types of information 
material for various categories of taxpayers. SKV argued that taxpayers are different and 
therefore have various needs in order to be able to comply. Not everybody has the 
capability to adequately pose tax-related questions for example and therefore needs to get 
help. 
Third, the principle of legality is one which raises the question of who can make what type 
of legal decisions (Hambre 2018, 89) and more specifically the extent to which SKV can 
make rules and enforce norms respectively (ibid., 113). Fördjupad dialog does not fulfil the 
principle of legality within Swedish administrative law. The programme could only be 
implemented following a change of law, according to Hambre (2018, 176). 
The strong external structural, legal, hindrances prevented the Swedish co-operative 
compliance programme from getting so far as to be contested in terms of internal 
organizational hindrances; since so few corporations came to be part of the programme 
due to the above described legal matters, internal hindrances never became an issue.  
 
7.4.2 Dimension IV: Summary 
The analysis above shows that across the cases we generally find similar kinds of 
hindrances, some of which are external structural hindrances and some of which are 
internal organizational hindrances. The external structural hindrances cover the Swedish 
legal framework with regards to public access to documents, equality and principle of 
legality and the Danish issues of non-binding responses—also found in the Finnish case—
and the lessened possibility to sign off minor issues due to the public sentiment on Skat. 
Moreover, the external structural hindrance from the Norwegian case on the need to 
coordinate with other compliance initiatives e.g. in the area of transfer pricing. The 
internal organizational hindrances cover the Norwegian coexisting schools of thought and 
the development of tax risk monitoring routines/software as well as aspects of the internal 
organization in Skat and in the corporations in the Danish case. Furthermore the Finnish 
issues of internal discussions in the tax administration on impartiality and the Danish 
guideline on when to start casework belongs to this category of hindrances. These are all 
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elements that in one way or another have caused difficulties in the national co-operative 
compliance programmes and been influencing the transition of co-operative compliance 
from a formulated programme to specific work(ing) practices. 
However, despite the similarities the elements listed above differ in three important 
aspects. First, the timing of their introduction—are they pre-existing or were they 
introduced during the running of the co-operative compliance programmes and thus 
foreseeable or non-foreseeable? Second, what effects have they had? Have they just created 
concerns, contributed to setting the programme on hold, causing less flexibility in the 
collaborative relations or caused what is perceived as more “meaningless” work for the 
corporations? Third, how have the specific hindrance been perceived by the actors 
involved? For example some have caused frustration among tax officials but have been 
learned to live with; others have created the need for better communication on certain 
issues; and others still have resulted in adjustments to the programmes.  
This dimension therefore also shows that the “country context” does not determine the fate 
of the programme. When looking from outside the four countries discussed here are quite 
similar with regards to being “classic” Nordic welfare states both with high trust in tax 
administrations and relatively high tax rates; despite these similarities the co-operative 
compliance programmes have played out differently in each of the countries. Therefore, 
these comparative insights of the dimension “structural and organizational hindrances” 
point to the importance of considering the basic “country context” and conditions for 
implementing seemingly “detached” and universally applicable models. Our point is that 
these always need to be fitted to the specific “landscape” and organization they are 
entering. Importantly, the models are also often—subtly or drastically—reshaped in the 
implicit or explicit process of fitting the model and the “implementation landscape”. 
Sometimes this can be done, but sometimes the efforts and possibilities available do not 
meet the challenges—as in the Swedish case. In this way it can be argued that if the 
external structural hindrances become too large to overcome, the co-operative compliance 
programmes might not get as far as to be faced with internal organizational hindrances.  
 
7.4.3 Dimension IV: Recommendations 
On the basis of this comparison on the dimension of external structural and internal 
organizational hindrances we have the following recommendations: 
• We encourage national tax administration to thoroughly consider the specificities of 
the legal “landscape” in which the programme is to be implemented. The Swedish 
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case teaches us the importance of letting independent scholars look into legal and 
soft law issues before launching co-operative compliance programmes.  
• We point to the importance of creating security or stability concerning the “mandate” 
of the tax administration, for instance in relation to issuing “binding responses”. 
• We suggest that national tax administrations carefully consider ways to make space 
for more ongoing clarification, or at least make the procedures for determining what 
can be clarified more transparent and predictable. 
• Be aware of potentially conflicting organizing principles or schools of thought that are 
to co-exist in a co-operative compliance programme. 
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7.5 Dimension V: Resistance 
It is well known that policy changes as well as organizational change processes arouse 
opposition and resistance. As the purpose of the co-operative compliance measures is to 
drive change we expected, saw and heard that there was resistance to the changes. Hence, 
resistance is a useful common denominator that makes it possible to compare the 
unfolding of co-operative compliance measures. A comparison of the resistance will yield 
valuable understanding of how the measures work—or do not work. Hence, the discussion 
in this section can be used to search for good practice. The discussion in this section only 
concerns resistance directed towards tax administrations adoption and implementation of 
co-operative compliance programmes. 
The aim is that tax administrations should ensure that tax returns are filed in the “correct” 
way and on time (OECD 2014, 60). Correct here refers both to the quality of the paperwork 
and of the numbers disclosed. Both should be of such a quality that the tax administration 
can assess the correct amount of tax that the taxpayer is required to pay. Taxpayers are 
responsible for disclosing the information needed, the tax administration for providing the 
tools to make disclosure possible. 
Resistance can take many forms. In order to compare the Nordic countries in terms of 
resistance to the co-operative compliance measures, we make use of a conceptual model 
known as the Voice-Exit-Loyalty model (Hirschman 1970). The model is a basic cost–
benefit model that has had considerable impact since it was designed. We use it here as a 
heuristic device to bring out comparable aspects of the empirical material about co-
operative compliance measures as they have been tried out in the Nordic countries. The 
point we want to make is that resistance to administrative changes may not always be a 
sign of ill will and low morale. It may very well relate to concerns that can be solved 
practically. 
What then is the “Voice” form of resistance in relation to co-operative compliance 
measures? That is simply arguments against some aspect of the co-operative compliance 
measures. The “voicing of resistance” can be loud and appear in national media, or it can 
be only a few comments in a meeting. Often strong, vocal protests are part of larger 
political conflicts, and for purposes of devising new policies. However, in case of tax 
administration, resistance may be less loud and vocal as the interaction is related to 
humdrum everyday affairs and of little interest to others than those directly concerned. It 
is also possible to identify “silent resistance”. The notion of a “silent voice” may sound like 
a contradiction in terms. However, by “silent resistance” we refer to things that are not 
said, like information that is not shared by the taxpayer unless the tax administration 
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explicitly asks for it, terse emails, convoluted letter exchanges, outdated information about 
the corporation, to name a few examples. In short “silent resistance” is expressed in actions 
that limit access to information (excluding information about doubtful tax positions, which 
shall be shared according to the co-operative compliance measures). In a change process 
like the implementation of co-operative compliance measures, to identify and react to 
signals of resistance can make the difference between a smooth process or a bumpy ride. 
Attentiveness requires the tax administration to be willing to listen and ask follow-up 
questions carefully if there is a suspicion that some form of resistance is at work. It also 
requires taxpayers to make sure that the resistance is registered by the tax administrations.  
The other option is “Exit”. That is when taxpayers leave the co-operative compliance 
programme. In principle, if participation in co-operative compliance is voluntary, 
taxpayers can step out of an already established co-operative compliance relationship of 
which they have been a part. However, as taxpayers are citizens, not consumers or 
customers, there are fewer options for exits than in a conventional commercial 
relationship. We therefore include instances when taxpayers decline an invitation to enter 
into a co-operative compliance programme as an exit strategy. To stay out is also a form of 
exit. Assessing the reasons why taxpayers choose this strategy is necessary to ascertain 
whether it is an expression of resistance or not.  
In addition, there is according to Hirschman’s model one sentiment that mediates either of 
the voice and exits options, namely loyalty. Loyalty is defined as to stay in place and cope 
with the decisions that have been taken without either voicing protests or opting out of it 
altogether. The degree of loyalty or commitment affects how taxpayers, or tax 
administrators, cope with problems when they arise. Resistance is therefore a key 
dimension when it comes to making co-operative compliance measures work. Resistance 
affects both the efficiency of tax collection and the legitimacy of the tax system. 
Understanding resistance and proactively engaging with it is an important factor of 
successful co-operative compliance as the following examples illustrate.  
 
7.5.1 Dimension V: Comparison by drawing on practices/experiences   
Denmark: In the Danish case the element of resistance has played out primarily in rather 
subtle ways. Relating to the aspect of “exit”, to our knowledge no corporation has stepped 
out of an already established Tax Governance collaboration. However, there has been what 
can be termed a silent resistance towards the programme. This silent resistance is 
indicated in the following numbers: during 2013–2015 more than 50 corporations were 
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invited to be part of Tax Governance and in 2017 30 corporations participated (From 
2017). This means that a substantial number have declined the invitation from Skat for 
different reasons: lack of resources, a perceived low likelihood of tax audits, not wanting to 
expose the organization to Skat and different structural hindrances (see also Boll and 
Brehm Johansen 2018, 16–23). This we see as a form of silent resistance to Tax 
Governance.  
With regards to “voice”—resistance voiced in protests and arguments—Tax Governance has 
not spurred public debate among corporations, however objections and critiques have been 
voiced by national bodies such as the auditors’ organization, Foreningen Danske Revisorer 
(personal email communication 2014), and the National Audit Office, Rigsrevisionen 
(Rigsrevisionen 2014). The National Audit Office has aired public critique of introducing 
Tax Governance, their critique is primarily aimed at the lack of evidence of the 
programme’s effectiveness: “The investigation from the National Audit Office has shown 
that Skat has started a programme on ‘Tax Governance’ despite the fact that there exists no 
documentation of the effectiveness of the method compared to more traditional forms of 
control” (Rigsrevisionen 2014, 22). This publicly voiced critique can be seen as aimed more 
fundamentally at the very goal and purpose of Tax Governance. 
Except from the examples just mentioned, neither a clear “exit” nor “voice” have been 
weighty elements in the Danish case. “Loyalty”, in contrast, is prominent in the interview 
material with the tax directors of large corporations participating in Tax Governance. 
Loyalty is defined as to stay in place and cope with the decisions that have been taken 
without either voicing protests or opting out (cf. definition above). Overall, the tax 
directors interviewed are very concerned with compliance and to point out that they “play 
by the rules”. Most of the tax directors interviewed explain that they see entering Tax 
Governance as the only right thing to do, that in their opinion there is no alternative. The 
reasons for this are primarily expressed as a moral, ideational and societal obligation. 
However, a concern regarding the consequences of declining the invitation to enter, 
mentioned in brief by a few interviewees, was that it could reflect unfavourably on them. 
They explained this concern as a contributory reason for accepting the invitation. So, for 
many the moral imperative of participating is explained as outweighing the practical 
troubles or heavy resource demands some of them explain they are faced with in their daily 
work with Tax Governance. It should be noted that the corporations’ specific engagements 
in Tax Governance differ—some go in proactively, take the lead in the relation and 
prioritize adding the resources needed in their tax department in order to be dedicated to 
the collaboration. Others take a more passive stance and try to cope with the new kinds of 
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demands from Skat using as few resources as possible while still being loyal to the 
programme.  
The loyalty position in the Danish case thus covers both the ideational and moral element 
of societal responsibility and a stance towards the practical collaborative working principle 
that is highly valued by many. Concluding with how “resistance” has played a role in the 
Danish case, the most apt description of the stance of corporations towards Tax 
Governance might be the coexistence of silent resistance—declining the invitation to 
participate—and loyalty—staying in place and coping either in a proactive way or through a 
more passive stance of accepting the premises but not taking the lead in the collaboration.  
Finland: The existence of either voice- or exit-responses would be markers of 
dissatisfaction in the co-operative compliance relationship, i.e. the relationship between 
the tax administration and corporations. In an existing relationship, these options would 
manifest themselves either in voicing the dissatisfaction (voice) or in the decision to 
withdraw from the relationship (exit). In a proposed, potential relationship, a voice-
response would have been evident in a critique against the chosen approach, with the 
purpose of e.g. improving the suggested relationship, and an exit-response in opting out of 
the proposed cooperative relationship. 
In the Finnish case, the resistance towards the cooperation was neither vocal nor public, 
but was rather hidden in the processes and could be found e.g. in declining participation. It 
can be safely argued that voice-option was not used in resisting the approach. The 
resistance against the approach, if existing, could be found in companies resolving to 
decline cooperation. The assumed reasons for the exit-responses were manifold.  
In general, the tax administration found the overall attitude towards the cooperation 
positive although some corporations had decided to decline the offer to join the 
relationship. As participation in Syvennetty is voluntary, the decision to join or to opt out 
is in both parties’, a corporation’s and the tax administration’s, discretion. A tax official 
who was interviewed described that the fact that co-operative compliance was somewhat 
newly established and its practical implications for the corporations had not been 
sufficiently spelled out may have been a reason not to join the programme: 
… in one case it was also that they were not ready to take part at this point because they did 
not exactly know, what it means at this stage. (Interview, tax official) 
Other assumed reasons not to join Syvennetty were the high workload related to the initial 
“compliance scan” or the unwillingness to disclose the required information, e.g. 
concerning the tax strategy, to the tax administration. In some cases, it remained unclear 
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to the tax administration why certain corporations chose not to join the co-operative 
compliance programme, as a tax official explained:  
One potential customer opted out, it raised some questions about why that was, when we 
thought that the negotiations were held in a positive atmosphere and it came a little bit out of 
the blue when they said that, okay, we won’t be joining this. (Interview, tax official) 
The corporate informants suggested that the increase in the administrative tax burden that 
has taken place in the past few years might also contribute to declining cooperation. For 
example, the recently introduced country-by-country reporting is one of the sources of this 
added burden to consolidated companies, and therefore some companies may have been 
reluctant to take on new responsibilities. Representatives of business interest groups and 
tax consultants presumed the same: the approach was feared to take up too much of a 
corporation’s resources, it was too heavy and the benefits were also in doubt. The 
contentment with the current operating procedure was also stated as a reason for the exit-
responses: some of the corporate taxpayers maybe did not find closer cooperation with the 
tax administration necessary as they found that matters were well enough taken care of 
with the current operating procedure. 
As described above, becoming a partner in the cooperation was a source of some concerns 
for some companies, resulting, according to the informants, in some companies choosing 
the exit strategy as a reply to the offer to join the cooperative relationship. Joining the 
cooperation was not without problems, but opting out was not always seen as a viable 
solution, either. According to some informants from the business interest organizations, 
some companies feared that declining the offer to join would result in an immediate tax 
audit.  
Pertaining “loyalty”, some businesses regarded participation as a part of their CSR, 
implicitly presumed to manifest itself in joining the co-operative compliance programme. 
Another aspect of loyalty may be perceived in the comments made by some of the 
companies interviewed: they did not see problems involved in declining to join, but rather 
found that the tax administration is aware of the limited resources companies nowadays 
have for taxation issues. The tax administration’s stance towards companies is mainly 
empathetic, as they understand the administrative burden the companies and their tax 
departments have to carry, one of the interviewees concluded.  
Concluding on how “resistance” has played a role in the Finnish case, the most apt 
description of companies’ stance might be loyalty, to stay in place and cope with what 
participation brought up. A number of companies expressed expectations of fair and 
emphatic treatment, which is a signal of a strong, collaborative tradition already in place. 
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Norway: In Norway, neither of the CC projects raised strong resistance. There seemed to 
be neither strong Voice nor forceful Exit. There was however, one initiative that created 
much silent protest. It is neither an example of Voice nor of Exit, but it is an example of 
Loyalty, which mediates both, 
Before the extension of Large Tax Offices, all corporations received a letter with 
information about the organizational change and the name of the corporation’s contact 
person. Then, in 2016, all corporations interviewed had received another letter requiring 
more information. The letters also notified taxpayers that the tax assessment could be 
issued beyond the ordinary deadline. These letters generated surprise and frustration 
among tax directors. Some said they reacted to the “tone” of the letters, others to the 
amount and nature of information required. Interpretations varied as to why they had got 
the letter.  
… there are cultural changes between the tax officers … a lack of understanding for the 
complexity of the business. It was requested to see liability clauses in all the supplier 
contracts. There are several of them and no standard liability clause … The tax officials’ 
approach towards co-operative compliance will have an impact on the decisions … it is a 
much more controlling approach. (Tax director, Finance)  
This director understood the request as the result of internal changes in Tax Norway, as a 
mix of different “audit cultures”. Another found that the quality of the relationship was 
changing: 
… the company is “used as pilot” for practice, for training purposes … an introvert approach ... 
unpredictable and lacking in understanding of the facts. They are now acting as counterparty 
… correspondence through letters is inappropriate. (Tax director, Manufacture) 
The need for training was also the theory of another tax director who said that the 
corporation was “[u]sed for teaching (of a new team), especially trials”, and continued that 
they “do not follow good case law … expect the company to do audits instead of doing it 
itself … (there is) not any trust as they only act as authority for controlling purposes” (Tax 
director, Media). 
What is particularly salient in the responses was that tax directors perceived the new 
situations as a step away from the collaboration as the corporations had experienced it 
earlier. When we asked how they would react, the Finance tax director would, “become 
more reserved in the “co-operative compliance approach”, the Manufacture tax director 
would “ask for more meetings”, and the Media Tax director would also be more reserved 
and “only enclose documents, not upfront communication”. Other reactions varied from 
considerations of minimizing contact with LTO to go-slow actions like sending all 
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correspondence and documents by post. What is significant in these reactions is the fact 
that none of these tax directors considered protesting. A few had sent emails or called 
about specific issues and one had contacted their lawyer to find out what was going on. 
None of the tax directions mention forms of exit. The tax directors were committed to sort 
out the problems, or bear the consequences. The tax officials on their part said they had 
heard rumours that not all had gone smoothly in the use of the new measures. Neither 
party accused the other of deliberately making the cooperation more difficult. The 
corporations would wait and see what happened. The tax administration would adjust the 
routine. This confirms that the initiative for changing the relation lies with the tax 
administration. They have the initiative and they set the standard for the relationship. If 
the tax administration uses a proactive approach, the corporations would act accordingly.  
Concluding on how “resistance” has played a role in the Norwegian case, the most apt 
description of the stance of the corporations might be a combination of silent resistance 
(limiting the amount and content of the information provided) and loyalty, to stay in place 
and cope. A number of companies expressed expectations that the relationship would 
eventually return to the established collaborative practice once LTO had got its act together 
again. 
Sweden: The first co-operative compliance programme, Fördjupad samverkan, was met 
with fierce resistance which was publicly played out in a heated media debate. Resisting 
voices were so loud in the Swedish case that exit never even became an issue. There were 
many ways to articulate resistance (which has been illustrated in some of the other 
Dimensions, noteworthy in I, III and IV). Here, the event leading up to the strong chorus 
that never made participation an issue for most large corporations illustrates Swedish 
resistance.  
The larger business community was introduced to Fördjupad samverkan in early March 
2011 in an article in Dagens industri, Sweden’s pink business journal signed by SKV’s 
director general and by the manager for the Department for Large Corporations (Hansson 
& Landén 2011). The article describes the background for developing the programme being 
the result of SKV’s increased focus on multinational corporations’ risk taking and their 
internal control procedures in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. It was 
argued that such corporations’ management had difficulties foreseeing tax risks that could 
potentially result in drawn out legal processes and costly tax reassessments. Fördjupad 
samverkan was argued to be a new way of working; it was formalized cooperation where 
large corporations would get a specified contact at SKV. Yet, the details of cooperation 
were not yet teased out as SKV would be perceptive to the wishes of participating 
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corporations. A few large corporations would be invited to participate at the end of 2011, a 
group that would be enlarged to eventually encompass all larger multinationals. The aim 
with the programme was thus a long-term commitment and both parties would sign a 
declaration of intent. These declarations would however not be legally binding. The article 
concluded that both SKV and participating corporations would benefit from this way of 
working. The article was quite invitational. 
A hectic and high-pitched media debate ensued in the same newspaper. Support for 
resistance was articulated in an array of articles. These discussed insights from public 
workshops on reports by legal scholars. Resistance was also raised in closed meetings in 
various tax contexts (especially through the Confederation for Swedish Enterprise) and in 
various academic workshops (e.g. Kristoffersson 2014) criticizing the programme(s). SKV 
obviously defended FS, whereas representatives of the Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprises and several law professors argued against it or at least recommended putting 
the initiative on hold awaiting legal decisions. The arguments against the initiative were 
mainly from a legal perspective, yet the resistance displayed underlying emotional currents 
that for various reasons deny closer relations between SKV and large corporations. 
All these discussions resulted in a letter signed by 25 of the largest Swedish corporations 
declining to even be invited to participate. Although the content of the letter is a 
compromise and the text is quite bland, as the signers had different views on the initiative, 
one cannot understate the importance of this letter. It stated that although the 
corporations were pleased with services like Dialogueen, which was said to increase trust 
in their relations with SKV, they had numerous concerns with the collaboration suggested 
in FS. Corporations were already required to report on many and diverse types of risk and 
also had an obligation to provide an increasingly large amount of information to SKV. The 
administrative burden had increased, although the result was that they also have good 
control over tax risks and are very transparent regarding those. If engaging with FS, the 
benefits of it had to correspond to the increased administrative burden AND legal risks, 
especially concerning the secrecy of information. In addition, the letter argued that the tax 
law environment in Sweden does not provide proper prerequisites for co-operative 
compliance (here the reference was to the OECD report) and Swedish law limits this type 
of collaboration. Newspaper editorials followed suit with a call for arms against such 
programmes. It was a heated debate as arguments for the programme could also be turned 
around and used against it (Björklund Larsen 2016). Parts of the resistance were even 
cultural arguments raised in terms of “we are not a trading nation where we negotiate 
taxes, compared to Denmark or the Netherlands” (Interview, tax expert).  
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This letter ended the public debate and attention in the media petered out. Later a less 
ambitious programme, Fördjupad Dialogue, was started.  
Concluding on how “resistance” has played a role in the Swedish case, the most apt 
description of the corporations’ stance might be a combination of loud voice and exit.  
 
7.5.2 Dimension V: Summary 
Outspoken resistance has played a minor role in the implementation of co-operative 
compliance measures in the Nordic countries, with the exception of Sweden. In the cases of 
Denmark, Finland and Norway the most apt description of the stance of the corporations is 
“Voice” and “Loyalty”. It can be described as characterized by the coexistence of silent 
resistance—declining the invitation to participate or postponing letters and meetings—and 
loyalty—staying in place and coping in either a proactive way or through a more passive 
stance of accepting the premises, but not taking the lead in the collaboration. In Sweden 
the stance was “Voice” and “Exit”, which stalled the implementation of the measures.  
 
7.5.3 Dimension V: Recommendations 
• We urge the tax administrations to carefully clarify expectations about the 
corporations’ rights and duties within the scope of the collaboration. 
• Advance information to all stakeholders about internal changes in the tax 
administration. 
• It is important to anchor changes in policies and practices among all stakeholders in 
the tax arena before launching initiatives that might be questioned. Benefits ought to 
be apparent. 
• Do not rely on a sole point of contact when trying out several initiatives; have more 
than one channel into corporations. 
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7.6 Dimension VI: Trust  
Co-operative compliance programmes—in most countries that have such programmes—
have been implemented in the context of developing risk management strategies (OECD 
2013, 2016). The shift from “traditional” control to co-operative compliance has happened 
in parallel with tax administrations setting their clients into categories based on the 
taxpayer’s perceived willingness and ability to comply. The same setting can be viewed 
alternatively, and equally well, from the perspective of trust: “The path-dependent 
connection between trust and risk arises from a reciprocal relationship: risk creates an 
opportunity for trust, which leads to risk taking” (Rousseau et al. 1998, 395). 
In this dimension we will explore various ways trust—or lack of it—is articulated between 
tax administrations and corporations. Already the initial process of selecting which 
corporations to invite—and who is seen to be willing to participate—in co-operative 
compliance programmes entails implicit evaluations of trust between the tax authority and 
the corporation. Although we mainly deal with trust between organizations, the issue of 
trust in co-operative compliance programmes can also be articulated on a personal level. 
When corporations enter co-operative compliance, they are both promised and expected 
“certainty in exchange for transparency” (OECD 2016). This means that in a co-operative 
compliance relationship, the tax administration is expected to work on the assumption that 
it may “trust that uncertain tax positions and other problematic tax positions […] will be 
brought to its attention” (OECD 2016, 11). Co-operative compliance is “based on justified 
trust and empirical evidence” (OECD 2016, 10). The process of collecting evidence to 
justify trust by the tax administration towards the corporation typically entails self-
assessment and documentation of internal tax control by the participating corporations (de 
Widt and Oats 2018). 
Accordingly, tax administrations “adjust the risk management strategy for an individual 
large business in the context of a (voluntary) co-operative compliance relationship” (OECD 
2016, 7).  
Trust within or between organizations, or between individuals, has been examined in 
numerous academic studies (e.g. Rousseau et al. 1998; Schoorman et al. 2007). While 
definitions of trust may differ, trust is often characterized through “confident expectations 
and a willingness to be vulnerable” (Rousseau et al. 1998). Rousseau et al. (1998) define 
trust as follows: 
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Psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another.  
Mayeret al. (1995) and Schoorman et al. (2007) argue that the following characteristics of 
the trustee (the person that is being trusted) are important for the trustor to continue to 
assume that the trustee is reliable and trustworthy: 
• ability 
• benevolence 
• integrity. 
These three are distinct, yet intertwined characteristics. Trust may be hampered or lost if 
the trustor considers that any of the three is missing. According to our empirical research, 
all three dimensions are at work, or at stake, in how trust affects and is affected by the co-
operative compliance relationship. Trust is not static: the reciprocal assessments 
concerning the ability, benevolence and integrity of the other party in co-operative 
compliance can change over time. 
First, the level of trust by the tax administration (trustor) towards a particular taxpayer 
(trustee) is affected and assessed e.g. by documenting the internal tax control framework in 
place within the corporation. Furthermore, previous evidence that the tax administration 
has accumulated of a corporation e.g. through recent tax audits can affect the level of trust. 
As de Widt and Oats (2018, 21) point out: the corporation’s future tax strategy and whether 
the corporation shows “willingness and ability” to improve its internal tax controls play a 
role (rather than merely the current level of these controls).  
One the other hand, the level of trust by the corporation (now the trustor) given to the tax 
administration is affected by the perceived ability, benevolence and integrity of the tax 
administration, and the persons involved. Working more closely involves increased 
interdependence between the parties involved. The need for trust, however, only arises in 
situations that involve risk. Accordingly, trust is a necessary component of cooperation 
occurring only if the cooperation involves risk (Mayer et al. 1995) As co-operative 
compliance involves “going beyond statutory obligations” and increased transparency 
(OECD 2008, 39), from the perspective of the corporation, providing such voluntary 
disclosure can involve risks. Therefore, the ability, benevolence and integrity of the tax 
administrators are essential. 
Trust can be also divided into interpersonal vs. inter-organizational trust (Zaheer et al. 
1998). Zaheer et al. (1998) argue that while trust is inherently an individual level concept, 
trust operates at both individual and organizational level. Interpersonal trust “refer[s] to 
FairTax WP-Series No.20 
Nordic experiences of co-operative compliance programmes: Comparisons and Recommendations 
 
97 
the extent of a boundary-spanning agent’s trust in her counterpart in the partner 
organization” (ibid., 142). Inter-organizational trust, on the other hand, is defined as “the 
extent of trust placed in the partner organization by the members of a focal organization” 
(ibid., 142). The relationship between organizations, and trust therein, is not “faceless or 
monolithic” but actively managed and built up by the individuals “whose orientations and 
motivations may well be different from those of the organization as a whole” (ibid., 142). 
The connection between interpersonal and inter-organizational trust is established 
through institutionalizing processes: with repeated ties between organizations over time 
stabilizing cooperative practices. Therefore, whereas individual boundary spanners may 
change over time, their roles have become stabilized and taken-for-granted organizational 
structures (ibid.). 
The ability required from the tax administrations involved in co-operative compliance is 
elaborated on in Section 7.3, Competencies. 
People differ in their general willingness to trust other people, both based on their previous 
experiences, cultural backgrounds and other factors (Mayer et al. 1995). The empirical 
research reported in this study has been conducted in four Northern European countries in 
which the general level of trust of other people and governmental institutions is generally 
high. 
This dimension shows that trust at both interpersonal and inter-organizational level are 
important to consider when implementing a more cooperative approach to tax compliance. 
However, trust is not only an abstract phenomenon but it comes down to issues of ability, 
benevolence and integrity (Mayer et al. 1995). Or alternatively to – reliability, 
predictability and fairness – the inter-organizational level as Zaheer et al. (1998) 
conceptualize it. Considerations of trust should entail both the existing orientation to trust 
and how trust could be cultivated in co-operative compliance. As the unsuccessful 
implementation of co-operative compliance in Sweden illustrates, how the introduction 
and running of co-operative compliance affects the level of trust between the parties 
involved and society more broadly should be carefully considered.  
 
7.6.1 Dimension VI: Comparison by drawing on national 
practices/experiences 
Denmark: In the Danish case trust is—mirroring the formal setup of co-operative 
compliance programmes more generally—described as a fundamental cornerstone in the 
Tax Governance programme. Yet, to specify what is implied with trust, we show that the 
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Danish case is characterized by three interconnected kinds of trust: inter-organizational 
trust between Skat and Tax Governance corporations, interpersonal trust between Tax 
Governance managers and tax directors of corporations and inter-organizational trust 
between Tax Governance and their “evaluator”.  
Inter-organizational trust between Skat and the corporations 
During an interview a tax official reads aloud from the Tax Governance script on the 
question of how corporations are selected for participation:  
The corporations who are part of the programme are selected manually from lists of the 
largest Danish corporations. In the selection, the individual corporation’s suitability for 
entering a trust-based collaboration is taken into consideration. The corporations are selected 
on the basis of Skat’s experiences with the individual corporation […] and the experiences are 
to be collected from all law areas in Skat. (Interview, tax official) 
Here being part of a trust-based relation is linked with suitability and experiences. Trust 
here becomes something you are suitable or non-suitable for building a relation with Skat 
based on Skat’s prior experiences with the corporation in question. Another element in this 
relation commented on by the tax official is the balancing of expectations to the 
collaboration that is to take place in the trust-based relationship:  
You balance expectations [at the introductory meeting], what is it [Tax Governance] about 
and you plan a meeting structure. It is incredibly important that this balancing of 
expectations takes place, so that they [the corporation] do not all of a sudden have the 
understanding that they can avoid reactive audit controls, for example. Because they [reactive 
audits] can still be there but the point of departure is that we are to trust each other. 
(Interview, tax official) 
Trust is described here as the very point of departure for the Tax Governance approach. It 
is about establishing trust through balancing expectation between organizations (Skat and 
the corporation) when moving away from the well-known control-based relationship to a 
trust-based relation. A tax official explains one of the dilemmas of this shift:  
[…] we had quite some episodes where other employees in Skat had gone out [to the 
corporations she is Tax Governance manager of] […] and that was a bit unfortunate because 
we had been promising them something else [one access to Skat through the Tax Governance 
manager], so there were some conflicts. With regards to the approach and attitude, we went 
out in a spirit of collaboration and then someone else came wearing their duty-caps (the 
traditional control approach). Not that there is something wrong with that […] but it was 
something different we were trying to build, it was to get a relationship of trust with the 
corporations. (Interview, tax official) 
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Here control is explained to be detrimental—almost incompatible—with a trust-based 
relationship, and the coexistence of these principles is claimed to sometimes cause the 
need for mending of the relation by the Tax Governance manager. 
Overall trust is explained to be the point of departure and a core element of the approach 
between organizations in Tax Governance. However, trust is also talked about by the 
interviewees as something developed in specific relations between specific persons—as 
interpersonal trust. 
Interpersonal trust between Tax Governance managers and tax directors 
Informants typically agree that interpersonal trust is important; a tax official states: “The 
trust between the tax governance managers and the tax director of a corporation is the 
alpha and omega” (Interview, tax official). The relation is fore-fronted here as an essential 
element of the collaboration. Another tax official explains: 
It is about building a relationship of trust, that you know you can trust each other. They know 
they can trust the answers they get from me, but I can also trust that the answers I get from 
them are honest and correct. But it is also very much about that if they are in doubt about 
something they contact me and ask “is it okay if we do like this, do you see any problems with 
it?” and so on. (Interview, tax official) 
Here trust is relational and resides in the specific relation between a Tax Governance 
manager and his/her counterparts in the corporation. Furthermore, trust is described as 
something built up (e.g. through running dialogue) in this specific relation and moreover it 
is connected to predictability.  
Another tax official points to when the trust relation is established it can reach a more 
general level and turn role-based: “you establish a trust relation to a corporation […] then 
the manager might be replaced but the trust relation is still in place” (Interview, tax 
official). As the cooperation endures over time, role definitions become stabilized and 
inter-organizational trust evolves. In this, the trust based in the specific interpersonal 
relation is seen to be able to persist beyond the specific persons when the trust relation is 
well-founded. Yet another tax official adds a nuance on how trust is grounded: “You have 
checked the systems they [the corporation] have for avoiding errors and you know the 
systems get updated, then you have created a running certainty and then you need to be in 
a running dialogue with this corporation” (Interview, tax official). This can be seen as a 
way of shifting away from trust as only residing in the specific personal or role-based 
relation, towards trust being upheld by internal control systems in corporations, in line 
with OECD’s (2016) recommendation concerning “justified trust and empirical evidence”. 
The internal control systems and the dialogue are somehow seen to “carry” trust over time 
FairTax WP-Series No.20 
Nordic experiences of co-operative compliance programmes: Comparisons and Recommendations 
 
100 
once it has been established. Another tax official adds to this aspect of trust grounded in 
systems: 
… the primary goal [is] to get a trust relation established so that we do not have to audit the 
reports from the corporation on different law areas […] you look at the corporations’ internal 
controls and get a well-founded conviction that everything is as it should be. (Interview, tax 
official) 
The interpersonal trust between Tax Governance managers and the tax directors of large 
corporations has been pointed to as trust established in relations between specific persons 
but also as trust as potentially becoming independent of these specific persons. There has 
been a shift over time in Tax Governance following the increasing formalization of the 
programme towards more role-defined trust building on established control systems that 
are to carry an enduring trust over time.  
Inter-organizational trust between Tax Governance and its evaluators 
Last, trust is also an element between Tax Governance and its prime “evaluator”, The 
National Audit Office [Rigsrevisionen], is the Danish authority responsible for auditing 
and monitoring Skat as an organization and therefore also Tax Governance. The relation 
between Skat and the National Audit Office, however, does not mirror the trust approach 
and relation between Tax Governance and corporations. Instead this relation is largely 
defined through measurability and “trust in numbers”. The demand for measurability of 
the effectiveness of Tax Governance (see Dimension 2) can be argued to resemble the 
control-based relation between Skat and the corporations that Skat is trying to move away 
from with the introduction of Tax Governance. A tax official explains:  
… this [Tax Governance] is not suitable for strict quantitative performance management, 
because how can you detect if Søren is productive? No, you cannot, you can only see that still 
80% [of the corporate tax revenue] comes from these corporations, but this is useless for a 
statistician. That is a huge challenge, because just as we have trust in the corporations, then 
there also needs to be someone who has trust in that we follow these concepts. Therefore they 
need to be standardized so that we can document it. (Interview, tax official) 
With trust primarily taking the shape of numbers and measures not as something built in 
relations, Tax Governance has difficulties in the wider context of Skat (where quantitative 
performance management is also widely in use) and in relation to the National Audit 
Office. This is also reflected in the attempt to reform Tax Governance for example by 
inserting levels to measure progression in the degree of participation in the reformed Tax 
Governance programme (see also Dimension 2 and Boll and Brehm Johansen 2018, 73–
74).  
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Summing up, the Danish case shows interconnected kinds of trust—the inter-
organizational trust of the very Tax Governance approach, interpersonal trust based on 
specific relations, trust based in role-relations and system-based trust to endure over time. 
Moreover, it can be argued that Tax Governance and the connection with these different 
kinds of trust can be difficult to evaluate—and hence accept—from the surrounding 
environment. Further, Tax Governance as a programme is not subjected to the same trust-
based approach by its own evaluators as Tax Governance bases its relation to the 
corporations. This has been one of the reasons for reforming the Danish Tax Governance 
programme to include more measurable elements such as the four-phase model (discussed 
in Subsection 7.2 of this paper). 
Finland: During the interviews with different parties in the tax triangle—corporate 
representatives, tax administrators and tax advisors—issues of trust surfaced in several 
discussions. In the Finnish case, inter-organizational trust, or occasionally the lack of 
thereof, was the most prevailing form of trust discussed.  
Interestingly, tax advisors interviewed pointed out that most often there cannot be 
interpersonal trust in the persons working at the tax administration in the first place. The 
rationale behind this statement was that there has not previously been real dialogue 
between the tax administrators and the tax directors or tax advisors, where interpersonal 
trust could have been built up. A tax advisor interviewed described:  
In the Large Taxpayers’ Office, they are not that eager to enter into a dialogue, so personal 
relationships are not formed, and therefore no trust in any individuals either. If the co-
operative compliance is the way that we are going, I think that the meaning of trust will be 
emphasized, because it is more personal, and there they are the same persons who work 
there. So, then it would be emphasized a lot. During my career, for example, the interpersonal 
relationships with the tax authorities have been at a minimum, the kind of relationships that 
you could not say that there is any trust involved in a particular person. The existing trust is 
towards the institution or to the Large Taxpayers’ Office. (Interview, tax advisor) 
Another tax advisor agreed saying that she has never thought that the personal chemistry 
between people at the corporation and the tax administration could affect the outcomes, or 
be otherwise of much importance in taxation. She continued saying, however, that things 
can actually escalate either when an advance ruling is applied or when a corporation is 
being audited:  
In a case where the corporation applies for an advance ruling, the interpersonal trust can 
have an effect. The trust culminates in whether they trust what is said in the appeal. In 
principle it should be clear: what has been written in the appeal, hakemuksessa, should count 
as facts. And if it later turns out that the facts do not hold, then the advance ruling does not 
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bind. But it is not like that in practice. If there is not trust, it does not proceed right. 
(Interview, tax advisor) 
She also pointed out that trust can be built by meeting face to face:  
I think that meeting people is the most important [element in developing trust]. And what 
corporations can contribute to trust building is not having the trust lost. If the trust [by tax 
administration to the corporation] has been lost, it does not matter anymore what you do. 
(Interview, tax advisor) 
Trust as an outcome of the exchanges and cooperation was discussed by tax directors. For 
example, a tax director explained that “trust should be built in the process”. The 
interviewees from corporations raised high-level expertise (ability), integrity and 
predictability as the main elements that create trust, for example, as a representative of a 
corporation stated: 
It is important that you can build trust on the fact that the tax administration is up-to-date, 
for example, in international matters, and that each corporation receives similar advice. 
Keeping everybody at the same level of expertise is a big challenge. (Interview, tax director) 
This view was echoed by other corporate interviewees also highlighting predictability and 
competence. Some interviewees pointed out that co-operative compliance can be a way to 
establish trust by corporations in the tax administration. Yet, trust can also become 
weakened in co-operative compliance if the expectations and assumptions are not met. As 
an example of this, an interviewee from a business interest organization described how the 
expectation of the cooperation can be broken, for example, if the corporation participating 
in co-operative compliance is audited “as usual” and if the persons at the corporation get 
the impression that the information that they provide is not trusted. 
Overall, interviewees representing the business interest groups were more critical when it 
comes to inter-organizational trust in the tax administration. As factors contributing to the 
weakened trust, they referred to e.g. recent litigation processes concerning TP where they 
considered that the tax administration had been “aggressive”. Such litigation cases 
concerning TP, where the corporation has won the case, have also caught attention in the 
Finnish media in the recent years. These interviewees also mention that the recent distrust 
towards the tax administration has led some corporations to no longer aim to participate in 
co-operative compliance.  
The fact the trust was discussed in different contexts by different groups of interviewees 
can also relate to the sampling of interviewees for the present study. The majority of tax 
directors interviewed were from corporations that participate in co-operative compliance, 
and are therefore more likely to represent organizations where the trust orientation 
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towards the tax administration is likely to be more positive, given to voluntary 
participation in this trust-based approach.  
In sum, the prominent form of trust discussed in Finland was the inter-organizational trust 
between the corporations and the tax administration. In contrast to Denmark, the inter-
organizational trust, or the lack of thereof, between the tax administration and its 
evaluators did not appear to be a significant element in how the practices of co-operative 
compliance have evolved. 
Norway: The distinguishing feature of co-operative compliance measures is the voluntary 
disclosure of uncertain tax positions. To reveal uncertainty is challenging and requires a 
high degree of trust. Norway is rated as a high-trust country both in terms of interpersonal 
trust and inter-organizational trust. This means that there is a platform of trust that 
facilitates co-operative compliance. Even so, trust can be lost. The most certain way for a 
corporation to lose the trust of the tax administration was if their tax files did not to reveal 
which position(s) they were in doubt about, and it later became clear that corporations had 
had doubts. Interviewees in the tax administration strongly emphasized this point. Not 
disclosing uncertainty was regarded as cheating. Contact persons told how affronted they 
felt when that had happened. This loss of trust was not in individuals, but in the 
corporation as the counterparty. On the other hand, the tax administration risked losing 
the trust of the corporation if it did not show ability, integrity, or benevolence. This became 
apparent in the tax directors’ reactions to the letters sent out by the tax administration in 
2016. In the letters, the tax administration asked for new information and gave notice that 
previously accepted and closed accounts might be reopened if the information provided 
was not deemed sufficient. The tax directors questioned the ability of the new teams, their 
commitment to earlier decisions and their concerns for the taxpayers’ situation.  
In Norway the dominant form of trust is institutional (inter-organizational). We will point 
out three aspects of this institutional trust to make clear what it means in practice. The 
first aspect is trust in the tax institute itself, the tax laws and regulations of the country. 
The second is trust in organizations, the tax administration and the corporations 
respectively. The third is trust in professional bodies. The complex weaves of these kinds of 
trust was revealed in a comment from one tax official who in an interview explained that 
“when we change employers, we change hats” (interview, tax official). The tax director had 
also worked in the tax administration and as a tax advisor before being employed in the 
corporation. She knew from first-hand experience the informal rights and duties of the 
different positions. Her comment came as a conclusion to a discussion among the tax 
directors interviewed about what to do with the letter mentioned above. The first step was 
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to find out what was going on in the tax administration. Who could they ask? It turned out 
that there was no one to rely on to informally share the information needed, neither former 
colleagues, members of their professional network or tax directors in other corporations. 
The interviewees briefly considered drawing on their personal relationships, but after a 
quick check, abandoned the thought. Questions about individuals in the tax administration 
could not be asked via personal networks. Institutional positions trumped personal 
relationships. To develop lasting co-operative compliance relations, it is crucial to consider 
the type of trust that dominates and develop relationships in accordance with this. 
Sweden: Perhaps it is the lack of trust in the first place, the very essence of relationships 
within co-operative compliance ways of working (OECD 2008, 2013) that rendered the 
Swedish case a failure? This is counter-intuitive as most corporations according to surveys 
feel correctly treated by SKV, although corporations increasingly dislike the tax system 
(compared to the last survey in 2013). It is doubtful that the explanation for the Swedish 
failure is as simple as one of general (mis)trust that governs the relation between large 
corporations and SKV. The trust issue needs to be explored in detail; for example if 
governance of the relationship between large corporations and SKV is structured in such a 
way that changes in issues that governs it, relationship could lead to greater distrust. 
Corporations seemed pleased with the pre-existing tools for communication, Dialogueen. 
It is a way for large corporations to pose questions to SKV either by email or by phone. The 
advantages with Dialogueen are said to be several: the corporations obtain SKV’s view on 
issues from a tax perspective prior to making doubtful transactions; and the possibility of 
quickly solving unclear issues. Although Dialogueen is not subject to secrecy, it had made 
taxation issues less insecure and more predictable with the result that there was growing 
trust in relations between SKV and corporations. Yet, SKV argued that a greater number of 
questions with increased complexity had been posed within Dialogueen and that many 
corporations responded with follow-up questions through this forum. SKV concluded that 
other measures were needed which were one of the underpinnings for the Fördjupad 
samverkan initiative. Do not rock the boat seems to be the message. In the following, 
SKV’s (dis)ability to create trust is explored in terms of ability, benevolence and integrity. 
As we have seen in the section on competence, Dimension III, SKV’s professional ability to 
help corporations pay “the right tax” was questioned. What was missing in this simplified 
critique was not that SKV would solve all complicated tax issues but would rather help to 
identify those issues that make taxation in Sweden unnecessarily cumbersome. For 
example, helping corporations to be timely in the manifold reporting deadlines or identify 
why certain errors are made repetitiously. One of SKV’s contact persons proudly suggested 
that “his” corporation had adopted several of his proposals. Even non-participants in the 
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programme agreed on this. One chief finance officer (CFO) meant that trust is built on 
getting adequate answers. She meant that SKV often has a good view on what is right and 
reasonable when it comes to specific questions. There are always new commercial sectors 
and new techniques for which tax aspects need to be addressed. The corporation she works 
for did still steer away any communication it has with SKV unless directly stipulated by 
law. “It is not only SKV that should have the goodies without listening to our concerns” 
(Interview, tax director). 
Yet, SKV’s ability can also be seen on a societal level and encompass how SKV intends to 
work with all large corporations. Working with them does not always mean cooperating but 
also taking proper action with them. Fördjupad samverkan is described as a way of 
identifying that the correct measures would be taken towards the right corporations. For 
example, the initial guidelines did state that the aim is to decrease aggressive tax planning 
among all taxpayers. In addition to the earlier stated arguments of decreased tax risks and 
tax errors, this programme would make possible an increased flow of information, 
transparency and thus trust between SKV and participating corporations. Yet, while the 
programme was introduced, SKV ran a large programme where the aim was to identify 
massive tax planning on the fringes of licit behaviour among larger corporations.17 The 
programme aimed to classify corporations based on risk evaluations, especially focusing on 
corporations active in tax planning schemes. Inspired by the UK’s HMRC’s and the 
Australian Taxation Office (ATO)’s work with classifications of risky taxpayers, Swedish 
corporations were to be divided into three different groups of taxpayers where audits and 
control measures were applied according to “riskiness”. So this classification programme 
seemed to backfire on the new cooperative programme. It was stated in its guidelines that 
corporations who were not willing to participate would possibly be categorized as riskier. 
So instead of admiring SKV’s ability to target non-compliant corporations, SKV was seen as 
targeting all corporations that were not willing to communicate as non-compliant. 
Corporations see all SKV initiatives taken together; SKV regards each initiative as separate.  
This leads us to benevolence. Benevolence can be expressed in two ways from SKV’s 
perspective: the way tax collectors regard the taxpayer (large corporations in this case) and 
how the amount of revenue is calculated. First, trust in the tax collector depends on the 
attitude it has towards taxpayers (Wittberg 2005, 6). SKV has worked long and hard to 
change the older attitude among its employees basing strategies18 on international research 
and following a trend of working together with taxpayers to ensure that information, taxes 
                                                        
17 Interview 14.1.2016. It was the so-called SPA, skatteplaneringsaktiva, project. 
18 Interview 14.1.2016. 
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and fees were to the largest extent correct as early as possible. SKV officials previously 
often described the relation with corporations as a cat and mouse game; SKV and 
corporations were seen as opponents. These older strategies did not provide tools for SKV 
officials either to develop or ameliorate the relationship with corporate taxpayers and the 
programme was therefore abandoned. The co-operative compliance programme was seen 
as a way to give the benefit of doubt and help corporations pay “the right tax”. 
Second, it is argued that SKV works proactively with the aim of collecting the correct, not 
necessarily the maximum, tax from all taxpayers and in this way increase trust (Wittberg 
2005). Successful work at the Agency in the 1980s–1990s seemed to take place under the 
slogan “the more tax collected, the merrier” and the Agency’s emphasis was not on the 
right tax, but on collecting as much as possible. In those days there were even competitions 
between Agency offices, and the official who found most errors was a hero (Stridh and 
Wittberg 2015, 34). One official, Magnus, once reduced taxes by 200 million krona for a 
taxpayer, a result that dented his performance for the rest of the year. His nickname was 
“Minus-Magnus” from then on (ibid., 34; cf. Björklund Larsen 2018, 60). The current 
emphasis that SKV officials make corporations pay the right, not the maximum, tax at the 
right time is down to SKV’s integrity. To put this concern on a societal level, a valid 
question is what role SKV will have when it acts both as an arbiter and a consultant. When 
SKV’s old role of solely being a revenue collector changes to be engaged in a cooperation 
like Fördjupad dialog with taxpayers; what will this do to the trust in SKV and to tax 
compliance in general?19 
One CFO said that he actually missed the audits; not for their own sake but as he sees it, it 
is the only way to thwart non-compliance among competitors. “Does SKV not have the 
resources [to perform audits anymore]?” he asked rhetorically. In addition, he questioned 
what all the knowledge amassed at SKV would be used for. All issues combined, he 
concluded that Fördjupad samverkan had not had anything to offer for the corporation he 
works for. Trust in SKV, described as a prerequisite for an enhanced relationship/co-
operative compliance ways of working, was just not there. 
How ability, benevolence and integrity come together can be illustrated by an editorial in 
Dagens industri that commented on a seminar on Fördjupad samverkan held by the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprises (Dagens industri 2011). The editorial argued that co-
operative compliance initiatives have to rest on a foundation of trust and that there ought 
to be more advantages than drawbacks in such cooperation (following the prerequisites for 
co-operative compliance initiatives). This seems, it was said, to be missing on both SKV’s 
                                                        
19 Explorative interview with an SKV analyst 2013. 
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and Confederation of Swedish Enterprises’—accounts in the proposed FS. Referring to the 
OECD recommendation to consider the cultural, administrative and legal environment 
when putting such initiatives to work (OECD 2010) it appeared there were a number of 
provisions applying in the Swedish context to this way of working. First, Sweden’s legal 
constitution provides the right of public access to almost all documents, a fact that differs 
from many other OECD countries that have co-operative compliance initiatives. Second, 
commercial awareness for example at the Dutch Tax Administration20 (seen as 
implementing a successful co-operative compliance programme) is greater than at SKV. It 
has to be noted that this fact could be changed if the programme was broadly implemented 
and tax officials thus learnt more about tax operations in large corporations. Finally, SKV 
needs to take an increasingly impartial role if it is to judge what ought to be subject to tax 
and what not. This impartiality seems difficult to connect with SKV’s contemporary role as 
a judge of what the “right tax” is. This points to SKV’s ability to act with integrity. 
 
7.6.2 Dimension VI: Summary 
The above analysis shows that trust is essential in building enduring co-operative 
compliance programmes and relationships between tax administration and corporation. In 
all four countries, the dominant form of trust involved appeared to be inter-organizational 
trust. Along the interaction between tax administration and corporations, trust seems to 
persist even if individuals change. 
There were also differences between the countries as to the types of trust, however. The 
interpersonal trust between the Tax Governance administrators and tax directors in 
corporations played a significant role. It should be noted that a Tax Governance 
programme had been running a longer time in Denmark at the time of the interviews than 
their counterparts in Finland and Sweden. Given that trust is something that is developed 
in interaction and cooperation, it has been possible for interpersonal trust to develop in the 
course of the co-operative compliance programme in Denmark for a longer time period 
than in Finland and Sweden.  
As the case of Sweden shows, a generally high level of measured trust towards tax 
administrations is not a guarantee to the success of the co-operative compliance approach. 
                                                        
20 The Dutch tax administration paid much attention to broadening its employees’ skills while introducing 
horizontal monitoring. The focus was on the commercial structure of businesses beyond the tax function, and 
the commercial “way of thinking” in general, but also on softer skills, such as how to interact with taxpayers in 
a friendlier, less hierarchical manner. They aimed to create a “shift in mindset” which seems to have largely 
paid off, as proposed in interviews with Dennis de Widt 2015 and 2016. 
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For example, most corporations according to surveys feel correctly treated by SKV. Yet, 
they were not willing to join the co-operative compliance programme, FS/FD. A potential 
explanation for this is that governance of the relationship between large corporations and 
SKV is structured in such a way that changes in issues that govern the relationship could 
lead to greater distrust. While corporations were satisfied with extant working methods, 
co-operative compliance was rocking the boat. It is worth noting that co-operative 
compliance can also have adverse consequences on trust in the tax system. The case of 
Sweden illustrates that co-operative compliance was not viewed as primarily targeting the 
non-compliant corporations, which taxpayers might expect, leading representatives of 
corporations to conclude that traditional tax audits may, after all, be the only way to thwart 
non-compliance among competitors. 
Trust can be also lost. In Norway, the cooperative working methods with the large 
corporate taxpayers are more encompassing than in the remaining three countries. A 
certain way for a corporation to lose trust in the tax administration was if their tax returns 
did not to reveal which position(s) they were in doubt about.  
The four country cases were analysed under the following elements that are important for 
the trustor to continue to assume that the trustee is reliable and trustworthy: ability, 
benevolence and integrity. Ability was a crucial element for trust: For trust to develop and 
persist, corporations need be able to trust that the guidance that is given to them is of high 
quality and aims at paying “the right tax” rather than the maximum tax. Furthermore, 
predictability appeared to be a key element in developing and maintaining trust. Equally, 
for trust to prevail in tax administrations requires evidence of the willingness and ability to 
comply, which accumulated before entering into and along with the co-operative 
compliance relationship. 
 
7.6.3 Dimension VI: Recommendations 
• Consider the type of trust that dominates and develop relationships between tax 
administrations and other stakeholders in the tax arena. 
• Consider the more specific elements in co-operative compliance that have 
implications on trust. What are the effects of different measures taken on the 
(perceived) ability, benevolence and integrity between the actors? 
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7.7 Dimension VII: equitability and fair competition 
Equitability in taxation is about procedural justice and procedural justice has implications 
on many facets of corporate lives, including perceived fairness of taxation and fair 
competition between corporations. How co-operative compliance programmes might 
influence equitable treatment of corporations and thus fair competition between them is 
discussed in this dimension. 
Procedural justice is the idea that “authorities can be trusted not to abuse their power” 
(Gobena and van Dijke 2016, 26). According to Gobena and van Dijke (2016, 25), 
procedural justice, “fair play”, is a combination of three factors. The first factor pertains to 
the administering of the procedures: are they administered uniformly regardless of when 
they are applied and regardless of the clientele? The second one concerns the meticulous 
application of the procedures and whether or not the authority seeks its own advantage 
when applying them. The third factor is about the clients having the possibility to be heard 
in the process (Gobena and van Dijke, 2016, 25). Procedural justice and the resulting 
perceived fairness in taxation are important, as fairness is a factor in economic behaviour. 
Although empirical research pertaining to procedural justice and corporate tax compliance 
is limited, research on procedural justice in the individual tax compliance setting shows 
that fairness is an important factor in tax compliance (van der Hel et al. 2015, 764–765). 
The legal environment surrounding an organization, a corporation, can be seen for 
example as a “facilitative environment, in which law passively provides an arena for 
organizational action” (Edelman and Suchman 1997, 479). When providing this arena for 
businesses to operate in, the tax administration’s task is to maintain an even playing field 
for all the players in a given arena, where competition between companies is one facet of 
these organizational actions. If some corporations can cooperate with tax administrations 
in ways that are seen to influence their organizational actions on the market, and other 
corporations cannot, it is inherent in co-operative compliance programmes that market 
competition can be an issue. For corporations this also means that the issue of fair 
competition is at stake. If some corporations receive favourable treatment from the tax 
administration, this might have implications for corporate activities outside the tax arena. 
If not all corporations are subject to equitable treatment corporations that do not 
participate in co-operative compliance programmes might be impeded in competing on the 
same terms in the market.  
Studies show that if people experience situations where, according to their own moral 
standards, they are treated in an unfair manner, they adjust their own behaviour 
accordingly, i.e. by seeking retribution and by becoming less compliant (Cornelissen et al. 
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2013, 1). The experienced unfairness not only increases non-compliant behaviour in the 
context in question, but the perception of unfairness can result in impacts on other fields 
of society, labelled “fairness spillover” by Cornelissen et al. (2011, 1). Fairness spillover 
potentially results in less compliant behaviour in other contexts creating economic costs to 
society as a whole. As an example of the behaviour described, in their study Cornelissen et 
al. show a link between experienced injustice in taxation and work morale (2013, 20). Due 
to the existence of fairness spillover, the perceived fairness of taxation is not only 
important to tax compliance itself but to compliance in society in general. Since one of the 
goals in co-operative compliance is to increase tax compliance, the notion of perceived 
fairness and experienced fairness, not only among participants in co-operative compliance 
programmes, but also in the eyes of non-participants, should be paid attention.  
The effects of procedural justice on tax compliance are twofold. First, procedural justice 
has effects on experienced fairness, which in turn has implications for compliance (Gobena 
and van Dijke, 2016, 26). Second, procedural justice has a positive effect on trust in the 
authority itself (ibid., 26) and trust, in turn, is a factor in compliant behaviour (ibid., 31). 
Before proceeding to national cases, we state three caveats to what we include (or 
understand) with our focus on procedural justice and “fair competition”. First, it is 
important to underline that at an outset we do not consider tax competition between 
countries here. These latter are national policy issues that are beyond the responsibility of 
tax administrations and therefore not directly relevant for our study. We mean fair 
competition as one of the principal tenets for corporations to act on markets. There is a 
large scholarship on this issue; our point is to underscore that initiatives like co-operative 
compliance can have implications beyond specific tax laws. Yet, it has been questioned 
whether these programmes, available only to certain corporate taxpayers, make for unfair 
competition in view of EU state aid rules. Under certain circumstances participating 
corporations could receive advantageous tax treatment (Szudoczky and Majdanska 2017). 
Second, this dimension could be regarded as a part of structural hindrances. Equitability 
does after all mean equal treatment before the law. However, the issue of fair competition 
stands out as it has implications that go to the core of corporate activities when competing 
with other actors on markets. As for the third caveat, procedural justice is covered only in 
the context of how companies are treated depending on whether they are in a cooperative 
relationship or outside it. No other contexts of procedural justice, e.g. whether procedures 
are applied consistently over time regarding a single corporation, are covered.  
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7.7.1 Dimension VII: Comparison by drawing on practices/experiences   
Denmark: In the Danish case, the element of questioned equitability and unfair 
competition is not at first sight a dominant theme. On the contrary, there is a positive focus 
internally in Skat on the issue of equal treatment of corporations in the programme and 
those not in the programme. This equal treatment is mostly talked about in the manner 
that both kinds of corporations are equal to the same law; no exceptions or special rules 
exist for corporations in Tax Governance. This is explained by one of the interviewed tax 
officials in Skat who says:  
I do not think so [that we treat corporations differently if they are a Tax Governance member 
or not]. […] Because it has the same legal effect [retsvirkning] [if Skat goes out and finds a 
mistake in traditional control and if the corporation come to Skat does have a dialogue about 
something], no doubt about that, it is just a question whether you discover it versus a 
corporation who inquires themselves. (Interview, tax official) 
Hence, from this we infer that Skat keeps a close eye on not privileging or making 
favourable treatments of Tax Governance corporations.  
That said, equal treatment in the specific approach from Skat towards corporations in their 
daily interactions is an element that raises concerns of potential favourable treatment of 
certain corporations. In the Danish Tax Governance programme a Tax Governance 
manager is the main contact and direct access to Skat for corporations participating in Tax 
Governance. Therefore the specific approach and engagement of the Tax Governance 
manager is highly formative of the relation and interactions taking place in the 
collaboration. The challenge that a Tax Governance manager with a certain proactive or 
very dedicated approach to the corporations he/she is responsible for may form the basis 
for a kind of unfair competition due to a potentially uneven treatment or engagement 
(from both corporations and tax officials) due to the non-detailed specifications of the 
steps and progress of a tax governance collaboration (an element that has recently been 
addressed in the reformed Tax Governance programme). With regards to this challenge, a 
tax official explains: “We are trying to make some guidelines, retningslinjer, and some 
instructions, vejledninger, because everyone here should preferably have the same 
approach. And they should also have some help as to how they call for that, how to 
approach things” (Interview, tax official). Moreover the tax official points to their role with 
regards to the corporations:  
We might be able to give some input and suggestions as to how they get internal controls 
established in specific areas. But it is still only guidance, and we do not make them [the 
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internal controls], they do. It is their job, we do not offer consultancy [rådgivning], we are not 
allowed to. (Interview, tax official)  
Here the interviewee points to a central element of the Danish case—the strong discursive 
distinction between consultancy and guidance. This distinction is important in the way tax 
officials describe their new role in relation to corporations. It can be argued that some of 
the importance of this might relate to overstepping the demarcation between consultancy 
and guidance being potentially a step towards unfair competition. The seemingly mundane 
everyday interactions where Tax Governance managers interact and engage with 
corporations are important since they are a potential source of unfair competition—yet still 
keeping in mind that there is a huge step between what we may call an uneven engagement 
and actual unfair competition on a more regular/structural basis. That this is—in 
practice—not such a big problem, is perhaps best illustrated by the tax directors’ views on 
this. Asked whether they find any issues of unfair competition or other related challenges 
in relation to Tax Governance they are close to uniform in their answers: they do not find 
the issue of equitability and fair competition to be a problem in Tax Governance. And we 
may most likely trust that if there were any challenges in this regard, the corporations 
would probably be the first ones to notice and raise their voice. This we have not seen signs 
of. 
Finland: Public discussion on the procedural justice of taxation, on equitability, in the 
context of Syvennetty, i.e. does Syvennetty place companies in unequal positions, has been 
scarce. The topic was brought up, however, by the interviewees for the present study.  
As stated in the Finnish Law on tax administration (Laki Verohallinnosta), VERO has to 
promote correct and uniform taxation, which translates into treating all companies 
equally. VERO actively promotes this view as, for example, a goal in VERO strategy is to 
become “one of the best in the world in terms of reputation and results”, and VERO sees 
the expected prestige deriving from both operating in a trustworthy, uniform manner and 
from possessing personnel with expertise (https://www.vero.fi/tietoa-
verohallinnosta/verohallinnon_esittely/verohallinnon_strategia_2013201/).  
The question of consistent application of procedures across the corporate clientele of 
VERO came up in the interviews. VERO’s corporate clients can be divided into two groups: 
the larger companies whose taxation is handled in KOVE and the smaller companies who 
are customers of the regional offices of the Corporate Taxation Unit. The question of fair 
treatment between the larger companies (the KOVE customers with the potential access to 
Syvennetty) and the smaller companies (without the access to Syvennetty) was brought 
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up: do the larger companies get something more, something that is out of the reach of 
smaller companies?  
When discussing the question of equal treatment regarding the potential juxtaposition of 
larger companies vs smaller companies, the informants did not find the approach chosen 
by VERO, with Syvennetty only being available to the customers of KOVE, problematic or 
presenting concerns regulation-wise. Choosing the larger companies, the clients of KOVE, 
as a target group for Syvennetty was deemed a well-founded solution, as it was seen that 
the new ways to operate were easier to test and develop with larger companies with tax 
departments and personnel focusing on tax issues. One tax advisor interviewed saw the 
larger companies in Syvennetty receiving special treatment, but that the tax 
administration also requires more of those companies. The tax advisor also added that it is 
debatable if, at the end of the day, these companies are provided with different or better 
tax treatment by VERO as every corporation has the possibility of acquiring similar 
certainty regarding its taxation as the companies in Syvennetty, the process is just 
different. Preliminary rulings, available for all corporate taxpayers, were named as one way 
a corporation can seek to improve certainty over tax issues. A tax advisor explains: 
They [corporations in Syvennetty] do … get a different kind of treatment. And especially if it 
[Syvennetty] works well, they do get a different kind of treatment … but on the other hand, a 
lot more is also demanded of them. But do they get, regarding the process, I believe that they 
are treated differently and they may get some kind of certainty on issues, something that 
other companies don´t get, but do they, at the end of the day, get a different kind of and 
better tax treatment, that I don’t necessarily believe in, when a corporation … each 
corporation has a possibility to get similar certainty … It is just a different kind of a process  
(Interview, tax advisor) 
Focusing on the larger companies was also seen as a question about resources and tax 
revenue. The larger companies generate an extensive portion of the tax revenue, and 
therefore, to enhance the effectiveness and efficient use of the limited resources of tax 
administration, the decision to concentrate on larger companies was not disputed. As an 
academic said “Of course, the largest revenue is there [in the larger companies], that is 
obvious. It is about economy, too”. (Interview, academic) 
The question about the equitability among the clients of KOVE was also raised. Are the 
clients divided into two categories: those in Syvennetty and those outside Syvennetty? 
Among the informants, trust in KOVE was high, as companies believed, like most 
interviewees, in KOVE treating all larger companies equally, and did not see the 
collaborative approach bringing special benefits. The informants relied that the same rules, 
as per the law, are applied in all cases and the laws bind all the parties involved. Although 
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trust in KOVE, (as discussed in section 7.6), may have experienced some blows in the past 
few years—as certain interviewees suggested—the fairness of the process, vis-à-vis from 
one corporation to another, was not questioned.  
Some interviewees from KOVE were more critical of their own organization and of their 
own procedures. The prevailing opinion was that, in accordance with current legislation 
and reflecting the VERO strategy, equal treatment of all companies was a goal, and that the 
same legislation and rulings were applied to all companies, regardless of involvement in 
Syvennetty. While concurring with this statement, some interviewees maintained that 
companies did actually benefit from being in Syvennetty. Based on the findings of this 
current study, benefits might come, for example, from real-time taxation and prompt 
replies to inquiries.  
… the exact same regulation and laws and everything apply to all customers in Syvennetty 
and outside Syvennetty, but for sure, of course, to some extent maybe more service is 
provided or such to a taxpayer in Enhanced Customer Cooperation, but I do not know if it can 
be interpreted as a deviation from equality, but as such all the regulation is the same and this 
[Syvennetty] is voluntary. (Interview, tax official) 
Cooperative relationships have been presented in different jurisdictions in order to shift 
the emphasis from the traditional ways of promoting compliance, i.e. deterrence in the 
form of e.g. tax audits, and to introduce new ways emphasizing cooperation and trust. 
OECD presented co-operative compliance (earlier “enhanced relationships”) as a means of 
influencing the “demand side” of aggressive tax planning schemes (OECD 2013, 15). 
Despite this underlying purpose and distinction between the traditional approach and 
cooperative regimes, Syvennetty was in some discussions argued to fall within justifiable 
discretion of the tax administration. If we draw an analogy to tax supervision, the tax 
administration has the authority to use different forms of tax supervision at their own 
discretion in different cases, prioritizing and selecting where and how to use their 
resources. Some companies and some interviewees from the tax administration shared this 
opinion and emphasized that different regimes of tax supervision target different taxpayer 
groups. Thus, Syvennetty was not perceived to violate the fairness or equal treatment of 
taxpayers. A tax director explained: 
… but it has been an old strategy of the tax administration that using a particular sampling to 
choose the customers demanding a more thorough review and then those demanding less 
review, and that is just reasonable allocation of resources and I think that the corporate world 
understands it very well that this is how prioritization is done in every place, and selection. 
(Interview, tax director) 
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The other factor of procedural justice, the accurate application of procedures and without 
authorities seeking to benefit from the situation, received only a few comments in the 
interviews. Fulfilling the requirement of accuracy demands adequate expertise and know-
how from the VERO personnel. One of the companies interviewed questioned whether it 
ever would be possible for the tax administration to treat all corporate clients in a similar 
manner and all personnel to possess the same level of knowhow:  
Maybe we will never truly get to the situation, where the tax administration would have the 
possibility to treat all companies in a similar way and that everybody working in the tax 
administration would have the same know-how. (Interview, tax director) 
Without the required level of know-how or with varying levels of know-how among 
personnel, the fairness of the process may be compromised. In Syvennetty, companies all 
have teams with assigned personnel to handle their taxation. In the interviews, this 
possibility of concentrating on particular customers was seen as a factor in improving the 
expertise and know-how of the personnel. If companies in Syvennetty have more 
experienced personnel working with them than other companies, will this impair the 
relative procedural justice for those outside of Syvennetty? Relating to the question of 
know-how was the question of the quality and quantity of information on which taxation 
decisions are based. Syvennetty was seen to level the playing field between VERO and the 
companies, when all the parties involved have to make their decisions at the same time, 
based on the same set of information available to them.  
… what I find very positive here, is that now we are on the same line, that both [a corporation 
and tax administration] have to base their decisions on the same set of facts at the same time 
and not so that the other one comes five years later and says that you should have taken this 
issue and that issue into account; they cannot do this anymore afterwards, which means they 
have to adjust to the rhythm of the business; here we cannot wait for a year or two. 
(Interview, tax director) 
Thus, both VERO strategy targeting the employment of personnel with expertise and 
Syvennetty with its target in real-time decision making contribute to procedural justice, 
perceived and experienced fairness, and result, at least theoretically, in increased 
compliance.  
The third factor in procedural justice, the possibility for clients to be heard, was covered 
implicitly and explicitly in the comments. The subject was touched on implicitly with 
comments on the special benefits the companies in Syvennetty receive, and explicitly with 
comments on the possibility of having direct contact and real-time access to the tax 
administration, and with the comments on the written vs oral procedures. Only comments 
on the special benefits were in the context of fairness, the other comments were more 
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general and not seen as indications of unequal treatment of companies, rather as benefits 
of the approach. As all the companies in the Syvennetty are appointed a team to handle 
their taxation, and as the approach includes a promise of working in real time and 
promptly, this all improves the corporations’ possibility of being heard. Traditionally, the 
processes in taxation rely heavily on written procedures and the transition to oral 
procedures benefits those involved in the cooperation. As mentioned earlier, these aspects 
were not brought up in the interviews as examples of unequal treatment, but may serve 
here as examples of improved procedural justice, for the corporations involved, through 
the approach.  
Analogous to the idea of “fairness spillover”, perceived fairness and lack of trust were 
deemed to have spillover effects, albeit effects other than those in the form of deviations in 
compliance. The opinion of a business interest organization interviewee was that lack of 
trust in the tax administration would result in general distrust in authorities. This distrust 
may discourage people from becoming entrepreneurs or establishing companies, or it may 
prevent international companies from locating to Finland, it was argued. 
To summarize the findings, it can be said that the issue of procedural justice (vis-à-vis 
those in Syvennetty and those outside) did not come up very strongly in the interviews. As 
a caveat, it must be noted that the interviews did not extensively cover companies outside 
Syvennetty. The prevailing opinion among the informants was that concern over 
companies being treated differently was not and will not become relevant.  
Norway: Different industries have different tax regimes, therefore the treatment of all 
corporations cannot be judged on precisely equal terms. Corporations followed their 
competitors closely, but were not interested in just any other corporation. What they were 
concerned with was that the tax administration ensured a level playing field. Giving 
preferential treatment to one corporation was likened to giving it state subsidies, which is 
both against international treaties and against the principle of fair competition. The tax 
administration thought that the corporations’ acknowledgement of the need to ensure fair 
competition was an important reason why they complied.  
Court cases were a source of detailed information about tax dispositions. They were 
therefore the subject of many discussions and interpretations of the law among tax 
advisors and managers as they set the standard for what was legal and what was not. 
Another important source was “the yellow book”. This is a volume on tax rulings published 
irregularly by LTO (Carlsen 2012), which provided input to discussions about, among other 
things, fairness. In addition to these two sources were scientific articles by prominent tax 
law professors. Taken together these sources provided a commons, a discursive space 
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which each party could draw on to find out where the line between fair and unfair 
competition is drawn. Various tax fora and seminars were public arenas where suspicions 
of unreasonable treatment or unfair competition would be deliberated informally. 
Misunderstandings could be cleared up and consensus allowed to develop in the 
community of taxpayers. These discussions would then be summed up in the form of policy 
concerns. When it comes to tax administration specifically, each case was a matter between 
the corporation and the tax administration, and yet another reason why it was so crucial 
for the tax administration to be seen as not taking sides.  
Sweden: one small corporation brought SKV to court arguing that participants in the co-
operative compliance programme had more advantageous decisions regarding VAT levels. 
The results were that the former had lost customers. Corporations cannot compete on 
equal terms if they are subject to different legal treatment. Not only the issue of fair 
competition was at stake; the resulting court decision brought out the issue of unequal 
treatment of taxpayers. In fact, it was even argued that co-operative compliance created a 
VIP lane, gräddfil, for participating taxpayers. Such treatment is not consistent with 
Swedish administrative law or practice. The programme thus provided another case for 
criticism of favouring larger corporations in Swedish society. SKV’s response was that 
different taxpayers have to be met in different ways and co-operative compliance would 
just continue the long tradition which had developed. It has for example a long history of 
providing different types of information material for various categories of taxpayers (in 
different languages, written in easily accessible language, etc.) and arranging information 
meetings for various types of taxpayers, e.g. SMEs and the self-employed. It is an 
adaptation of research and SKV’s recognition that taxpayers are different and therefore 
have various needs.  
 
7.7.2 Dimension VII: Summary 
The dimension of fair competition varied substantially between countries. In Norway it 
was not an issue at all. The tax law is structured according to industrial sectors which 
means that corporations at the outset are used to the fact that different industries might be 
subject to different treatment. The treatment of all corporations can never be judged on 
precisely equal terms.  
In Denmark the issue was up for discussion as potential favourable treatment. The 
discussion was pronounced in terms of consultancy vs guidance. The first type of activity in 
not allowed for Skat’s tax officials, whereas the latter is. The contemporary standing is that 
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it currently does not raise a problem; should a corporation be subject to it they would 
quickly raise their voice. In the context of the Finnish Syvennetty has discussions about 
unequable treatment been scarce. Yet, there are important issues to be learnt from the 
Finnish discussion about equitable treatment. First of all, it was argued that it would be 
easier to develop this way of working with larger corporations as they have both the 
knowledge and the staff that smaller corporations might lack. Second, there is the 
reciprocal argument both in terms of taxes paid and of information required. Larger 
corporations pay a substantially larger amount of tax and while some corporations might 
receive better treatment, VERO also requires more of them. Some deviating opinions 
existed among the KOVE interviewees, but the prevailing opinion among informants was 
that concerns about unequitable treatment of companies was not and would not become 
relevant. 
In Sweden, the discussion of unequitable treatment was one of FS/FDs major obstacles. 
The very idea of a VIP lane for certain “customers” at a public bureaucracy did not go down 
well in Swedish society. 
Equitable treatment of taxpayers according to the law and to societal values is a 
fundamental issue in constitutional jurisdictions like the Nordic countries. The dimension 
of equal treatment is one where the diversity of our Nordic cases is most distinctly 
pronounced. 
  
7.7.3 Dimension VII: Recommendations 
• Ensure that legal equitability and procedural justice prevails for all corporate 
taxpayers. 
• Attention needs to be paid to how co-operative compliance programmes affect 
taxpayer activity outside the tax arena; how they get their income. Does the 
programme change the rules of competition for participants in programmes vis-à-vis 
non-participants? 
• The issue of reciprocity might be one attenuating circumstance. Certain taxpayers 
might have certain responsibilities and therefore it can be argued that they should 
also receive certain—different/better—treatment. 
 
 
FairTax WP-Series No.20 
Nordic experiences of co-operative compliance programmes: Comparisons and Recommendations 
 
120 
8 Conclusion 
Before summing up, a brief recapitulation of the background for the conclusions is 
provided as a reminder of what they are based on. 
This working paper has documented findings from implementations of OECD inspired co-
operative compliance frameworks in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway in the years 
2009 and to the present. The empirical material is based on interviews, document analyses 
and observations by a group of researchers in each country. Making use of a case taxonomy 
developed by Flyvbjerg (2006), these four countries are identified as representing three 
different case types. Denmark and Finland are paradigmatic cases, Norway is a multiple 
variation case and Sweden is an extreme case. In this classification schema, Denmark and 
Finland represent cases that “shine” and when initiatives work out as, more or less, 
intended in relation to the aims stated in the OECD framework and more explicitly 
according to national guidelines. What can be learnt from how these two countries have 
approached co-operative compliance? Are there good practices that can be borrowed by 
other tax administrations that aim to implement similar initiatives? (Here, we must add 
the caveat that even the best of practices cannot be moved full scale from one context to 
another. However, as the national contexts are relatively similar, it makes it possible to 
compare similar elements). In spite of their very different experience, can the Norwegian 
and Swedish cases also serve as exemplary cases, but more in the sense of providing 
“counterfactual evidence” to those provided by the two paradigmatic cases. What was done 
differently in Norway and Sweden? What role did the outsets have which made for such 
different outcomes? Can these differences account for the variation in outcomes? 
In order to find out, we investigated how these four countries fare when their co-operative 
compliance initiatives are compared in light of the same conceptual dimensions. Our aim 
was to compare beyond the choice of the various “models of co-operative compliance”, 
across national tax laws, policies and guidelines, number of participants or size of 
participating corporations, year of introduction and similar factual dimensions. We have 
taken inspiration from anthropological studies: we account for the views of a broad range 
of stakeholders, we are interested in the programmes’ outcome in practice, and we see 
taxation as creating relations (cf. Steinmo 2018).  
This means including the literature that our informants are inspired by. An important asset 
in our work is existing academic and policy inspired literature on co-operative compliance, 
but we have mostly relied on our national studies and the empirical data these have 
provided. Thus we have “translated” our informants’ views and experiences of working and 
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dealing with co-operative compliance frameworks and programmes. An important facet in 
this work is the validation of our results from interactive discussions in workshops and 
seminars with our informants. It has been a key concern not to limit the research by the 
established categories of the legal and economic professions, but to open for other 
interpretations.  
The seven dimensions we propose are  
1. cultural orientation 
2. efficiency evaluation 
3. competencies in tax administration 
4. structural and organizational hindrances 
5. resistance 
6. trust 
7. equitability and fair competition 
These dimensions are not mutually exclusive, but are defined in such a way that there are 
possible overlaps between them. We regard this as a strength of the analytical approach 
because it allows the analysis to capture more nuances and diversity in the material than 
would a less generous and more limited taxonomy. In the course of the analyses, paradoxes 
and contradictions have turned up that mirror those that are experienced as part of the 
actual practice of cooperation about tax compliance. They would more likely than not have 
been invisible if there had been no “cracks” between the dimensions where the light of 
understanding could come in.  
The seven dimensions we propose are not ordered in hierarchical importance. Yet some of 
the dimensions show substantial differences between the countries, whereas other 
dimensions display more similar insights. Our findings are preliminary and we welcome 
more research to refine the dimensions, and to “thicken” the ethnographic descriptions 
with more contextual empirical material.  
We would like to end this working paper with three concluding remarks. The first is that a 
number of cultural, institutional and societal factors influence compliance practices. As 
mentioned above, a major trend within tax administration has been to shift from a roughly 
one size fits all approach—where close to all taxpayers experienced a deterrence 
approach—to a responsive approach where various segments of taxpayers receive 
treatment according to their motivational postures on compliance. That has been a 
foundational principle of the OECD co-operative compliance guidelines. Hence, the 
measures are founded on the idea that the will of the individual is the decisive factor for tax 
compliance. In this working paper, the comparison between actual co-operative 
FairTax WP-Series No.20 
Nordic experiences of co-operative compliance programmes: Comparisons and Recommendations 
 
122 
compliance practices in the four Nordic countries provides evidence that a number of 
cultural, institutional and societal factors also influence compliance practices. Therefore, 
tax compliance does not only depend on the will of taxpayers. It is as much shaped in the 
course of the actual interaction between the taxpayer and the tax administration as well as 
by contextual factors. A contribution from the present working paper is the finding that 
when other factors are taken into consideration, as they frequently are in actual practice, 
other venues for cooperation and responsiveness open up. The aim of a more responsive 
tax administration becomes more attainable than when the only course of action is to 
influence the taxpayers’ will.  
The second remark is that other key principles of the OECD guidelines, namely voluntary 
disclosure and real-time responses are too narrow, and perhaps too idealistic, to be feasible 
guidelines for all circumstances when compliance is mitigated. The OECD also defines co-
operative compliance as a regulatory approach building on the idea that—on the one side—
participating corporations disclose relevant information including their tax risks and are 
transparent to the tax administrations. And—on the other side—tax administrations are in 
return to provide real-time predictability and clarity concerning taxation issues of 
relevance for the corporation (OECD 2016, 7). In the paper, we show that real-time 
responses are neither welcome nor possible under all circumstances. It is actually more 
crucial to be explicit about a change in time frame than to have all interaction in real time. 
The last remark is about the possibility of obtaining reliable measurements and evaluations 
of effects. A key ambition for the co-operative compliance measures has been to increase 
efficiency and effective use of resources for tax administration and there are many 
stakeholders that demand “proof” for efficient usage of resources, not least the taxpayers 
themselves. For several reasons there is a need to increase efficiency and document it. It is 
necessary for coping with the increasing complexity of the tax systems, partly due to the 
huge increase in cross-border transactions. It is needed as tax bases are broadened. It is 
simply not feasible to control all tax returns in detail every year. It is needed to determine 
the amount of public money (and time) spent on tax administration. For many years 
therefore there have been ongoing searches for methods to innovate the control functions 
of tax administration. New risk management methods are part of this effort and have been 
implemented as part of co-operative compliance measures. The problem is that tax returns 
are complex reports that yield information about a number of other issues than merely tax 
revenue. A conclusion from our project confirms findings from an earlier OECD study that 
there has so far not been one single objective method identified for assessing effectiveness 
and efficiency (OECD 2001). In actual practice, such evaluations of costs and effects need 
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to combine subjective and objective criteria, statistical analysis, logical argument, common 
sense, human skills and judgement. 
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Appendix 1. Abbreviations and national concepts 
 
Concept In English Country Explanation 
egenkontroltilgangen self-checking approach DK  
Fördjupad dialog  enhanced dialogue SE  
Fördjupad samverkan  enhanced collaboration SE  
hensigtserklæring declaration of intent DK  
Högsta 
förvaltningsdomstolen 
Supreme Administrative 
Court 
SE  
KOVE Department at VERO 
handling larger companies 
FI  
Laki Verohallinnosta Finnish Law on tax 
administration 
FI  
LTO The Central Tax Office for 
Large Enterprises  
NO  
offentlighetsprincipen  SE  
LTO Central Tax Office for Large 
Enterprises 
NO  
Skat  DK  
Skatteetaten Tax Norway NO  
skattekontroltilgangen tax control approach DK  
SKD, Skattedirektoratet The Tax Directorate NO  
SKV, Skatteverket The Swedish Tax Agency SE  
Syvennetty 
Asiakasyhteistyö 
Enhanced Customer 
Cooperation—ECC 
FI  
tax	control	framework  all Corporation’s internal control mechanisms 
and systems regarding tax issues 
tax director  all Director, manager or person with similar 
position, responsible for tax issues at a 
corporation. Can be a CFO, etc. 
Tax Governance  DK  
Tax Governance manager  DK The contact person for corporations at the 
Danish Skat 
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tax official  all Employee at tax administrations 
VERO The Finnish tax 
administration 
FI  
Vova Tax Recipients’ Legal 
Services Unit 
FI  
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Appendix 2. Structural differences between CC-
programmes in Nordic countries 
Structural difference Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
Voluntary Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Formal agreement Yes Yes No No 
Pilot Yes Yes Yes No 
Explicit programme Yes Yes No No  
Single point of contact Yes Yes Yes No 
Binding advance rulings Yes Yes No No 
Changes in laws and 
regulations 
No No No No 
Inclusion of all corporate 
taxpayer segments 
No Yes No No 
 
 
  
FairTax WP-Series No.20 
Nordic experiences of co-operative compliance programmes: Comparisons and Recommendations 
 
135 
Appendix 3. Key similarities and differences in national 
contexts 
 
   Country 
 
Dimension 
Denmark  Finland  Norway  Sweden 
1a Cultural orientation 
—time  
Reorientations and inversions of time horizons in all the  
Nordic countries 
1b Cultural 
orientation—space 
Balance 
private–public  
Balance 
private–public  
Assessments to 
be private 
Assessments to be 
public 
1c Cultural 
orientation—
organization 
Hierarchical Mutual Hierarchical Contractual 
2 Efficiency 
evaluations  
Judged, not objectively measured 
3  Competences in tax 
administrations 
Both person-oriented/service and technical skills required 
 
4 Structural and 
organizational 
hindrances  
Both  
5 Resistance  Loyalty Loyalty Voice, Loyalty Voice, Exit 
6 Institutional trust Dominant in all countries 
6 Interpersonal trust Yes Yes No No 
7  Equitability and fair 
competition 
Moral sentiment is that tax administrations should ensure a level playing 
field 
